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In many complex systems, such as nuclear power plants, etc., human decision 
makers are required to make critical decisions in a time-pressured environment. 
Typically, most of these applications are dynamic and uncertain and require humans 
making supervisory control decisions through monitoring, re-planning, troubleshooting, 
and control. Due to the critical nature of decision making, human operators are 
responsible for the safe and efficient operation of these applications. Delays and failures 
in making decisions, in these applications, are often expensive in terms of money, system 
performance, and may even cost human lives. In a system where human supervisors 
control computerized processes, the human must work seamlessly with the computerized 
system in achieving overall system objectives. Research on human-centered automation 
in aviation, satellite ground control, and nuclear power plant control has resulted in broad 
guidelines on system design involving human and computerized processes in supervisory 
control. However, problems remain, such as increased human error, lack of situational 
awareness, and opacity from poorly automated systems, particularly in scenarios where 
human operators must make decisions in time-pressured planning. 
A key aspect of overcoming these problems is to effectively couple human 
decision makers with the computerized systems through user interface design. Context-
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free research, i.e., research on 'best' menu structure or set of colors for display screens, is 
not typically useful in enhancing operator or system performance in which operators are 
well motivated. Research on interface design for complex systems for example, 
demonstrates that semantic issues such as display content, level of abstraction, visual 
momentum across windows, etc., quickly dominate the effects of the primarily syntactic 
aspects of the human-computer interface, e.g., color, selection style, etc. 
While there are broad guidelines for display or user interface design, creating 
effective human-computer interfaces for complex, dynamic systems control is 
challenging.  Ad hoc approaches which consider the human as an afterthought are 
limiting. This research proposes a systematic approach to human / computer interface 
design that focuses on both the semantic and syntactic aspects of display design in the 
context of human-in-the-loop supervisory control of intelligent, autonomous multi-agent 
simulated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A systematic way to understand what needs 
to be displayed, how it should be displayed, and how the integrated system needs to be 
assessed is outlined through a combination of concepts from naturalistic decision making, 
semiotic analysis, and situational awareness literature. A new sprocket-based design was 
designed and evaluated in this research.  
For the practical designer, this research developed a systematic, iterative design 
process:  design using cognitive sensitive principles, test the new interface in a laboratory 
situation; bring in subject matter experts to examine the interface in isolation; and finally, 
incorporate the resulting feedback into a full-size simulation.  At each one of these steps, 
the operator, the engineer and the designer reexamined the results.  The goal is to present 
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to the operator a more complete feel for the complex system, and one that can evolve 
with the operator’s experience.  Individual user interface components were empirically 
examined before acceptance into the integrated global design. 
Two laboratory-based controlled experiments were designed and executed:  a 
static decision-aiding display showing relative merits for alternate mission routes and a 
dynamic system monitoring display showing each UAVs health status.  Following the 
success of the first two experiments, the results were presented to domain subject matter 
experts, at which time further refinements were suggested.  Finally, this was followed up 
by a hands-on demonstration of the displays embedded within a simulator testbed.  
This research provided useful insights into human decision making in complex 
systems.  It examined multiple user interfaces:  tabular text-based, graphical bar charts, 
analog gauges and Visual Thinking widgets.  Results are promising.  The Visual 
Thinking Sprocket display was significantly better as a decision aid and as a system 
monitoring display.  Responses were faster and more accurate using the Visual Thinking 
Sprocket.  This research presents a practical framework that can be systematically applied 
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Although many attempts have been made to create a practical framework for the 
design of user interfaces, there has not been a definitive, easy to follow set of steps in 
design.  Rather, the designer is told to understand the key concepts and then figure out 
how to translate that into a display. 
Designing effective human-system interaction is critical when there are increases 
in automation and computerization in complex systems.  The user is separated from the 
entity and can feel disassociated from the fate of the automated system.  The increased 
automation can lead to a loss of situational awareness, because the operator may not feel 
entirely immersed. 
Purely technology-centered approaches that consider the human as an 
afterthought may lead to user/system mismatches resulting in lack of acceptance, or 
worse – fatalities.  There is an abundance of examples for this, such as the Three Mile 
Island meltdown attributed to pertinent information being buried down 8 menu levels; 
NASA landing system requirements calculated in meters while all other systems were in 
foot-pound measurements; and the engineering designs that never caught on because they 
were built for the engineer rather than the user, such as Reverse Polish Notation 
calculators.  Clearly, design impacts usage.  Technological advances must be integrated 
with human capabilities in the context of the application.  This is one of the major tenets 
of Klein’s (1993) Naturalistic Decision Making.   
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Our research framework is discussed in-depth in Chapter 4 and follows the 
McNeese, Bautsch et al. (1999) recommended research framework.  It is an iterative 
approach that allows for an analysis of a wide range of complex systems research to 
proceed in a reasonably straightforward way. 
This research’s goal is to create a framework for display designers to 
systematically create cognitively sensitive displays – defined as a system in which the 
human operator can recognize a solution pattern without tremendous mental gymnastics, 
i.e., a high mental workload.  Furthermore, this research presents one possible set of tools 
and a recommended ordering for applying those tools.  The design toolkit includes 
Naturalistic Decision Making, Semiotic Analysis, Operator Function Model and Situation 
Awareness tools.  With this toolkit, the designer should be able to consistently create 
displays of high quality and usefulness. 
 
Figure 1.1 Iterative process to designing a display 
WHAT  
information 











The process for designing a display should be a simple iterative process that asks 
“What information needs to be presented?”; How should that information be present to 
the user?”; and “How does one evaluate the goodness of the design?” (Figure 1.3).  Each 
time through the iteration allows a more complete tuning of the display into the final 
desired product.  Chapter 2 will expand the discussion of this iterative process and where 
the tools in the toolkit can be applied.  The toolkit has the flexibility of modular tools that 
can be changed to fit the problem and designer’s knowledge.  For example, if the 
designer is more comfortable with another methodology for eliciting information form 
stakeholders, then he can substitute that tool for the NDM toolkit. 
1.1 Research Model 
To perform any research in the Human Computer Interface (HCI) domain, the 
researcher must ask three very important questions.  The first two questions are about the 
“what” and “how” of the information to present when designing the visual user interface, 
while the third question is interested in deciding the effectiveness or “goodness” of the 
HCI design.  Another way of looking at the display design is the semantics (meaning) and 
syntax (form) of the message being sent by the UAVs to the operator/supervisor.  We 
first elicit the appropriate or desired information for this domain (semantics) by 
interviewing subject matter experts in the field of UAV command and control; and then 
present it in a clear, concise way (syntax) through Visual Thinking design principles. 
So the theoretical building blocks needed to create a cognitively sensitive display 
are “what”, “how” and “assess”, but what tools can perform these functions (Figure 1.2).  
This research used NDM to elicit the “what” from the SMEs and then used Semiotic 
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Analysis collaboratively to present some “back of the envelope” design ideas – bar 
graphs, gauges, etc.  Further Semiotic Analysis applied with Visual Thinking visual cues 
(color coding, area visual acuity, etc.) suggested the first draft of a Visual Thinking 
sprocket – our “how”.  Finally, using SA techniques to compose questions, we showed 
the resulting images to non-experience subjects.  Furthermore, the results were so 
favorable that the displays were demonstrated to active duty military SMEs for their 
comments. 
 
Figure 1.2 Experimental design building blocks for a cognitively sensitive user interface 
The first question, “What information needs to be presented to the user?” 
examines the implications and content of the information pipeline, and makes tradeoffs.  
This solution incorporates the Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) principle of 
developing designs with ample consideration to the domain users, i.e., develop products 
within a given context, not in a vacuum.  Thus, subject matter experts (SMEs) were 


















interviewed to elicit what information should be included in any viable display, and these 
categories were then subjectively weighted by the SMEs.  After interviewing and 
observing UAV operators and instructors at the Victorville, CA UAV flight school, a 
flexible, intuitive display was envisioned – all SMEs were either active duty or retired 
USAF UAV operators and the instructors represented the manufacturers.  At least three 
levels of display flexibility were requested:  USAF, manufacture and operator.  In other 
words, the USAF may require certain Fields of Merits (FoMs), the manufacturer may 
require UAV model specific FoMs, while the operator may know operational/mission 
specific information that needs to be displayed. That is, the USAF might require the 
display supply the air speed for all missions, the manufacturer may require crosswind 
calculations to be displayed for this particular model, and the operator may want the oil 
temperature for this particular UAV because “it ran hot last mission”.  The design of the 
Visual Sprocket is such that the input stream can be changed to reflect “best practice” 
mandates directed by the organizations and manufacturers, while at the same time 
allowing for individual operator preferences.  This design allows the flexibility the 
operator desires, while addressing organizational and manufacturer concerns.   
For a visual display within the UAV mission planning domain, the pertinent 
information must be quickly interpretable and assist in narrowing down the possible 
alternate choices without excessively taxing the operator’s mental capacity.  At the same 
time, the underlying details behind the information must be accessible.  Within this 
structure, the minimum / maximum / current / alert data values should be readily 
available to the decision maker.  Considering that any decision will have multiple 
dimensions to consider and requires a quick response, then waiting for the operator to 
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“interpret” or “calculate” the raw data values on the display can be detrimental to 
resolving the decision. 
The second question, “How is the information to be presented to the user?” 
examines the graphical layout and visual cues to be implemented or constructed.  Visual 
Thinking posits that people make decisions almost instantaneously using visual cues in 
the environment.  Through evolution, the eye/brain connection has optimized responses 
to certain visual cues (such as movement, shape, size, etc.). If the display follows Visual 
Thinking guidelines, then the display should require a minimal mental workload and able 
to be constructed with culturally obvious visual cues.  The information sought by the 
operator should nearly “pop off” the screen, i.e., allowing a near gestalt interpretation of 
the information presented by the display.  Semiosis (study of signs) supplies the relevant 
cognitive model for display cues, in particular, designing culturally relevant signs.  The 
cultural influence of the signs this research explored were within the existing military 
culture for UAV ground control stations and international representations of cold and hot 
(water temperature) conventions.  At the same time, it should be recognized that the user 
interface is the communication pipeline from the UAV to the operator (as envisioned by 
the UI designer). 
Within the third question, “How do we assess the HCI?” is the issue of 
quantifying the user interface experience.  Is the proposed display truly better than 
existing displays?  NDM supplied the structure and tools to observe the single UAV 
operators “in the wild”, and from those observations led to a new hypothetical multi-
UAV display design.  NDM also supports testing the final display results with Subject 
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Matter Experts (SMEs), while at the same time acknowledging the usefulness of non-
domain subjects for controlled testing environments.  Furthermore, situation awareness 
research has supplied the framework upon which this very subjective “is this display 
better” can be objectively examined.  Designing the experiments to address specific 
levels of situation awareness allows for the quantification of the user experience.  Finally, 
in accordance with the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, Situation 
Present Assessment Method (SPAM) was used as it is one of the best experiment 
assessment feedback tools to use when addressing complex dynamic systems in this 
domain. 
1.2 Domain 
One of the goals of any strategic military commander is to inflict the most damage 
on the enemy with the least cost while sustaining the least amount of damage to their own 
troops.  The easiest technological solution to this problem was to “extend the warrior’s 
arm”, meaning extending the offensive reach while at the same time not allowing the 
enemy to attack.  For example, swords are preferred to daggers, spears are preferred to 
swords, archery preferred to hand-to-hand, etc.  Each of these technological innovations 
placed the warrior farther from the opponent. 
Remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) remove the human from harm’s way, and are 
thus a technological innovation that enables this extension objective.  Uninhabited aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) belong to the class of ROVs that function without a human crew on 
board.  When the UAVs carry munitions, they are called uninhabited combat aerial 
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vehicles (UCAVs).  Even though the human is not on board, humans play an important 
role in the applications of UAVs in practice (Narayanan, Edala et al. 1999). 
Controlling a single UAV is a complex task:  although there are multiple sensor 
inputs, many of those inputs are very limited in their ability to transmit data about the 
entire situation.  As an example, consider the Predator UAV system (or squadron):  “the 
fully operational system consists of four air vehicles (with sensors), a ground control 
station (GCS), a Predator primary satellite link communication suite and 55 people” 
(Wikipedia 2007).  For each of the four vehicles, the three most important personnel are 
the pilot operator and the two sensor operators.  Data supplied to the operators comes 
from the UAV’s sensors and from external sources.  Former USAF Deputy Chief of Staff 
for ISR, Lt. Gen. David Deptula, recently observed that a single Predator soon will be 
able to provide 60 or more video streams and noted that, “In terms of information1 
fusion, today’s main challenge is not too little but rather too much information.” 
Furthermore, USAF Chief of Staff, Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, said that 
approximately 160 persons are required to perform “command and control” (C2) and 
“processing, exploitation, and dissemination” (PED) for a single Predator.  PED includes, 
but is not limited to, data interpretation, intelligence, mission planning, etc.  Now imagine 
                                                 
1 Throughout this dissertation, the use of the word “information” has the strict meaning of data plus 
meaning.  In other words, the display shows the operator data that has been filtered through a semantic 
filter, placing that information with context (maximum, minimum, tolerances, etc.)  The displays are 
not raw data that need further interpretation skills by the operator at the basic level.  The operator may 
have to mentally join or split displayed information to assist current decision actions. 
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the added system complexity when multiple UAVs are “flown” by a single person – now 
in a supervisory role. 
Obviously, if the operator controller is going to graduate to a supervisory role, 
then the information needed by the supervisor is significantly different.  More of the 
rudimentary flying is offloaded to the UAV through automation, allowing the supervisor 
to make more of the difficult, mission decisions.  This fits with the 2010 USAF 
Technology Horizons study’s top finding, which identified the greater use of autonomous 
systems as critical to realizing capability increases.  Within this emerging multi-UAV 
domain, developing new displays to present the information needed by the supervisor is a 
priority. 
This research assumes the operator works in a supervisory role and interacts with 
the multiple UAVs in a method similar to a simulation game player.  Directions are given 
to the entities – individually or as a group.  The entities are semi-autonomous and 
perform tasks without interference from the supervisor – unless the supervisor needs to 
re-task the entities or the task requires human intervention (bombing, surveillance 
imagery, etc.).  An entity may be re-tasked (externally by the supervisor or internally by 
the entity) because of successful completion of a subgoal, deficiencies in performance, or 
changed mission priorities. 
Yet another question to ask is “Why do we need a new user interface?”  Two 
simple answers to this question:  (1) The current display for one UAV is barely sufficient 
to successfully operate the current control system of single UAVs – crashes during 
takeoff and landing happen much too frequently; and (2) The large amount of data 
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inundation / information overload for the UAV operator must be brought under control, 
especially when increasing the number of UAVs the operator supervises.  Controlling 
multiple UAVs dictates that the operator-level “piloting” skills used with one UAV, such 
as takeoff and landing, must be automated and offloaded to the UAV.  This automation 
has been incorporated in the aircraft of the domestic and international airlines for years. 
The USAF clearly envisions autonomy as a major enabler of its vision for the 
future of RPAs.  More importantly, a key assumption in the USAF UAS Flight Plan is 
that “Automation with a clear and effective user interface are the keys to increasing 
effects while potentially reducing cost, forward footprint, and risk” (HQ USAF, 2009). 
1.3 Research Approach 
This research developed a cognitively sensitive approach that efficiently 
incorporated the human into supervisory roles for mission planning and system 
monitoring for multiple UAVs.  A cognitively sensitive system is defined as a system in 
which the human operator can recognize a solution pattern without tremendous mental 
gymnastics, i.e., a high mental workload.  Another way of saying this is the solution is 
recognized as a whole, gestalt pattern, or “status at a glance”.  If the pattern does not 
exactly fit the requirements of the solution, then the operator can mentally reorganize the 
given pattern with relative ease to suggest an alternative solution.  It is hypothesized that 
a system designed and implemented using this approach will improve operator 
performance especially in high-stress or time intensive situations. 
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This display system is contrasted with existing user interfaces within the military 
UAV domain, mainly tables of numbers, and what can be considered traditional graphical 
user interface design packages including analog gauges or bar charts.   
In order to evaluate the displays, a high-fidelity test bed that could be configured 
for the alternate displays is necessary.  This research utilized Sytronics, Inc. Multiple-
UAV Agency (MAGE®) test bed and it was designed to integrate net centric information 
to facilitate control of multiple UAVs.  One of the chosen features for the MAGE® 
software was to provide automated mission planning to reduce operator workload.  
Towards this end, Sytronics, Inc. licensed from Operations Research Concepts Applied, 
Inc. (ORCA) its OPUS® mission planning software library.  OPUS® was employed by 
MAGE® to generate multiple alternative mission routes from which the MAGE® 
operator could choose to execute.  In addition to the routes, the OPUS® software also 
generates a series of Figures of Merit (FoM) to describe the characteristics of each 
alternative.  These FoMs could include more than a dozen dimensions, including the 
probability of surviving the mission, number of surface-to-air missile (SAM) launches, 
minutes of exposure to anti-aircraft artillery, minutes exposure to search radars, minutes 
exposure to missile guidance radars, fuel consumption, to name a few.  These measures 
are all numeric but have different measures, different minimums and maximums, and run 
in different directions (fewer SAM missile launches and higher probability of survival are 
both better). 
MAGE® uses state of the art agent programming to assist the operator, but the 
simulation has been limited to a traditional Microsoft Windows® / Java-style interface, 
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i.e., buttons, trees, menus, etc.  This clunky user interface paradigm may be quite 
adequate for an office environment, but can be a hindrance to a time sensitive, high stress 
military mission.  Requiring a user to traverse a menu system multiple layers deep or read 
several pages of data tables has been shown to be a human factors nightmare.2  The 
research examined the user interface as a presenter of information in a format that caused 
little cognitive dissonance.  Key FoMs of the problem to be solved by the operator are 
presented as a visual pattern that he/she can readily recognize and allowed him/her to 
quickly identify a potential solution. 
 
Figure 1.3 Research into the human's role in control 
                                                 
2 “On March 28, 1979 a sequence of events; equipment malfunction, design related problems and worker 
errors, led to a partial meltdown of Unit 2 at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near 
Middletown, Pennsylvania. The main feed water pumps stopped running, which prevented the steam 
generators from removing heat from the reactor. Signals available to the operators failed to show 
exactly what had happened, which may be why they took a series of actions that made conditions worse 
by simply reducing the flow of coolant through the core.” 
Lloyd J. Dumas, Waking up to the Real Threats to Security in the Post-Cold War World. Human 
Factor and the risk of Nuclear War http://www.slmk.org/main/artiklar/Human_Factor.pdf, 
Svenska Läkare mot Kärnvapen  (Swedish Section of International Physicians for the Prevention 



















How does one human operator/supervisor control multiple UAVs?  What control 
mechanisms or paradigms are needed to assure the appropriate level of human control?  
In other words, must the control mechanisms for controlling multiple UAVs be 
significantly different than the control mechanisms needed to control an individual UAV?  
Figure 1.3 illustrates current research at the ends of the spectrum with regards to 
controlling multiple agents.  Those exploring swarm intelligence (Bonabeau and 
Théraulaz 2000; Dorigo, Bonabeau et al. 2000; Gaudiano, Shargel et al. 2003; Holland, 
Woods et al. 2005) assume a fully autonomous swarm without a human-in-the-loop to 
solve the given problem space.  In their approach the human presents the scenario to 
solve to the swarm and the swarm proceeds to “discover” a viable solution.  At the other 
research extreme (Narayanan, Ruff et al. 2000; Karim, Heinze et al. 2004; Ruff, Calhoun 
et al. 2004; Lewis, Wang et al. 2006), the researchers are not interested in swarm 
intelligence; but rather, are interested in humans controlling multiple autonomous agents.  
These researchers experimentally demonstrated that under various levels of autonomy, 
operators can control from one to thirteen UAVs.  They claim that any larger group of 
UAVs would require a massive leap forward in UAV autonomy technology. 
These laboratory results were discussed among software designers and Multiple-
UAV Aircraft Control (MAC) Predator operators/pilots during the design of the MAGE 
simulation testbed.  The MAC concept was proposed and deployed as a method to 
decrease the number of personnel needed to man multiple operational UAVs.  The MAC 
was envisioned to be a group of four traditional GCSs, but manned by four sensor 
operators (SO) and one pilot – the pilot was the commander.  As a method of reducing 
the pilot workload, the SO controlled the UAV during low-intensity legs of the mission.  
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However, after implementing the MAC, the pilot felt situationally detached during these 
low intensity operations.  When the pilot had to control a UAV in a (planned) high-
intensity leg of the mission (surveillance of a moving target or nearing a weapons 
release), an auxiliary pilot was required to attend to the remaining (low-intensity) UAVs.  
When a UAV unexpectedly goes from low- to high-intensity activity, the pilot felt he 
needed to be in the loop at least one-half hour earlier.  Although a MAC was originally 
envisioned to have a capability of four UAVs being simultaneously controlled, only three 
UAVs were put into operation because of the pilots’ fear of being overloaded.  Finally, 
the geographic separation of the operator to the UAV (operator in Nevada and the UAV 
in Afghanistan) seems to aggravate many situation awareness problems.  After 
experimenting and redeploying personnel in the 4-UAV MAC, the final empirical 
personnel ratio for a MAC was four SOs and three pilots – a savings of only one pilot! 
When one discusses human factors engineering and user interfaces in complex, 
dynamic systems, we are entering the domain of situation awareness.  Here we come to 
the essential/primary problem this research addresses – how to get the critical information 
to an operator in a timely manner.  An operator has situation awareness of the system 
when he/she has reasonable knowledge of all critical aspects of a controlled system, i.e., 
informally, he/she knows what is happening.  Endsley (1988) formally defined situation 
awareness as the “perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time 
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and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and projection of their status in the near 
future”3. 
This dissertation is arranged in the following order:  Chapter 2 is a review of the 
literature with respect to the military UAV domain, key technologies and the theories on 
which this research is based.  The third chapter explores semiosis and how it was used to 
guide the research.  The fourth chapter describes the research framework used throughout 
the research.  The fifth chapter describes the research methodology for each experiment.  
The sixth chapter presents the findings of the research.  And finally, the seventh chapter 
describes the research contributions. 
                                                 
3 Notice the lack of reference to past actions and states.  Gary Klein (NDM fame) told me at the 15th 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology held at Wright State University that this alone is 
why his NDM is superior to Endsley’s SA theory.  The current situation must not be concerned with 




2 Literature Review 
This literature review is divided into two sections:  (1) Theoretical Background 
associated with the design of a cognitively sensitive display and (2) Information about the 
multi-UAV domain necessary to understand the experiments – essentially, a toolkit and 
an object on which to use the tools. 
Some of the past cognitive science theories that have explored the design of the 
user interface:  Naturalistic Decision Making (Klein 1993), Visual Thinking (Arnheim 
1969), and Situation Awareness (Endsley 2006).  Each of these approaches tries to 
address the operator’s strengths and weaknesses, each with its own level of success.  
Although the operator may have a goal or goals recognized by each of these theories, 
there is the distinct possibility that the operator goals may not fit the specific theory – the 
proverbial “square peg in a round hole”.  Additionally, to fill in some of the perceived 
applied design gaps, Semiotic Analysis4 and Operator Function Models (OFM) were 
applied. 
Klein theorizes that experts internally encode information based on experience; 
this experience is the experts’ knowledge and that sets them apart from non-experts – the 
ability to “see/feel/hear” patterns in an evolving situation.  Klein’s research shows that 
experts do not necessarily compare multiple options, but rather use experience to look for 
                                                 
4 Semiotic Analysis (semiosis) is the study of signs and their meanings.  The display is a grouping of lines 
and symbols that are used to communicate between the system and the operator – as the designer 
understood the problem. 
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a solution (that has worked in the past) that satisfies the pattern of the problem without 
real consideration for optimal solutions.  Arnheim claims all cognition is derived from 
visual processing and, because of this, displays should leverage this by encoding 
information consistent with visual perception capabilities5.  He supports visual encoding 
of numerical information where applicable – maps that emphasize population density 
using color-coding, train routes using color and line width to emphasize direction and 
capacity, etc.  Endsley postulates the existence of three levels of situation awareness and 
any interface that is going to succeed in any dynamically complex domain must address 
these three levels – unsuccessful interfaces will fail in at least one level of SA when 
presenting the operator with the needed information to make a correct decision.   
These theories direct the designer to encode vital information the operator can 
easily recognize, that will in turn, allow the operator to make correct and efficient 
decisions.  However, none of these three theories had a specific methodology for 
encoding the display information.  This is obviously a distinct shortfall for these methods 
to the practical designer, but later authors have addressed some of these failings.  In 
particular, the design of the display utilized semiotic analysis (Nadin 1988; Tufte 1997; 
Ferreira, Barr et al. 2005; Tufte 2006) and recommendations from information / scientific 
visualization to examine what might be considered culturally significant visual cues 
(Tufte 1997; Spence 2001; Ware 2004; Tufte 2006). 
                                                 
5 This seems a little extreme, since by this definition, blind people could not reason!  I believe it is meant 
that most survival and base instincts/decisions are predominately visually aided, i.e., fight or flee 
decisions.  In this context, slow thoughtful decisions can have fatal consequences. 
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The goal of this research is to create a framework for designers to systematically 
design displays.  The iterative steps to creating the display are as follows:   
1) Interview stakeholders within the domain to ascertain what information 
needs to be presented [Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and Semiotic 
Analysis]; 
2) Develop a user model [Operator Function Model (OFM)]; 
3) Use semiotic analysis to create a display that encodes the information with 
visual cues.  These cues should be design such that the human can quickly 
recognize any patterns [Semiotic Analysis and Visual Thinking (VT)]; 
4) Evaluate the design empirically through laboratory experiments [Situation 
Awareness (SA)] and “in the wild” with stakeholders [NDM]; and 
5) Assess the success of the designed display with stakeholders [NDM, SA 
and VT].  Repeat if necessary. 
An instantiation of the objective of this research was to develop a cognitively 
sensitive approach that incorporates the human into the decision mechanism of 
supervising multiple UAVs to promote effective control.  In the context of human 
centered decision-making of multiple UAV control, this research explores whether a 
“cognitively sensitive” paradigm can be utilized to design intelligent user interfaces that 
are human friendly.  It is hypothesized that a system developed using this approach will 
improve operator performance in high-stress situations. 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
The research is presented in the order necessary to successfully proceed through 
the steps of the framework proposed in Figure 1.3. The steps are expanded in Figure 2.1.  
As can be seen by Figure 2.1, the three steps have been expanded to five steps, but in 
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reality, the “what” and “assess” steps are expanded to show the tools used, and is not 
necessarily sequential.  In fact, in this research, the assessment of the results was done 
using an in-house pilot study with a reassessment of the display before the formal 
experiments were performed.  This pilot study inspired a mouse rollover function to 
display the underlying data – minimum, maximum, low and high thresholds, etc.  This 
rollover function was not tested as part of the experiment, but was added to subsequent 
releases at the behest of other stakeholders.  The steps for designing a display should lead 
to an iterative solution.   
 
Figure 2.1 Steps to designing a cognitively sensitive display 
Furthermore, the three steps for designing are not temporally mutually exclusive – 
they frequently overlap.  However, this suggested guide can keep the designer on task 
enough to say that they are currently performing step X. 
WHAT 
Interview domain 
stakeholders [NDM]  
for what information 
needs to be 
presented [Semiosis] 
WHAT 




Use semiotic analysis 
to create a display 
that encodes the data 
w/  visual thinking 
[VT] 
ASSESS 
Evaluate the design 
empirically: 
laboratory [SA] and 
“in the wild” [NDM] 
ASSESS 
Assess success of the 
designed display w/ 
stakeholders [NDM]. 
 Repeat if necessary. 
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The organization of Section 2.1, as mentioned previously, is illustrated in Figure 
2.1.  Section 2.1.1 discusses Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and how it can be used 
as a tool to extract What information needs to be presented to the user in the new display 
through interviews and examining the existing context or environment.  Furthermore, 
NDM can help validate the display, and verify the user has the information needed.  
Section 2.1.2 presents a user modeling tool, called the Operator Function Model, which 
will be used in Chapter 4 to more completely understand what the operator needs to know 
so that they can make quick and accurate decisions.  Semiotic analysis is described in 
Section 2.1.3 and used as a tool in Chapter 3 to perform an analysis of the existing and 
proposed alternate displays.  The analysis helps transition from the What to the How 
steps of the process.  Following the analysis, the research examines Visual Thinking 
(Section 2.1.4) and its implications in the How information is presented to the user, 
addressing the need to present information that the human can perceive and categorize 
quickly.  The last step of this process is to Assess the display within the context of the 
domain.  To achieve this, we examine the Situation Awareness research as a 
measurement tool (Section 2.1.5).  Furthermore, NDM is again used to verify the display 
is useful within the context of the domain.  Finally, Section 2.1.6 examines the research 
on Separate, Integral and Integrated Displays and how these concepts can help explain 
the research decision process on which existing and proposed alternate displays were 
chosen and why. 
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2.1.1 Naturalistic Decision Making 
In the first step of the cognitively sensitive display design, one needs to gather 
information about “what” should be presented to the operator/supervisor.  This is one of 
the most important steps, because an incomplete picture of the problem will probably 
produce an incomplete solution.  One such tool that has been successfully used within the 
human factors community is Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). 
In his report on Naturalistic Decision Making, Klein (1993) asserts that most 
designers of decision aids are handicapped by a lack of knowledge of the decision 
maker’s internal decision algorithms for any given domain.  Human computer interfaces 
(HCIs) being developed “to help people perform cognitive tasks do not support decision 
making”.  Just presenting the information is not enough.  It has to be presented in a 
cognitively sensitive way. 
The expert decision maker may not have all the information he would like, but 
because of constraints (time, cost, etc.) a decision still must be made.  The expert infers 
or gathers information from external sources, “rules of thumb”, experience, etc.  As 
described by Klein (1993), experienced people do not normally perform a formal 
decision analysis, but rather, attempts to pattern match previous situations to identify 
potential solutions.  The solutions are adapted to fit the current problem. 
On the other hand, the designer has formal specifications that present the apparent 
minimum decision requirements needed by a neophyte – requirements that do not 
necessarily provide the whole cognitive picture.  From these specifications, the designer 
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is expected to design an HCI without being given information about how the operators 
expect to use it to make their decisions.  The resulting decision aid may not have the “feel 
of the system” that an expert learns over time. 
NDM attempts to go beyond the formal specifications by exploring how (and 
why) operators make important decisions.  It looks at the decision requirements of an 
expert, not a neophyte, and then presents that information to the operator.  One such tool 
is Recognition-Primed Decision-Making (RPD). 
2.1.1.1 Recognition-Primed Decision Making 
One naturally assumes that when a person makes a complicated decision, he 
would mentally make a list of alternative solutions and then narrow it down to two or 
three good choices.  Then these small few choices would be examined in more depth to 
select the best.   
Klein (1993) found that this is just not the case.  Instead, he found that 
experienced problem solvers looked at the current problem and tried to find a previous 
problem that was similar.  They then mentally tried to use the successful solution on new 
problem – if it did not work mentally, then they tried to adapt it mentally to better fit the 
new problem.  In other words, they recognized patterns in the problem to find a solution 
template in the solution space.  New innovative solutions were not created from scratch.  
Alternative solution lists were not created. 
These recognized patterns are the priming needed to find a viable solution.  It 
does not necessarily guarantee an optimal solution, but rather a tried and true solution 
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that satisfies the problem constrains.  Keeping the patterns simple for the operator / 
supervisor allows them to quickly assimilate the situation – patterns such as “bigger is 
better” and “best is a medium circle shape”. 
2.1.2 User Modeling 
Because the first tool does not have a formal method of modeling the expert user, 
a second tool is needed to do this.  NDM does recognize the need to understand the 
expert and their decisions, but it does not have a specific toolset to perform this 
modeling. 
There exist several tools to that do such as Task Analysis (McCormick, 1976; 
Sanders and McCormick, 1987) and Operator Function Model.  This research’s primary 
user model is the Operator Function Model (OFM), with the proposed solution for this 
domain presented in chapter 4.  Discrete control models (task analysis) and models of 
operator function using discrete control modeling (OFM; Mitchell and Miller, 1985, 
1986; Mitchell, 1987, 1996) constructs have been successfully used for modeling users in 
complex systems. Task analysis identifies “and list[s] all the human operations performed 
and their relation to system tasks (McCormick 1976, p. 24)."   
They describe operator behavior in a range of complex systems and prescribe 
operator functions by representing the interrelations between dynamic system state and 
operator functions, subfunctions, control actions, and information needs related to 
operator activities (Mitchell and Miller, 1986; Mitchell, 1987, 1996).  The OFM is an 
alternative to task analysis techniques used by other human factors engineers 
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(McCormick, 1976; Sanders and McCormick, 1987), since OFM is a modeling tool that 
provides a dynamic, task-analytic structure that can be used by system designers to define 
a user interface that is based on operator rather than hardware function (Mitchell, 1987, 
1996). 
2.1.2.1 Cognitive Models 
From nonscientific anecdotal accounts (Flying Magazine) and accident reports 
[(Giffen and Rockwell 1987) summarizes many accident report findings], one finds that 
there is a certain mysticism associated with regards to a pilot’s decision making skills.  
These reports find that poor decision making skills cause or contribute to many of the 
“pilot error” accidents.  Most of these accidents involve time constraints or time pressure 
requiring a very rapid decision by the pilot; the reports’ general recommendations tend to 
be “more research is needed on pilot judgment and decision making”. 
Despite these recommendations, researchers have been slow in examining the 
cognitive processes of the cockpit crew.  In the absence of experimental/empirical data to 
support a new analytical model of decision making, it has been assumed that standard 
analytical model fits.  Besco, Maurino et al. (1994) claimed: 
Decision making in the cockpit follows traditional views of decision making … in 
which the decision maker, i.e., Captain, is 1) presented with a situation that 
requires a decision; 2) the nature of the situation is assessed by the decision 
maker; who 3) determines the availability of alternative outcomes to respond to 
the situation, and 4) after evaluating the risk and benefits of each alternative; 
5) selects an alternative in response to the needs of the situation. (p. 43) 
The assumption that decision-makers’ always examine all alternatives 
exhaustively is unrealistic.  The Captain typically does not jot down a few alternatives, 
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weigh and balance each possible outcome, and then select the “best” alternative.  
Research in NDM argues that the Captain, if he/she is a good decision maker, is going to 
recognize the current situation fits a previous situation problem pattern and use (adapt) 
the solution that satisfied the previous situation, if possible.  This requires much less 
cognitive workload from the Captain. 
2.1.3 Semiosis, Semiotic Analysis 
Semiosis is the study of signs; including the cultural influences on the 
interpretation of signs (Table 2.1).  As an example, within the USA culture, the color red 
is often interpreted as danger, or bad luck; while in China, red is considered very lucky.  
The number “7” is lucky and “13” is unlucky in the USA, while in China, “4” is unlucky 
because of the word “four” in Chinese sounds the very similar to the word “death”.  So a 
more complete definition of semiosis is the study of signs within a culture, but the culture 
does not have to be based on national or ethnic backgrounds.  It can be the culture within 
a corporation (e.g., “mac happy face”, “blue screen of death”), a military branch 
(iconology for war games), etc.  In this section, the cultural influence of the signs this 
research explored were within the existing military culture for UAV ground control 
stations (GCS).6 
                                                 
6 A detailed semiotic analysis of this display is reported in Chapter 3. 
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Table 2.1  Some definitions of semiotics and its uses. 
Semiotics is the doctrine of signs.  The sign is the most important building block to 
semiotic study and it is defined as anything that stands for something else to some 
interpreter. 
(Ferreira, Barr et al. 
2005) 
The object of semiotics is sign systems and their functioning within culture. (Nadin 1988) 
The main tenet of Semiotic Engineering is that interactive systems designers 
actually communicate with users (at interaction time) through computer systems 
interfaces.  Interfaces act as the designers’ proxies (the designers’ deputy, 
according to the theory).  Thus, when designing any system’s interface, designers 
are actually deciding what kinds of conversations they will have with users, using 
which modes and media, and for what purposes. 
(Valente, Souza 
et al. 2008) 
Semiotics, also called semiotic studies or semiology, is the study of sign processes 




The overall goal of the human operator modeling and semiosis effort is to decide 
upon the content and form of information to be displayed to a well-trained and 
motivated ... supervisor ....  Semiotic analysis deals with the assessment of the 
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics associated with human/system interaction. 
(Narayanan, Ruff 
et al. 2000) 
The history of semiotics has two major figures which have defined the western 
traditions, mainly the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and the 
American scientist and philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce.  This research used a model 
derived by Pierce that has been shown to be appropriate for computer based signs.  This 
model has a three part relationship containing the representamen, the object, and the 
interpretant (Figure 2.2).  The representamen is the physical instantiation of the symbol 
in reality – like an eight sided red and white stop sign is physical representation of the 
concept to stop.  The object is the actual concept for which the representamen stands – 
“cars stop here”.  And finally, the interpretant is therefore the sign created in the mind of 
the perceiver, or how the sign is perceived.  To an observer, the representamen creates in 




Although Peirce classified thousands of sign categories, he found the three most 
fundamental sign divisions are icon, index and symbol.  Any given sign can be assigned 
one of these three categories based on the relationship between the object and the 
representamen (See Figure 2.3).  These categories are not mutually exclusive; any given 
sign may belong to more than one of these categories. 
In the left illustration of Figure 2.3, an iconic sign is presented.  The 
representamen resembles a portrait of the author and the perceiver can interpret this as 
such precisely because the representamen looks like the author enough to be recognized.  
Figure 2.2 Peircean Triad 
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It should be noted that the representamen can be (and has been) weakly argued to be an 
indexical sign precisely because it is not three dimensional. 
 
 
The middle illustration shows an example of the indexical sign.  In this case, the 
sign is representative of a (class of) object(s).  It does not represent a specific object, but 
rather it makes a connection to a (class of) object(s) within the perceiver’s mind.  The 
object may not even be physically observable.  In Figure 2.3, the middle illustration can 
be interpreted differently based on the context, the symbol could be interpreted as 
“weighing” (weigh something), “metric weighing” (weigh something using the metric 
system), “measurement” (measure something to exactly 1 kg, like in a recipe), or a class 
of measuring devices (scales). 
Finally, the right illustration is an example of the iconic sign.  These tend to be 












Weight shown on 









Figure 2.3 Sign classifications 
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overlaid on another sign means “do not”.  For instance, placing this sign over an image of 
a cigarette is interpreted as “do not smoke cigarettes near this sign”, placing this sign over 
the icons for restroom on a map should be interpreted as no restrooms available at this 
site, placing the sign over a symbol of a fishing pole should be interpreted as “no 
fishing”, etc.  However, without the interpretant being instructed by their culture as to the 
meaning of the sign, there is no intuitive, obvious interpretation.  With the training, the 
interpretation of the overlaid sign is easy to generalize of other settings.  It should be 
noted that written languages are iconic – we are taught to read and write for many years 
to understand this very complex signing language. 
2.1.4 Visual Thinking 
The Visual Thinking phrase was first coined by Arnheim (1969) to address how 
people make decisions almost instantaneously.  Inherent in vision is the ability to 
preprocess data and recognize visual patterns. 
Vision is not perception and perception is not thinking.  The mind 
gathers information and processes it.  Note that I said information, 
information is data plus meaning.  Before the mind conveys the 
information your eyes must observe it, and some preprocessing needs to 
be done to turn this data into information. 
Arnheim 2004 
The key to Arnheim's thesis is that vision and thinking are not necessarily disjoint 
concepts.  When a person perceives an object with your eyes, before deep thoughts about 
the object can be conceived, the simple sight of that thing at least causes classification 
(placing the object in the context of other objects like it).  For instance, if you see a cat, 
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before any separate thinking is performed about the cat, it has already been placed in the 
category of “cat”.  This is a particularly useful cognitive trait to have when that cat is a 
dangerous one that needs to be fled from, such as a tiger. 
Arnheim contends the idea of visual thinking is an old one, going back to the 
ancient Greek philosophers: Plato, Socrates and Aristotle.  These philosophers were the 
first to make a distinction between perceiving and reasoning, mainly because perception 
from direct senses could not be trusted.  (We have all experienced “our eyes playing 
tricks on us”, or heard tales of mirages in the desert.)  Reasoning was considered to be the 
“correction of the senses” and the “establishment of truth”. 
It can be reasonably argued that Arnheim’s visual thinking is almost 
instantaneous pattern classification. It is not the perception of the object that classifies the 
object, but rather the very well-travelled mental pathways that react with almost 
lightening quick classification.  The perceiving of the object (cat) does not require new 
neurons to fire off and create new paths; the existing short pathways have always 
succeeded previously. 
Within this same paradigm of visual thinking may fall the education concepts of 
audio and visual learning.  It is recognized within the field of teaching that some students 
learn best by listening, others by seeing, and still others by doing.  It is recommended that 
teachers make the effort to discover each student’s learning style, and furthermore, 
present the subject material in as many modalities as possible to help the students’ 
diverse learning styles. 
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2.1.4.1 Graphical Displays 
This research proposes a new graphical display “widget” called the “visual 
thinking sprocket” to enhance the supervisor’s control capabilities.  To judge the 
appropriateness of the display, we look to Tufte’s (2006) [p. 13] definition of what 
determines an excellent (statistical) graphical display: 
• show the data 
• induce the viewer to think about the substance rather than … something else 
• avoid distorting what the data have to say 
• present many numbers in a small space 
• make large data sets coherent 
• reveal the data at several levels of detail, from a broad overview to the fine 
structure 
• serve a reasonably clear purpose:  description, exploration, tabulation, or 
decoration 
• be closely integrated with the … data set. 
The sprocket display fulfills all of these characteristics. 
2.1.4.2 Visual Thinking Sprocket 
Physiologically, the eyeball as an information-gathering instrument scans the 
world under the guidance of cognitive attention centers.  The eyeball fixates on a region 
of interest.  An image is buffered and scanned, like a massively parallel computer, to find 
objects within the image through feature extraction.  Once extracted, these objects are 
serially scanned at about 25 items per second.  Since the eye scans quickly, reacquiring a 
new image about 10 times a second, only four to twelve objects are recognized before the 
eye jumps to another fixation.  These physical boundaries must drive the design of 
cognitively sensitive displays. 
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Furthermore, when designing a display, the two attributes must be balanced:  the 
overview of the situation and the details within the situation.  The overview is a 
qualitative “aspect of data preferably acquired rapidly and even better, pre-attentively; 
that is, without cognitive effort” (Spence 2007).  A well designed overview display uses 
visual cues that are acknowledged to be pattern classifier aids so information “pops out” 
at the operator.  On the other hand, details are quantitative and should only be presented 
to the operator on an as needed basis, i.e., when the operator requests more in-depth 
information, presumably because of the overview display observations. 
Within the design of the Visual Thinking Sprocket display, primary attention is 
devoted to the overview pattern classifier aids.  A design that presents an overview of a 
situation must be designed simply and stress those features that can be pre-attentively 
processed.  According to Ware (2004), features that can be pre-attentively processed can 
be organized in the following categories: 
• Form:  Line orientation, line length, line width, line collinearity, size, 
curvature, special grouping, blur, added marks, numerosity 
• Color:  Hue, Intensity 
• Motion:  Flicker, Direction of Motion 
• Spatial Position:  2D position, Stereoscopic depth, convex/concave shape 
from shading 
The features in bold were the pre-attentive cues this Visual Thinking Sprocket 
research attempted to model.   
With this in mind, let us examine the interesting history of the Visual Thinking 
Sprocket.  One of the earliest applications of a sprocket design (Spence 2001) to 
graphically present data is Florence Nightingale’s Rose (See Figure 2.4).  During the 
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Crimea war, Nightingale visited the field hospitals while attending the sick and wounded.  
She was appalled at the squalid conditions at the hospitals and persuaded the Sanitary 
Commission to undertake improvements. 
 
Figure 2.4 Nighingale's Rose illustrating the dramatic reduction of deaths in Crimea War field 
hospitals attributed to improving sanitary conditions 
The Rose depicts the striking improvements attributed to the improved conditions:  
the length of each petal is proportional to the number of deaths that month; the subtended 
angle of each segment is the elapsed time; and the dotted line is the number of deaths in 
Army hospitals in Manchester, England.  The new regime was initiated in March 1855 
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(approximately 9:00 o’clock on the Rose), and the figure dramatically shows the 
improvements. 
 
Figure 2.5 Interactive Nightingale's Rose (http://understandinguncertainty.org/coxcombs) 
The Rose is such a fascinating visual tool that it has inspired several online 
versions of the display.  One such interactive display is illustrated in Figure 2.5.  With 
this display, the rose can grow throughout the Crimean War, each wedge being added, 
starting with April 1854 and proceeding through March 1856.  The right-hand Rose 
precedes the left-hand Rose, with the first three months of the right-hand Rose being 
deaths preceding the Crimean War.  The left-hand Rose is the second year of the war and 
illustrates how implementing the recommended sanitary guidelines greatly enhanced the 




Figure 2.6 Starfield visual thinking widget 
Singers and Endres (1996) present a second visual thinking widget they call the 
Starfield® (Johnson Controls Inc. 2001).  The Starfield shown in Figure 2.6, was created 
to “help operators readily extract useful information from the vast quantities of data 
generated by complex systems”, in particular, the facility management systems.  A large 
facility can have dozens of zones, each with its own heating, ventilating, air conditioning, 
fire, lighting, and security systems.  Text displays can provide values at each point in the 
entire system.  However, an operator of a large facility may need to scan through 
“numerous floor plans or hundreds of thousands of lines of text” to find that one piece of 
relevant data.  The Starfield represents data as points that appear in a scatterplot – “like 
stars in the sky”.  The clustering of points indicated data similarity or patterns of interest, 
with the color of the points indicating tolerance status [red (corresponding analog value is 
above the specified range), blue (below the specified range), green (within the specified 
range), gray (offline)].  Using a mouse to select a point provides more details about the 
data, for example doing a “mouse-over” of a point produces a Windows’ “tool tip” 
indicating the name and value of the point while clicking on the point expands the details 
to include possible fixes.  The largest dot represents the systems calculated global status.  
The most important parts of this research were:  (1) operators are provided an “at-a-
glance visual gestalt” of the data; (2) the display works to the humans strengths of pattern 




Figure 2.7 Visual thinking Kaleidoscope® for selecting search strategies 
A third example of using a visual thinking widget, called a Kaleidoscope (Figure 
2.7), is presented by Pu and Lalanne (2002).  This Kaleidoscope is used as a decision tool 
to select land usage in a neighborhood.  Existing structures (housing, cemetery, school, 
dumpsite, etc.) constrain the placement of new structures in available lots.  For instance, 
do not place a dumpsite next to a school.  In the Kaleidoscope, the entire circle represents 
the multivariate search space.  Any solid lines represent a successfully met constraint, 
with longer (black) lines being better solutions.  Extending through the edge are the 
potential solutions that must be examined in more depth. 
Examining Figure 2.8, one can see the intentional feature implementation on the 
initial single-threshold Visual Thinking Sprocket design prototype.  This Visual Thinking 




Figure 2.8 Early drawing of a multi-dimensional, multiple scaled decision support display.  The raw detail 
data display is visible by mouse roll-over of the slice. 
Encoded into this initial Visual Thinking Sprocket were (1) angular slices 
proportional to the weighting of the dimension; (2) acceptability of specific dimensions 
(pink – unacceptable, blue – acceptable); (3) individual dimension “health” or 
“preference” (larger colored area is always better); (4) slices nearer the red tolerance line 
are less optimal, those nearer the maximum radius are deemed near optimal; (5) labels 
naming individual dimensions and their associated current values; (6) a normalized 
rescaling of the dimensions; and (7) the global preference of the decision – bigger 
sprockets are better than smaller sprockets.  Finally, if the operator wanted more 
information about a specific dimension, a simple “mouse-over” displays the detailed raw 
data behind the image. 
From Figure 2.8, one can see why the resulting circular figure is called a sprocket, 
with geared teeth of varying length, resembling the tooth embellished wheel that drives a 
chain, or in this case, cognitive understanding.   
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2.1.4.2.1 Cognitive Congruence 
Presenting information to a user in an easily decipherable context is difficult.  As 
Tufte (2006) quoted from The Commercial and Political Atlas (London, 1786): 
Information, that is imperfectly acquired, is generally as imperfectly 
retained; and a man who has carefully investigated a printed table, finds, when 
done, that he has only a very faint and partial idea of what he has read; and that 
like a figure imprinted on sand, is soon totally erased and defaced... [pages 3-4]. 
This emphasizes the importance of imparting information in a fashion that is 
easily understood in an effort to make it effortlessly retainable.  To transfer the 
information to the user, the user must grasp its meaning quickly without being overloaded 
with extraneous minutiae. 
In educational parlance, people learn through three modalities:  visual/spatial, 
auditory/sequential and kinesthetic/tactile (Silverman 2006).  Visual learners prefer 
images, symbols, diagrams, etc. as the information conduit.  Concepts are holistically 
understood.  Thinking may be visualization three dimensions and occurs all at once rather 
than sequentially.  Auditory learners remember much of what they hear (and even more 
about what they hear and then say).  The auditory learner is a sequential thinker, 
preferring to “follow a logical pattern.”  [As an interesting aside, Felder and Silverman 
(1988) assert college age students tend to fall into the first category, while professors tend 
to fall into the second category.]  The third modality, kinesthetic/tactile learn through 
touching or moving things.  Learning is “anchored in the physical senses” and example or 
experimentation tends to help the learner.  For example, infants must touch or put things 
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in their mouths to learn or understand them.  Furthermore, athletes develop muscle 
memory by repetition of drills and exercises – this too is learning. 
2.1.4.3 Concept of Cognitive Impedance  
Cognitive impedance is the human information processing analog to electrical 
engineering concept of impedance matching.  Cognitive matching refers to information 
presentation/representation coinciding with the recipient’s internal model.  If the 
representations are too discordant, the recipient must perform mental gymnastics to bring 
the representations more aligned.  As examples, consider the electrical matching of two 
stereo systems and the problem of American aircraft horizon displays: 
2.1.4.3.1 Example:  Stereo systems in cars (4 Ohm) vs. home (8 Ohm) 
To get the best sound from a stereo system, use components (amplifier, speakers, 
etc.) that have their Ohm ratings matched.  In the American market, there exist 2 types of 
stereo systems: those made for automobiles are 4 ohm (4Ω) and those made for in-home 
are 8 ohms (8Ω).  Matching the ohmage creates the least amount of audio distortion when 
the signal is sent from the amplifier to the speaker.  If the components are mismatched, 
that is a 4Ω (8Ω) amplifier is paired with an 8Ω (4Ω) speakers, then "dropout" or 
distortion results in the speaker output.  Granted, the 4Ω => 8Ω distortion (dropout) is 
different from the 8Ω => 4Ω distortion (overmatching, over amping, etc.), but they both 
will lead to signal distortion of different frequencies. 
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2.1.4.3.2 Example:  Russian versus American Horizon displays 
In the flight instrument that shows whether the airplane is flying level or not, the 
Russians use an outside-in display and the Americans use an inside-out display.  What 
this means is that the perspective of the pilot relative to the aircraft is either from inside 
the plane to the horizon, or outside the plane from the horizon (Figure 2.9). 
 
Figure 2.9 Aircraft attitude instrument 
The Inside-out, FAA approved instrument (Figure 2.9.A), holds the image of the 
plane/pilot still and moves that earth's horizon moving in the distance.  On the other hand, 
the Russian instrument (Figure 2.9.B) holds the earth still and moves the plane. Donovan 
and Triggs (2006) found that FAA approved instrument had significantly more “reverse 
control” errors, i.e., turning the wrong direction and then having to correct that turn.  It 
was suggested that the pilots tried to "move the horizon" to the wing orientation instead 
of moving the wing to the horizon. 
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One can recognize that each represents a valid method of presenting information 
to the pilots.  However, if the pilots do not have the right frame of reference and/or point 
of view, the information must be transformed/interpreted by the pilot.  The pilots can be 
trained using simulators or receive on-the-job training.  If the pilot training is for a 
manned aircraft through simulators, the inside-out display matches the real cockpit 
perspective.  However, if the pilot is flying by remote control using a stick control and 
watching the vehicle’s movement, then the outside-in display more readily replicates how 
the student “thinks” about the maneuvers.  When the display matches the way the 
operator thinks, it is a cognitive impedance match and the information is transferred from 
interface to user without distortion or dropout. 
The historic weight of the inside-out instrumentation and training has made 
changing to the safer outside-in instrument nigh impossible.  American pilots in exchange 
programs with Russian pilots have reported the difficulty of relearning the 
instrumentation. 
The concept of cognitive impedance assumes the user interface (UI) is a 
communication channel that can be described by engineering descriptors.  If this is the 
case, then a designer of user interfaces must understand the user/operator bandwidth and 
test for impedance mismatch as part of the interface design process.  Obviously, signal 
encoding can affect the design.  For instance, any video display must be formatted to 
match the engineered system and match the operator’s internal visualization of the 
system. It might be easier for a dynamic display to adapt to the user's expertise, i.e., shape 
the UI or even shape the user training.  With a bidirectional communication, the UI can 
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adapt and be written in as a theoretical abstraction.  For example, a context or concept 
map could drive the displayed UI. 
2.1.4.4 Insertion of Information through Cognitively Sensitive User 
Interface/Methods 
To improve the cognitive impedance match of additional network centric 
information, the information must be relevant to the current task at hand, otherwise it is a 
useless distraction or noise, and it must be presented in an easy to assimilate format that 
makes its value readily apparent.  The visual thinking paradigm is a way to affect 
impedance matching.  However, just presenting data graphically does not necessarily 
create impedance matching. 
Within the Predator control system, three personnel are used to control the 
mission of the UAV.  In particular, one of the job titles is the mission 
coordinator/controller (MC) with the responsibility of gathering, prioritizing and 
presenting external information to the other operators.  This seems a strong argument by 
the Air Force for the requirement for an intelligent information channel that combines 
external information from diverse systems.  The purpose of the MAGE project testbed is 
to aid the MC by presenting network centric information that is relevant, timely and 
presented in an easy to assimilate format for the UAV/UCAV pilot or sensor operator. 
2.1.5 Situation Awareness 
When one discusses human factors engineering and user interfaces in complex, 
dynamic systems, we are entering the domain of situation awareness.  We say an operator 
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has situation awareness of the system when he/she has knowledge of all critical aspects of 
a controlled system.  Endsley and Kiris (1995) formally defined situation awareness as 
the “perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, 
the comprehension of their meaning, and projection of their status in the near future”.  
This definition of situation awareness suggested by Endsley and Kiris is echoed by many 
other researchers (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.2 The definitions of Situation Awareness (SA) in complex and dynamic environments 
(Vidulich et al., 1994) 
Definitions Sources 
Conscious awareness of actions within two mutually embedded 
four-dimensional envelopes. 
Beriger & Hancock, 
1998 
The pilot's continuous awareness of self and aircraft in relation to 
the dynamic environment of flight, threats, and mission and the 
ability to forecast then execute tasks based on that perception. 
Carroll, 1992 
The ability to extract, integrate, access, and act upon task relevant 
information is a skilled behavior known as "situation awareness". 
Companion, Corso & 
Kass, 1990 
The accurate perception of the factors and conditions that affect an 
aircraft in its flight crew. 
Edens, 1991 
The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume 
of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
projection of their status in the near future. 
Endsley, 1990 
The knowledge that results when attention is allocated to a zone of 
interest at a level of abstraction. 
Fracker, 1988 
The pilot's overall appreciation of his current 'world'. Gibson & Garrett, 
1992 
One's ability to remain aware of everything that is happening at the 
same time and to integrate that sense of awareness into what one is 
doing at the moment. 
Haines & Flateau, 
1992 
Where refers to spatial awareness…  What characterizes identity 
awareness, or the pilot's knowledge of the presence of threats and 
their objectives, [as well as] engine status and flight performance 
parameters?  Who is associated with responsibility, or automation 
awareness; that is, knowledge about 'who's in charge'.  Finally, 
when signifies temporal awareness and addresses knowledge of 
events as the mission evolves. 
Harwood, Barnett, & 
Wickens, 1988 
The ability to envision the current and near-term disposition of 
friendly and enemy forces. 
Masters, McTaggart, 
& Green, 1986 
Awareness of conditions and threats in the immediate surroundings. Morishige & Ratelle, 
1985 
The ability to maintain an accurate perception of the surrounding 
environment, both internal and external to the aircraft, as well as, 
identify problems and/or potential problems, recognize a need for 
action, note deviations in the mission, and maintain awareness of 
tasks performed. 





[Situational awareness] means that the pilot has to integrate 
understanding of factors that will contribute to the safe flying of the 
aircraft under normal or non-normal conditions. 
Regal, Rogers, & 
Bouchek, 1988 
Situation awareness refers to the ability to rapidly bring to 
consciousness those characteristics that evolve during flight. 
Wickens, 1992 
The pilot's knowledge about his surroundings in light of his mission 
goals. 
Whitaker & Klein, 
1988 
Endsley’s defined three levels of situation awareness:  Level 1 SA is awareness or 
perception; Level 2 SA is comprehension within the context of the current task or 
operator goal; and finally, Level 3 SA reflects the ability of the operator to predict the 
future outcomes base on the current situation.  A simplified model of SA in dynamic 
decision making inspired by Endsley (2006) is illustrated in Figure 2.10, but there are 
some key elements that have been moved for emphasis.  Note that Level 3 SA depends 
on Level 2 SA, which in turn depends on Level 1 SA.   
It should be noted, according to Klein (2009), that Situation Awareness is a 
measurement tool that takes no past information into account.  In particular, it takes no 
user’s domain experience into account.  Further criticisms fall into two categories:  
1) Are explicit measures necessary when more naturalistic techniques are available and 
appropriate (Durso, Bleckley et al. 2007) – is it long-term memory?; and 2) Then there 
are those that question the validity of the SA construct (Dekker and Woods 2002) – is this 




Figure 2.10 Model of Situation Awareness in a Dynamic Decision Making (derived from Endsley 
2006)  
Examining Figure 2.10 from top to bottom, the System Factors are those factors 
inherent to the task domain or designed into the task/user interface.  For example, 
operators monitoring multiple aircraft within a small domestic market such as 
Dayton, OH (1.3 million total passengers during 2006 and nestled on a very sparse 4,500! 
acres http://www.daytonairport.com/index.htm) is quite different from operators 
monitoring a large international market such as the Ronald Reagan International Airport, 
Washington, DC with 18.7 million total passengers during 2006 (10.2 times more 
passengers than Dayton!) and a very dense 840 acres (only 733 acres above water!) 
http://www.metwashairports.com/reagan/about_reagan_national/air_traffic_statistics_2]).  
The mental stress of the air traffic controllers in Dayton International Airport can be 
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assumed to be much less than Ronald Reagan International Airport.  The scale and 
complexity of the software and hardware for each market must be much different.  The 
automation and decision support included in the systems will be of different 
complexities. 
The Task Factors involve an operator feedback loop (very similar to the Boyd’s 
(1996) OODA loop) that interprets elements of the real environment to construct a mental 
map, called the situation awareness, as the basis of decisions and actions that follow.  If 
the situation awareness is not complete (enough), the decision and the action can be 
faulty.  The feedback loop allows the operator to self-correct if the action does not fit the 
predicted outcome. 
Finally, the Individual Factors can bias or shade the situation awareness of the 
operator.  Because the operator’s goals and objectives may differ slightly from the 
optimal solution’s objective, a first time operator may find an acceptable goal to be not 
crashing, whereas the mission statement may require a full surveillance of the target 
zone.  Furthermore, an individual operator’s personality, background, and 
resourcefulness may shade the preconceptions of what is or is not acceptable within the 
mission goal parameters.  Each operator will have their own level of aptitude, experience 
and training.  It is hoped that training will weed out the inept, but this is not guaranteed.  
Furthermore, additional training is often substituted for actual experience, but it is 
precisely the combination of aptitude, experience and training that provide the support for 
the skills (information processing skills), long term memory stores, and automaticity.  
(Automaticity is “performing without thinking”, for example, the automatic muscle 
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memory that allows a driver to automatically drive home without thinking about the 
route.  Whole segments of a trip can be “blanked out” by the driver, with no 
understanding of the details of how they got from point A to point B.) 
Of these three factors, situation awareness of the system is experienced in the 
Task Factors.  The other two factors influence or bias the interpretation of existing 
information of the current situation, but the actual actions based on the operator’s 
understanding of the situation is in the Task Factors.  Next, the individual levels of SA 
are examined. 
2.1.5.1 Level 1 Situation Awareness (Level 1 SA) 
The “basic building block” of all levels of SA is Level 1 SA.  Level 1 SA is the 
recognition that something in the environment needs attention.  This is the most basic of 
all situation awareness levels, but failure to recognize a problem in the environment can 
have horrendous repercussions.  The processing of Level 1 SA is “bottom-up”7, i.e., the 
scanning of all the data to find any unusual data points. 
                                                 
7 “There are two basic modes of processing.  ‘Bottom-up processing,’ also termed ‘data-driven processing,’ 
is processing initiated when data are bound to variables in bottom level subschemata that move upward 
to activate the higher level schemata in which the subschemata are embedded.  ‘Top-down processing,’ 
also called ‘conceptually driven processing,’ is processing initiated when top level schemata activate 
embedded subschemata in the expectation that these subschemata will fit the data …  Data-driven 
processing moves from part to whole, and conceptually driven processing moves from whole to part …  
Data-driven processing is subconscious, automatic, and guided by the principle that ‘all the data must be 
accounted for,’ while conceptually driven processing is conscious, purposive, and guided by high level 
plans and goals.” 




Approximately 76.3% of accidents reviewed by Jones and Endsley (1996) for the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were directly attributed to failure to 
perceive needed information.  It thus follows that the level of SA to which user interfaces 
need to focus is Level 1 SA and the critical cues of the domain need to be emphasized by 
the designer to aid the operator. 
How does one design a Level 1 SA UI?  Endsley and Kiris (1995) posit that 
critical cues are perceived in the environment when individual elements are classified 
using pattern-matching prototypes; this in turn activates corresponding mental models in 
long term memory.  What Endsley’s theory of SA does not address is an approach to 
create visual displays that present critical information cues tailored to the operators goals 
and objectives.  SA is enhanced when the critical cues attract the operator’s attention, are 
tailored to the task (within constraints), and are related to the operator goals.  By utilizing 
the operator’s innate 2D pattern recognition abilities (sorting relative area), the visual 
thinking display addressed Level 1 SA requirements, and thus enhance overall task 
performance. 
2.1.5.2 Level 2 Situation Awareness (Level 2 SA) 
Nested within the Level 1 SA (perception) is Level 2 SA.  This level recognizes 
the need for the operator to contextualize the perceived situation.  To contextualize, the 
operator accesses “schemata or knowledge stored in long-term memory (Rumelhart, 
1984) which are activated by recognized patterns in incoming data” (Endsley 1988).  
Level 2 SA is “top-down” processing, i.e., goal directed.  An operator has a set of goals 
that directs their attention to specific, relevant information in the environment.  
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Level 1 SA (“bottom-up”) and Level 2 SA (“top-down”) work in combination and in 
parallel with each other in a means-ends process that, if working properly, quickly zooms 
in on pertinent information.  Each level depends on the other to fully develop the 
operator’s situation awareness.  When working together, the perceived data and the 
operator goals afford meaning and significance, transforming the disconnected data into 
relevant information.8   
How important is Level 2 SA?  Approximately 20.3% of accidents reviewed by 
Jones and Endsley (1996) for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were 
directly attributed to failure to Level 2 SA.  This means the operator was able to detect or 
perceive that a problem existed, but was not able to recognize its importance or meaning 
within the context of the operator’s mission.  That is, the perceived problem’s importance 
was down played. 
According to Endsley and Kiris (1995), this combination of perception and 
contextualizing “activate the appropriate goals and models”, i.e., it triggers a cognitive 
schemata or pattern.  Connecting the appropriate situation pattern to the current situation 
allows the operator to access long-term working memory for suitable mental models.  
Activating the mental models is a “bottle-neck” within the information processing system 
of complex, dynamic systems (Endsley 1988).  Designing a user interface that facilitates 
this connection process would assist situation awareness:  the design has to be domain 
                                                 
8 The use of the terms data versus information is intentional.  From a strictly cognitive science viewpoint:  
data + meaning  information.  For example, 12, 3, 2 are data, but if you include the context (meaning) 
of being numbers within Christmas song titles, they become information (“Twelve Days of Christmas”, 
“We Three Kings of Orient Are”, “All I want for Christmas is my Two Front Teeth”). 
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specific to capture the significant data in the environment; and help the operator make the 
connections by utilizing the operator’s cognitive strengths. 
 
Figure 2.11 Cognitive processes influencing the formation of SA (Endsley and Kiris 1995) 
This active combining of Level 1 SA and Level 2 SA is situation assessment 
(Endsley and Kiris 1995), where “internal cognitive constructs such as attention, pattern 
matching, and long-term working memory influence what data in the environment” is 
attended to, and what the final “snapshot” of SA encompasses (Figure 2.11).  
Additionally, experience as a major external influence from the environment.  (Of course, 
SA is always fluid/dynamic and never static nor complete.  The “final SA” is the 
incomplete SA used to make decisions.) 
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To summarize the above discussion, situation awareness is not passive, and most 
definitely situation assessment is a very cognitively active.  The activities driving 
situation assessment are separate from the resulting constructed situation awareness.  As 
Tenney et al. (1992) states,  
[t]he state of awareness with respect to information and knowledge is the product. 
The process, in contrast, involves an active and dynamic series of cognitive 
activities. Maintenance of situation awareness is not easy because the process 
requires mental resources that may be in competition with ongoing task 
performance. The information gathering activities that contribute to situation 
awareness therefore may heighten workload momentarily.  However, a principal 
benefit of achieving situation awareness is that the operator or crewmember is 
prepared to deal with upcoming events such that the extreme surges in workload 
that can occur in unexpected circumstances are avoided.  [p.2-3] 
2.1.5.3 Level 3 Situation Awareness (Level 3 SA) 
Finally, the final level of situation awareness is Level 3 SA, projection.  Level 3 
SA is the result of the active cognitive mechanisms (attention, pattern matching, and 
long-term working memory) behind Level 1 SA (perception) and Level 2 SA (context).  
The perception and fusion of external data from the environment (Level 1 SA) along with 
information culled and guided by the operator’s goals and mental models allow the 
operator to predict or project potential future states of the system (Level 3 SA). 
Recall from the previous two sections, accidents reviewed by Jones and Endsley 
(1996) for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) were directly allocated to 
76.3% (Level 1 SA) and 20.3% (Level 2 SA).  In other words, accidents directly 
attributable to the Level 1 SA and Level 2 SA were 96.6% of the total accidents and only 
3.3% was attributable to Level 3 SA.  One way of explaining this is that once the problem 
is identified and placed in context, most pilots are able to respond satisfactory to the 
 
52 
existing problem.  Therefore, designing a user interface just to address Level 3 SA does 
not have a large return of investment.  For that reason, this research will be designing the 
user interface towards Level 1 SA and Level 2 SA.  Improvements in the Level 3A will 
be considered icing on the cake. 
2.1.5.4 Situation Awareness Assessment Tools – SAGAT and SPAM 
After this long discussion with regards to situation awareness, one would 
naturally ask:  “What does this give me?” and “How do I measure SA?”  The SA theory 
allows one to directly measure complex dynamic situations.  Thus, comparing two 
different user interfaces can be achieved directly by comparing the operator’s SA for 
each interface.  
With regards to the second question, one must next decide whether the subjects 
are required to memorize the situation or are they allowed to “look up” the answer.  If the 
first, then the subject should be well versed in the domain!  The operator must be able to 
mentally reconstruct the supplied information to reach a conclusion.  Since our subjects 
for the first two experiments were not subject matter experts, this did not seem feasible.  
If the latter, then the SA measures the subjects ability to locate the correct information!  
This seems to more accurately reflect real world complex domains.  Thus, the SA 
assessment tools considered for this experiment were SAGAT and SPAM, two very 
interesting assessment methods.  (There is a veritable alphabet soup of assessment 
methods, but these two are of particular interest within the operator assessment domain 
according to the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EOSAN).) 
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“The Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) is a global 
tool developed to assess SA across all of its elements based on a comprehensive 
assessment of operator SA requirements” (Endsley and Kiris 1995).  Endsley’s 
assessment technique requires the stopping of the experiment while hiding the 
information on the display.  The Situation Present Assessment Measure, or SPAM 
(Durso, Rawson, & Girotto, 2007), assesses the speed of accessing information from a 
nonblanked display and provides a more sensitive, continuously distributed (time) 
measure that will be less likely (than SAGAT) to be at floor levels because of memory 
decay.  Although Endsley prefers the SAGAT assessment tool, this research followed the 
recommendations of the EOSAN for measuring SA in the UAV domain and used SPAM, 
precisely because the subjects were inexperienced. 
2.1.6 Separate, Integral and Configural Displays 
Finally, one can describe this display with respect to display design organization.  
Any user interface performs two functions:  it presents the important state information (as 
envisioned by the designers) to the user and it enables the user to perform tasks to 
accomplish their goals.  An interface should extract the critical features of the problem 
space to enable users to achieve their goals.  Furthermore, “the interfaces control-display 
relationship should be consistent with human perceptual and cognitive abilities so that 
effective control of the design process can be achieved” (Rothrock, Barron et al. 2006).  




1. Make a relevant process easy to discriminate 
2. The process behavior (changes in state) intelligible 
3. If mapping between display states, behaviors in the process being 
controlled “easy” to follow 
4. Do all the above simultaneously, within a single representation 
This is very difficult and has had much research time expended on designing the visual 
representations (Pomerantz 1986; Barnett and Wickens 1988; Wickens and Carswell 
1995; Jenkins 2007). 
2.1.6.1 The Gulf of Evaluation 
Pomerantz (1986) proposed three relationships among visual stimuli:  separable, 
integral and configural.  A separable relationship has no interaction between dimensions, 
such as sound volume does not affect the perception of length.  At the opposite extent, an 
integral relationship cannot separate the relationship between dimensions, such as mass 
and gravity combine to form weight.  An intermediate configural relationship can be 
defined by the independence of the dimensions that has an emergence of a new property, 
such as the relative sizes of independent population bubble graphs.  There may not be an 
explicit ordering of the data on the graph, but the observer can identify an implicit 
ordering based on the size of the bubbles – this sort ability is the new emergent feature. 
According to Wickens and Carswell (1995) the Proximity Compatibility Principle 
(PCP) “specifies that displays relevant to a common task or mental operation should be 
rendered close together in perceptual space.”  This defines the relationships between task 
demands and the graphical form of a display (separable, integral, configural).   
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The PCP’s “close together in perceptual space” means both display (physical) 
proximity and mental proximity.  To have display proximity nearness one needs:  spatial 
proximity (physical distance), chromatic proximity (same or different color), code 
homogeneity (coding properties to be similar or different), and geometric form (integral 
or configural versus separable displays).   
On the other hand, mental proximity, meaning the “extent to which information 
from the various sources in a display must be considered together to accomplish a task” 
(Rothrock, Barron et al. 2006), has three categories:  integrative processing (highest 
proximity), nonintegrative processing (intermediate proximity), and independent 
processing (lowest proximity).  Integrative processing from multiple sources must be 
explicitly combined (e.g., probability of survival requires information about SAM sites, 
enemy aircraft and enemy positions).  Nonintegrative processing similar features can be 
categorized (e.g., oil- and engine-temperatures).  On the other hand, independent 
processing has no interaction between sources (e.g., distance-to-base and air-
temperature).  (However, to calculate time-to-return-to-base may require distance-to-base 
and air-temperature.) 
The Gulf of Evaluation (GoE) is the “nearness” of the display proximity and the 
mental proximity.  An efficient interaction has a small GoE and occurs when the display 
proximity matches the mental proximity, creating a cognitive congruence.  When these 
do not match, there exists a large GoE or cognitive dissonance.  Performance on 
integrated tasks (high mental proximity) is predicted to be facilitated by displays that 
have high perceptual proximity (integral or configural displays), i.e., analog gauges are 
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more conducive to driving a car.  By the same token, performance on focused tasks (low 
mental proximity) is predicted to be facilitated by displays that have low perceptual 
proximity (e.g., text tables are good for baseball batting statistics). 
2.1.6.2 The Gulf of Execution 
PCP may constrain displays so that efficient interaction can occur, it does not, 
however, specify the form.  Display control literature has developed general design 
guidelines called the principles of control-display compatibility (Wickens, 1992), that 
stipulate: 
• The spatial arrangement of controls should allow users to easily tell which 
control is used. 
• The indicator of a display should move in the same direction as its control. 
• The layout of the operational method of controls should be consistent with 
expectations of the user population. 
• The direction in which a part moves on the display should be consistent with 
user expectations. 
These principles serve as a guide that uses user expectations to guide the display 
design choices.  For example, “bigger is better” might translate to a bar graph size 
indicating the relative merits of that dimension.  When these expectations are not met, 
there exists a mental dissonance and the Gulf of Execution (GoE) is said to be larger. 
These principles have been incorporated into the design of the visual thinking 
display artifacts and the entire suite of displays for this research.  The text tables were 
modified to incorporate color as a visual cue to out of tolerance, and thus become 
configural displays of the most basic type.  The bar graph display was chosen as a naïve 
design attempt as a graphical user interface.  The bar graphs were grouped by dimension 
(FoM) to create a display proximity advantage for the dimension (number of SAM sites).  
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However, by definition of the bar chart form, this in turn presented a poor display 
proximity for the by UAV tasks (Which UAV had a better chance of survival?).  This 
mental proximity disjointedness is inherent to the bar graph feature set – if the bar graph 
is displayed along the UAV axis instead of the FoM axis, the mental proximity problem 
would just be reversed.  The mission decision aide (the configural visual thinking display 
for experiment 1) incorporated the same out of tolerance color cue, had the within UAV 
display proximity (the widget itself) and across dimension display proximity (adjoining 
widgets had dimensions represented in the same relative positions, making comparisons 
relatively easy). 
2.2 Domain 
The use of unmanned vehicles in the military and Homeland Security applications 
are specifically for those missions that are too long, dangerous, or dirty to waste human 
resources.  When a mission has a long duration, the human operator’s attention may 
wane; resulting is in a less than stellar mission result.  In dangerous missions, such as 
surveillance over enemy territory or rescue missions in toxic environments, the use of 
unmanned vehicles lowers human injury and death rates.  Finally, missions that are 
uncomfortable can be a distraction to the human operator, possibly causing the failure of 
mission objectives. 
As a final argument for the use of UAVs, let us examine the economics of using 
and crewing UAV systems.  UAVs are simpler and easier to operate than manned 
aircraft; hence the cost of training is much less.  For instance, training a rated pilot costs 
over one million dollars and incurs a yearly salary of $80-$100K.  Compare that to 
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training costs of UAV operators from the enlisted ranks ($30K), with salaries closer to 
$30K per year.  Furthermore, since there is no onboard crew, no crew safety training nor 
life support systems need to be integrated into the UAV systems.  Finally, the control 
systems can be made simpler, bringing down the cost further and simplifying design. 
The U.S. military is interested in applying single operator/supervisor control of 
multiple UAVs to their unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) missions; in particular, 
(1) search, (2) search and rescue (SAR), (3) search and destroy (SAD), and 
(4) suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions (SRA International Inc. 2005).  
SEAD “is the activity that neutralizes, destroys, or suppresses enemy [Air Defense (AD)] 
systems in a specific area by physical attack and [Electronic Warfare (EW)] to enable 
[Tactical Air] operations to be successfully conducted.  It increases the probability of 
success and reduces the loss of friendly air power” (Army 2000).  The SEAD mission has 
two forms:  non-lethal (disruptive suppression) and lethal (destructive suppression).  
Disruptive suppression complements destructive suppression, and is best used to:  
(1) degrade jammable threats; (2) assist destructive ground-based and airborne 
suppression systems in suppressing surface-to-air defense systems; (3) temporarily 
degrade or neutralize enemy AD systems when destruction is not possible or feasible; and 
(4) sustain suppression effects achieved by destruction, once the threats have been 
reduced to levels commensurate with the objective. 
If we compare the two varieties of SEAD mission in a communications scenario, 
the differences become clear.  The non-lethal SEAD mission employs UAVs that use 
electronic countermeasures to jam communication channels, thereby suppressing the 
 
59 
enemy command and control.  Non-lethal SEAD can also use force to temporarily 
damage communications towers, without obliterating the whole communications 
infrastructure.  On the other hand, lethal SEAD destroys the enemy communication 
infrastructure using any military force deemed necessary, including armed UAVs.  The 
intent is to inflict so much destruction that alternate means will be needed to 
communicate within the military and civilian societies for the foreseeable future.  
Recovering from a non-lethal SEAD mission is relatively painless compared to the 
rebuilding required if the lethal SEAD mission achieves its goals.  As the Army Field-
Manual 1-114 (2000) points out, lethal and non-lethal SEAD methods can be used in 
conjunction with each other.  Each of these SEAD missions is currently used by the 
military (individually and collectively).  This research addresses only the non-lethal 
SEAD mission. 
2.2.1 Control of UAVs 
Controlling UAVs falls under three categories:  (1) individual, (2) small team, and 
(3) swarm size.  Each of these categories requires different assumptions and levels of 
control.  Currently, the standard control paradigm is flying individual UAVs by a small 
group of individuals.  The UAVs do not need to be autonomous and the control 
mechanism can model operator control.  Small groups require a more sophisticated, semi-
autonomous UAV and transfer the control mechanism towards a supervisory role.  
However, the “pilot” may take operator level control of individual UAVs.  On the other 




The Predator family of UAVs is the leading deployed production UAV system.  
During the 1990’s, the usefulness of the Predator as a surveillance platform was proven 
very effective.  The Predator UAV started as an operator controlled vehicle, but is slowly 
evolving towards a semi-autonomous combat workhorse.  Since this research required an 
existing UAV system to test its theories, the Predator’s evolution of purpose and 
sophistication fit those requirements. 
Although swarm control is an interesting topic by itself, this research only 
examined the controlling of individual UAVs and small teams of UAVs. 
2.2.1.1 Control of Individual UAVs 
Individual UAVs can be controlled by pilot operators in a manner similar to how 
a pilot controls a manned combat aircraft, i.e., stick and rudder.  However, since the 
operator is situationally removed from the UAV and the feedback is drastically limited, 
forming a technological anomie, as experience has shown that the piloted aircraft control 
model is not the correct model with respect to UAVs.  Experience has changed the 
control model to a “point and click” mouse driven operator interface. 
The primary consumers of UAVs, the military and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), discussed the control of UAVs during the CERI 2nd Annual Human 
Factors of UAVs (2005) sponsored workshop.  Question and answer sessions were held 
with current UAV operators from the United States Air Force and Army along with a 
representative of the DHS and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  The 
following information was gleaned from those discussions. 
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One of the major concerns for the operator is situational awareness because of the 
lack of sensory feedback.  Each of the military branches uses their own resources and 
philosophies to try to address this problem.  Each branch had a representative discuss 
these military philosophies at the Cognitive Engineering Research Institute (CERI) 2nd 
Workshop. 
Currently, in the United States Air Force, each Predator UAV requires three 
persons to complete a mission:  an operator, a sensor operator (SO), and a mission 
controller/coordinator (MC).  The Predator is a large UAV, approximately one third of 
the size of an F-16 fighter aircraft.  The corporate mindset of the Air Force considers the 
UAV operator to be equivalent to a rated officer; this means the operator is an officer 
who has gone through the same initial training as any pilot or a rated navigator who has 
passed instrument flight ground school training.  Since the Air Force considers the ability 
to “place one’s self into a remote vehicle” difficult, it has stated that it expects a pilot 
may crash at least one UAV during training and still remain a viable candidate for pilot 
operator (Gunter and Lytle 2005).  Furthermore, the operators may be literally located 
half way around the world from the battlefield; for example, while the UAVs flying in 
Iraq II were launched and landed by pilots stationed in Iraq, the missions were flown by 
operators based in Nevada.  Although difficult, projecting oneself into the remote vehicle 
is seen as essential to effective operator situation awareness. 
On the other hand, The United States Navy requires only two rated officers as 
operators for their UAVs.  The navigator and weapons specialist positions are combined 
(Cummings and Guerlain 2004).  The Navy’s UAV interest seems directed more towards 
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intelligent munitions that can be launched from sea and redirected afterwards.  Retrieval 
of the weapons system does not seem to be an important issue.  The naval intelligent 
munitions can be launched from an aircraft carrier, while the operator can be located on 
the same ship, a different ship, or on a naval base on land.  Once again, the operator’s 
ability to project themselves into the remote vehicle’s situation is considered essential to 
the success of the mission. 
The third military branch, the United States Army, uses enlisted and warrant 
officer personnel to operate their rotary and fixed wing UAVs.  When choosing personnel 
for training, the army selects the enlisted personnel with experience using computer game 
and/or sophisticated model airplanes.  The Army expects the knowledge gained in 
immersive gaming and model airplane flying to translate into the operator being able to 
project themselves into the UAV’s remote situation. 
2.2.1.2 Multiple UAV Control 
As Cummings (2004) pointed out, “while currently [UAVs] require relatively 
concentrated input for flight control, in the future, it is likely that the human role for 
direct flight control will diminish and the need for supervisory control, to include higher-
level cognitive reasoning, will become much more substantial.”  In other words, in order 
for the services to progress from the individual UAVs to multiple UAVs, the individual 
UAV is required to become more autonomous.  This changes the control model from an 
operator/pilot control paradigm to a supervisor control paradigm.  The supervisor control 
paradigm presents a lower human risk and cost than traditional pilot-controlled aircraft 
and it is a lower cost alternative to single UAV operator-controlled aircraft. 
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Recent research examining autonomous pack control issues have examined 
heterogeneous teams (Tambe 1998), homogeneous wolf packs (Lewis, Polvichai et al. 
2005) and autonomous wingman (Cummings and Morales 2005).  Tambe’s (1998) 
research examined heterogeneous UAV teams, in which each UAV had a unique role and 
explicit responsibilities – commander, scout and attacker.  Each role had explicit rules; 
had to have all failures explicitly accounted for; and explicitly defined rules for recovery.  
This strict enforcement of roles is a very brittle, complicated system that does not easily 
scale up to larger groupings.  Furthermore, the teams used an “explicit model of 
teamwork”, known as the joint intentions framework.  The joint intentions framework 
creates an intention or commitment by the team to perform a task.  To create the 
commitment, all teammates must mutually believe:  (1) that the task has not been 
performed, (2) the task needs to be performed, and (3) that until the status of the task 
changes to be mutually known to all teammates to be achieved, unachievable or 
irrelevant, it remains a goal.  If one team member finds that the task becomes achieved, 
unachievable or irrelevant, then this team member makes its new task to be that of 
changing the team’s mutual belief to reflect its own beliefs. 
When one compares this approach with Lewis, Polvichai et al. (2005), teams are 
referred to as packs; the packs are homogeneous – utilizing intelligent munitions; and 
modeled after wolf pack attacking methods.  Most importantly, in Lewis’ approach, there 
are no unique roles.  For instance, in a search and destroy, each UAV is initially assigned 
a search role.  If a UAV finds a target it calls for reinforcements to form a pack.  Once it 
is formed, the pack may attack en masse or sequentially with a lone UAV always held in 
reserve to perform battle damage assessment.  If the target is of high enough priority, the 
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arrival of a second UAV can initiate the attack on the target by the first UAV.  If the first 
UAV does not destroy the target, then the second UAV waits for a third’s arrival before 
proceeding to attack, and so on…. 
The autonomous wingman (Cummings and Morales 2005) typically uses the 
UAVs as defensive weapons and battle damage assessment recorders.  The UAVs 
assigned the “wingman” role in a tactical air formation are controlled remotely by the 
lead manned aircraft.  Who, what, where, when, and why the pilot’s commands are 
executed is of intense interest to the researchers of the autonomous wingman paradigm.  
As Cummings and Morales (2005) point out, “[p]reliminary research suggests that 
without higher levels of autonomy and a shift from management-by-consent to 
management-by-exception control strategies, the workload of pilots controlling UAVs in-
flight, especially single seat pilots, will be too high.” 
2.2.2 Autonomous Agents 
How autonomous is autonomous enough?  If we assume that technologies already 
available to larger aircraft (automatic take-off and landings, collision avoidance, etc.) will 
soon be available to UAVs, then the argument can be made that the current or near term 
UAVs are autonomous enough.  These leading edge UAVs can be modeled as an 




Table 2.3 Agent criteria and rationale 
Ferber (1999) defines an autonomous agent is a 
biological, mechanical or virtual entity 
Rationale 
that is capable of acting in an environment; Environment affects decisions each 
UAV makes, pop-up entities can affect 
the UAV’s route 
that can communicate directly [or indirectly] with 
other agents; 
Communicate directly and indirectly 
(through other agents) with other agents 
that is driven by a set of tendencies (has autonomy); Target detection affects tendencies 
which possesses resources of its own; Has weapons and fuel 
that is capable of perceiving its environment 
(although limited); 
Perception of physical and virtual 
stigmatic information 
that has only a partial representation of this 
environment; 
Local view that can be augmented with 
neighboring agents views 
which possesses skills and can offer services; Can search for or attack targets 
that may be able to reproduce itself; and  
whose behavior tends towards satisfying its 
objectives, taking account of the resources and skills 
available to it and depending on its perception, its 
representations in the communications it receives. 
Each agent has a specific role and 
mission 
In preparation of the UAV hardware technology catching up with the 
requirements of autonomy, the Multiple-UAV Agency (MAGE) simulation testbed was 
created.  Table 2.3 shows how the MAGE UAV agents fit the agent programming criteria 
as defined by Ferber (1999) and the rationale applied to show how the UAVs in the 
MAGE simulation fit these criteria.  The MAGE environment is a distributed 
heterogeneous multi-agent simulation testbed using a flexible and portable interactive 
simulation infrastructure designed to be extensible. MAGE is a research testbed that 
permits exploring different facets of controlling multiple UAVs, such as, network centric 
information synthesis, supervisory control, path planning, multi-sensor data fusion, etc. 
However, having an agent in an environment is not enough.  Agents have only a 
partial, local representation of their environment.  There is no global awareness of the 
evolving environment (situation); this exactly mimics how it is in human society.  To 
overcome this weakness, humans form groups and share local information to create a 
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more global awareness.  This awareness does not guarantee omniscience, but rather less 
situation ignorance.  The equivalent in the agent paradigm is the multi-agent system 
(MAS).  Table 2.4 illustrates how the simulation within the MAGE structure will fulfill 
the MAS criteria. 
Table 2.4 Simulation swarm criteria and rationale 
Ferber (1999) defines a MAS application 
as requiring 
Rationale of MAGE as MAS 
an environment, E Simulated geographic location, including 
bases, no-fly zones, etc. 
a set of situated objects, O MAGE objects include targets, bases, 
UAVs, “red/blue forces”, etc. 
an assembly of agents, A, (a subset of 
objects) 
Some of the simulation agents are the 
UAVs agents and the target agents 
an assembly of relations R, that link the 
objects (and agents) 
A UAV can communicate capabilities, 
mission, etc. 
an assembly of operations, Op, allows the 
agents to act on the objects; and 
Each UAV search, destroy, perceive, etc. 
operators whose task is to represent the 
application and react to these operations. 
Decision Support Interface (DSI) agent, 
Wizard of OZ (WOOZ) agent, etc. 
Based on these two lists of criteria, this simulation fits comfortably into the agent-
based programming and MAS paradigms.  However, the “intelligence” of the individual 
agents may be programmatically internal or external to the agent, i.e., the MAGE 
software contains legacy software that does not necessarily contain fully encapsulated 
agents. 
2.2.3 Humans in Complex Systems 
Sheridan (1997) asserted that there are many alternatives to the human/machine 
interface, the extremes of the spectrum being technology-centered and human-centered 
paradigms.  The technology-centered paradigm insists “everything that can be automated 
should be automated,” while the human-centered approach believes one should “allocate 
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to the human the tasks best suited to the human, allocate to the automation the tasks best 
suited to it.”  Within human-centered automation exists a wide spectrum of alternatives:  
static or dynamic allocation; by function or by mission. 
If we contrast the goals of technological automation to human-centered 
automation; we find that the technological automation is trying to take the human out of 
the system (presumably, because it is the weak link).  As Hildebrandt and Harrison 
(2002) precisely state, “automation promises to extend or support human performance, to 
compensate for human performance deficits, to relieve the human of routine tasks, or to 
replace the human altogether.”  On the other hand, the human-centered automation goal 
creates human/machine systems in which the operator retains control in well-defined 
tasks such that the performance of both the machine and human is optimized 
(Hildebrandt and Harrison 2002).  In other words, the human should be intimately 
involved in the process without being overwhelmed.  It also means the human and 
machine need to work as a cohesive unit, and not as disjoint components. 
In dynamic complex systems, the human interaction in the system has two control 
methods at opposite extremes of the autonomy spectrum:  human-in-the-loop (HIL) and 
human-out-of-the-loop (HOL).  The HIL operator has more manual control over its 
system and, hence, is more active in the decision process; while the HOL operator has 
less control (since the system tends to run itself) and so this operator tends to be more 
passive.  The HIL operator tends to remain more vigilant and less complacent, since they 
are actively assisting in the decision making process.  The active involvement of the 
operator improves the operator’s situational awareness (SA) (Ruff 2000).  HIL operators 
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typically have faster response time and more accurate failure detection performance than 
HOL (Hildebrandt and Harrison 2003). 
When the operator is performing in HOL mode, then the individual UAV agent 
being controlled must be fully autonomous.  Endsley and Kiris (1995) argue the loss of 
manual skills is a major concern for HOL operation.  After interviewing eleven fighter 
pilots, Rouse, Geddes et al. (1987-1988) found “... there is a clear consensus [among the 
pilots] that the pilot should be in charge.”  This clearly makes a reasonable argument for 
lower levels of automation so that one can achieve HIL operator efficiency and maintain 
SA.  These human/agent systems are replacements for currently existing systems; that is, 
a pilot is replaced by an operator and a manned aircraft is replaced by an unmanned aerial 
vehicle.  Notice the one-to-one correspondence with pilot/operator and plane/UAV.  The 
previous research assumes that the system design must mimic current job divisions and 
methodologies.  This argument is not necessarily sound for the emerging multiple UAV 
systems research. 
However, with regards to multiple UAV control, the loss of manual skills should 
not be the reason for overloading the operator with information.  Multiple UAVs must be 
able to be controlled separately and as a unit.  Two facts should seem obvious:  1) one 
person cannot (simultaneously) fly multiple UAVs manually, and 2) a completely 
autonomous UAV will not be trusted.  One must find the right level of automation to 
assure the best SA for the operator/supervisor.  As Ruff (2000) points out, even 




It thus follows that we must find a level of automation, which is dynamic, 
somewhere between fully autonomous and manual. 
2.2.4 Levels of Automation 
Different levels of automation can be introduced into a decision support system 
from fully automated, which leaves the supervisor/operator out of the decision process, to 
the computer making no decisions and thus forcing the operator to make all of the 
decisions.  Modern supervisory control inserts a computer to track progress of a complex 
dynamic task (see Figure 2.12) 
 
Figure 2.12 Human supervisory control – adapted from (Sheridan 1997) 
Parasuraman, Sheridan et al. (2000) suggests ten levels of automation (LOA).  
These levels of automation can be categorized into three potential LOA paradigms:  
(1) manual control [level 10], (2) management-by-consent [levels 5-9], and 
(3) management-by-exception [levels 1-4].  In manual control, automation is inactive 
until explicitly activated by the operator, when the operator gives up control.  In 
management-by-consent, the automatic problem solver proposes actions and requires 
explicit operator approval to proceed.  Management-by-exception allows the automatic 
problem solver to act without requesting approval from the operator and will not act only 













Table 2.5 Different operator control paradigms provide different sets of strengths and challenges to 
C2 interface designers. As always, designers should examine potential methods for combining the 
aspects desired into hybrid approaches. (Lewis, Polvichai et al. 2005) 
Direct Control Management by Consent Management by Exception 
   Status    Approvals  
 Overrides    
• Operator does all 
decision making and 
information 
processing 
• Requires operator to 
constantly attend to 
vehicle 
• High workload 
• Vehicle performs 
planning and sends plan 
to operator for approval 
• Vehicle performs no 
action without obtaining 
operator approval 
• Operator highly 
interruption-driven 
• Operator must react 
quickly to ensure 
vehicle safety for time 
critical actions 
• Moderate workload 
• Vehicle performs 
planning, sends plan to 
operator, begins execution 
• Operator has ability to 
override vehicle actions, 
plans 
• Operator must maintain 
awareness of situation 
• Requires high degree of 
intelligence, autonomy for 
vehicle 
• Low workload 
Franke, Zaychik et al. (2005) illustrated the different operator control paradigms 
explicitly (see Table 2.5).  The military branches currently use direct control for 
individual UAVs.  Pack control require management-by-consent and management-by-
exception.  The level or emphasis is related to the autonomy of the UAVs. 
Ruff (2000) found that management-by-consent was the most appropriate 
operator control mechanism for a small number of UAVs, usually considered a pack level 
(four or less UAVs). 
2.2.5 Human Role in Multiple UAV Control 
Cummings (2004) suggests that within the supervisory levels of automation 
proposed by Sheridan (1997) an additional layer describing the inter-vehicle 
Status, Plans Requests Commands 
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communications levels of automation needs to be addressed to guarantee situational 
awareness for the supervisor (See Figure 2.12). 
Table 2.6 Operator and supervisor characteristics 
 Operator Supervisor 
Role Tactical/Operational Strategic 
Level of Automation Low-to-High Medium-to-High 
Minimum Level of Autonomy Minimum network Medium network 
Maximum Size Small (2-4) Small-to-Medium (4-12) 
Control paradigm Direct control Guidance only 
As Table 2.6 illustrates, there are two possible roles for human control in complex 
dynamic systems:  operator and supervisor.  The operator’s role is predisposed towards 
an operational approach with intervention behavior similar to an intermittent correction 
servo (Scerri, Xu et al. 2004; Lewis, Polvichai et al. 2005) , while the supervisor’s role 
tends towards strategic planning, such as assigning a computer to solve a problem, and 
then only intervening when computer makes a mistake or requires assistance. 
The role of the human evolving from an operator to a supervisor is illustrated in 
Figure 2.13.  The nodes represent entities involved in the performance of a high level 
mission.  The arrows represent implicit and explicit exchange of information over time 
throughout the mission.  The Human Computer Interface is any controls and displays 
necessary to interact with the computer.  The Computer Task Interface is any necessary 
actuators and sensors the computer needs to interact with its environment. 
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b) Traditional Supervisory Control



























Figure 2.13 Evolution of supervisory control 
As Figure 2.13.a illustrates, the operator performs a task with computer 
assistance.  Since the levels of automation can vary the task may be performed by the 
operator, the computer or combination of the two.  The Human UAV interface is the 
mental representation the operator forms of the UAV’s situation, i.e., position, 
acceleration, etc.  How well the operator can form this mental picture may determine how 
well the operator projects into the UAVs situation.  There is no direct communication 
between the UAV and the operator.  The human directs the computer as to which global 
and intermediate goals need to be performed; in turn the computer directs the UAV to 
perform a task (fly left, land, search, etc.); and finally, the UAV performs the task.  The 
UAV keeps an internal representation of its neighborhood and progress towards its task 
achievement.  The UAV reports on task progress by sending data back to the computer.  
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The computer uses data incoming from the UAV and internal data structure 
representations to update the operator through the Human Computer Interface. 
The traditional supervisory role shown in Figure 2.13.b. illustrates how the 
supervisor/operator no longer has direct contact with the task.  The computer directs the 
UAV to perform the task while the supervisor only corrects any perceived variance from 
the desired outcome.  The levels of automation may still in theory vary, but in a practical 
sense, supervisory control is useful when the computerized system has at least a moderate 
level of sophistication. 
2.2.5.1 Human Supervisor Tasks 
With these automation guidelines, some of the human supervisory roles for 
multiple UAV control might include:  1) mission assignment, 2) subgoal assignment, 
3) resource allocation, and 4) mission algorithm assignment.  For instance, the mission’s 
overall goal may be to identify survivors after a hurricane, but the individual UAVs may 
be assigned to search different map areas.  Furthermore, the supervisor may direct each 
UAV to search differently depending on the priorities and exigent circumstances. 
The supervisor must trust the UAVs to have a minimum level of autonomy, for 
example, they must be able to continue performing assigned tasks without intervention.  
While important decisions are necessarily reserved for the supervisor, this does not mean 
that the supervisor is not intimately involved in the perception of the sensed data, but 
rather that the UAV agent must also be highly automated in perceiving whether a sensed 
blob is a target and what that target’s preliminary priority should be.  If the sensed target 
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is easily identified as a target by the UAV, why not utilize that information?  The 
supervisor cannot track all sensors in a multiple UAV group simultaneously to identify 
targets and thus he requires help from the UAV in target identification.  However, not all 
blobs are going to be easily identified by the UAV and having a human’s pattern 
recognition ability complements the UAV’s ability. 
Along the three axes, the most difficult axis to model is determining the 
appropriate level of automation.  As time progresses within a dynamic system, the 
operator’s and UAV’s priorities and goals are going to change.  For example, the internal 
priorities of targets may change over time in a SEAD mission.  Suppose a UAV identifies 
a low priority stationary target during the initial search.  The location is marked using 
virtual pheromones and the supervisor’s global view is updated.  The decision is made 
(by the supervisor or UAV) to continue searching in hopes of finding a higher priority 
target.  As the mission progresses and fuel levels start to get low, suppose no new target 
are identified.  Then the UAV raises the priority of the already identified target and is 
scheduled for attack.  On the other hand, suppose a new higher priority target is found.  
This higher priority target is attacked, while the supervisor has the option of assigning a 
different nearby UAV to attacking the lower priority target.  In this way, the UAV 
resource is efficiently and optimally used. 
2.3 Summary 
This research overview presented several theories that individually are incomplete 
as design tools.  The theories’ creators (SA, NDM, etc.) purport that their specific theory 
is the complete design tool, but in fact, they should be used as tools within a toolkit.  
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According to Klein (2009), Situation Awareness fails as a theory because it does not use 
the historical information when analyzing the designed display, but is in fact a 
measurement tool that gauges the operator’s understanding of the present and future 
states without formally addressing past circumstances.  The fact that the operator may use 
their knowledge of past events (experience) to predict future possible events is not 
explicitly addressed by SA.  On the other hand, Naturalistic Decision Making encourages 
the context sensitive design of user interfaces, without really addressing how to assess 
their validity, nor does it present a specific systematic design framework.  NDM does 
support the formal interview process before and after the design to ensure that the 
stakeholder’s needs are met but the design is ad hoc.  Missing from both of these tools 
are the psychological and physiological tools needed to design the display, which is 
addressed by visual thinking theory.  Visual thinking emphasizes designing the display to 
exploit basic visual pre-attentive cues, giving the operator the clues needed to make the 
correct decision.  And finally, semiotic analysis is the linkage between the domain culture 
(context) and the display elements – how and why a display is used within the specific 
domain. 
Hence, each of these tools is purported by their supporters to be the complete 
“design” package, when in fact they perform admirably as tools within a larger toolkit.  
The first phase of this experiment is to develop a systematic approach that can be used by 
field practitioners to design human centered, cognitively sensitive displays.  The second 
phase incorporated a more robust display that allowed the operator to actively monitor 
the system, using historical system data to make predictions about near future states.  The 
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third phase integrated the developed displays into a simulator test bed and was observed 
by current UAV operators.  
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3 Semiosis/Semiotic Analysis of UAV Command and 
Control User Interface 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Semiosis is the study of signs; including the cultural 
influences on the interpretation of signs.  What follows is an examination of semiotic 
analysis applied to the different displays used in the command and control user interfaces. 
3.1 Semiotic Analysis of UAV command and control system 
Semiotic analyses applied to the domain of UAV command and control concludes 
the following observations. 
(1) Not all data available to the controller/operator is graphic.  Reams of paper are 
generated daily to inform the operator of weather, intelligence, target 
destinations, etc.  Some of this information is presented as images (weather 
patterns overlaid on a map, target location, etc.), while some is listed in 
tabular text form (available UAVs, target importance, target location, mission 
goal, etc.). 
(2) Information is processed through multiple data pipelines, informally known as 
stovepipes.  This limitation is in part forced on the system by onerous US 
government regulations.  Whenever a secure system is accepted by the US 
government, it must pass a series of difficult tests.  This testing can take over 
a year!  So when an accepted system needs to add a new data feed, the entire 
system needs to be recertified.  One way around this is to have the data 
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stovepipe certified separately from the rest of the system.  This requires the 
addition of separate displays for the new video displays.  (At one time, there 
were five screens displaying separate, disjoint views of the mission.)  Or, as is 
the case with some data stovepipes in the UAV control domain, hardcopy text 
table printouts that the operator reads/skims prior to and during mission runs. 
(3) Not all information could be quickly accessed from the operator’s chair.  
Some information is posted on a clipboard located away from the control 
station.  On shift changes, operators tended to read this information prior to 
replacing current operators occupying the chair.  Changes to the environment 
(weather, social, mission, etc.) may be represented on one screen, and then 
mentally composited on other screens by the operator. 
(4) Most monitoring displays mimic existing paper/pencil tables or existing 
gauges.  In general, the displays do not take advantage of inherent human 
cognitive perception abilities.  This tends to make decisions more difficult to 
arrive at and takes longer to execute.  Most of the time, this time delay is not 
crucial, but there does exist the possibility of a catastrophic result if the 
decision is delayed or wrong. 
(5) Since there is more than one person controlling the UAV, each person has his 
own responsibility.  It follows that there are times that the information needed 
by one member is known by another or must be retrieved by another. 
(6) Not all of the mission parameters are available to the operator prior to the 
UAV mission launch.  Since we are in a highly dynamic environment, 
missions, goals and targets can change quickly and unexpectedly.  Intelligence 
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operators frequently hi-jack the UAV mission to accomplish new, high 
priority goals.  Forces in contact with enemy forces drastically alter priorities.  
Informal and formal socio-political environments can alter UAV path 
parameters profoundly without having an associated “data pipeline”.  
Furthermore, adverse weather conditions can affect priorities on the mission 
list. 
One of the overarching themes of the semiotic analysis is the disjointedness of the 
data/information pipelines.  In part, this research presents a flexible display that can have 
multiple data pipelines that can be visually organized as a static, weighted, figures of 
merit decision aide or a dynamic, weighted health monitoring aide.  Furthermore, the 
number of axis available to view by the supervisor is flexible (range:  6-15), allowing the 
supervisor to dynamically remove any inconsequential axis to further aide decision 
making. 
3.2 Semiotic Analysis of Alternative Interfaces 
Next, we perform a semiotic analysis the different displays that could be 
considered as decision aids within the multi-UAV command and control domain and look 
at their strengths and weaknesses.  First, we examine the original data pipeline – text 
tables.  This is followed by the graphical displays:  bar chart for the static decision aid 
display and analog gauge for the dynamic monitoring display. 
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3.2.1 Text Display 
As mentioned previously, the default data access to the operator for UAV 
missions is the daily operations report, typically posted by the door, and more 
importantly, not digital.  These pages of text include daily weather reports, expected 
tactical and strategic conditions, expected troop and weaponry locations (both friend and 
foe), no-fly-zone information, etc.  What it does not contain is information concerning 
specific mission requirements, i.e., it does not contain the route the UAV is expected to 
travel. 
These original data tables were typically presented in generic tabular form on 
several pages – the operator must be trained on where the important data is located.  
Within this existing environment, there exist no cognitive cues to dynamically assist the 
operator.  The tables are plain black and white, without much formatting.  Because of this 
generic format, the learning curve is steep, and long experience of the tabular format 
must be endured to become proficient.  Furthermore, the data tables can be presented on a 
hardcopy daily report or (a more recent innovation) through a separate screen monitor.  
These two sources of data were not necessarily coordinated, nor consistent.  The 
operator’s experience is used to analyze and decipher any irregularities.  Furthermore, 
digital tables may not be updated regularly, so the operator must be aware of possible 
time lags. 
This requirement of a learning curve to achieve reasonable mastery must make 
one conclude that the text table in any of its forms is an iconic symbol.  In fact, tables as a 
generic information conduit are an iconic symbol system that is learned as a child in 
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elementary school mathematics.  One speaks of an iconic symbol system because the 
table as an entity has many conventions involving row and column manipulations 
(sorting, location, etc.) to speed data access and interpretation.  Furthermore, although the 
existing tables do not use visual cues, there exist some standard visual cues that can be 
incorporated into the tables to aid emphasis of important data. 
 
Figure 3.1 Static one-threshold text table display 
For this research, the text tables were adapted to show upper and lower threshold 
through color cueing.  In the first experiment (Figure 3.1), the text tables were static with 
a single threshold indicated by a red number, while the second experiment (Figure 3.2) 
had dynamic text tables that were updated every second and had a low threshold and high 
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threshold identified by a blue and red number, respectively.  These choices of color were 
chosen to reflect the western culture cues of cold (blue) and hot (red).  Although not 
displayed in this figure, the dynamic displays had an option of displaying the low and 
high thresholds in the lower left and right corners.  This was useful in predicting the 
possibility of the UAV going out of tolerance in the near future (SA3). 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Text table display for health monitoring system 
3.2.2 Bar Chart – across and between axis 
The bar chart is one of the subjects of middle school mathematics, and thus is also 
an iconic sign system.  Traditionally, the bar chart presents a relative scaling along one 
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axis as a simple graph or as nested bar charts to examine multiple axes.  In the UAV 
domain, it can be presented to the operator in three versions:  1) across the Figure of 
Merit (Anti-Aircraft batteries, distance, probability of success, etc.); 2) across the UAV 
(UAV1, UAV2, etc.); or 3) a nested hybrid (UAV with nested FoM or FoM with Nested 
UAV).  The single axis charts are simpler to interpret, but have limited usefulness – if 
your question about a FoM is presented via a UAV mapped bar chart, then the operator 
may struggle to find an interpretation.  The nested bars are difficult to interpret on a 
monitor due to lack of screen space. 
 
Figure 3.3 Bar graph display as a decision aid 
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The bar graph presented in this research (Figure 3.3) chose to present across the 
FoMs, and thus were handicapped for any questions across the UAV dimensions.  Along 
the left side, the label indicated whether the information presented was better with a large 
value (higher survival rate) or a small value (fewer SAM sites, Air Interceptors, etc.).   
3.2.3 Analog Gauge 
The analog gauge implementation derives from the analog gauge currently 
supplied in automobiles and aircraft, and is thus a pervasive iconic sign system.  The 
normalization of the data sets to range between [0-100] allowed for standardized gauges 
that arced 180° through this range.  Furthermore, each gauge had their high and low 




Figure 3.4 Analog gauge display for health monitoring system 
This GUI was implemented as a naïve approach a graphical display for multiple 
UAVs – it is easy to implement (existing software libraries have gauge widgets) and it 
has a direct real-life analogue to the gauges currently found in aircraft. 
3.2.4 Visual Thinking Interface Design 
During development of the Multiple UAV Agency (MAGE), designed to integrate net 
centric information to facilitate control of multiple UAVs, one of the chosen features for the 
MAGE software was to provide automated mission planning to reduce operator workload.  
Towards this end, SYTRONICS licensed from Operations Research Concepts Applied (ORCA) 
its OPUS mission planning software library.  OPUS was employed by MAGE to generate 
 
86 
multiple alternative mission routes from which the MAGE operator could choose to execute.  In 
addition to the routes, the OPUS software also generates a series of “figures of merit” (FoM) to 
describe the characteristics of each alternative.  These FoMs include more than a dozen 
dimensions, including the probability of surviving the mission, number of surface-to-air missile 
launches, minutes of exposure to anti-aircraft artillery, minutes exposure to search radars, minutes 
exposure to missile guidance radars, fuel consumption, to name a few.  These measures are all 
numeric but have different measures, different minimums and maximums, and run in different 
directions (fewer SAM missile launches and higher probability of survival are both better). 
The multiple scales, dimensions, and directions make it very difficult to integrate their 
meaning to get an overall idea of a route’s overall merit.  Our original representation of the FoMs 
was made in tables, similar to those shown in ORCA’s own interface to the OPUS mission 
planning software library.  However, because of the number and complexity of the FoMs the 
tables were not effective in supporting route alternative choices.  Our government technical 
contacts asked that we develop a more effective representation to support choice of route 
alternatives. 
We chose to approach the design problem from a cognitive systems engineering 
perspective, looking to theoretic psychology to determine how to build the new FoM display.  
One particularly promising cognitive theory was Arnheim (1969) description of what he called 
“Visual Thinking” (VT).  Arnheim was trying to explain how artists, particularly painters, shape 
their works cognitively.  He theorized that human cognition evolved from sensory information 
processing, particularly visual information processing, and shared communality with the 
perceptual processes.  Although Arnheim never considered the implications of this theory to 
displays and controls, others did.  McKim (1972) tried to translate VT’s hypothesis to the 
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information design to facilitate problem solving.  Using McKim as a point of departure, our 
design effort prototyped displays based on perceptual-cognitive principles (Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.5  Early drawing of a multi-dimensional, multiple scaled decision support display.  Major 
difference is the raw data display only was visible by mouse roll-over of the pie slice. 
The acute perceptual skill we based on display design was form recognition and in 
particular, the ability to judge the relative area of forms (Cleveland and McGill 1984).  
Experimenting with a large number of different representations of the FoM data, we derived a 
“pie” representation that employed expensive rescaling and standardization of the different route 
effectiveness measures.  The process first called for first determining the relative weight of each 
FoM to the final decision.  These weights determined the angular subtense of each measure’s 
slice of the pie. 
Second, a minimum and maximum value was identified for each measure.  This process 
was limited by identifying values beyond which there was no significant difference to the 
decision maker to keep the dynamic range within manageable values.  Also determined was a 
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threshold value (high or low) which defined whether the FoM made the mission alternative 
acceptable. 
Third, reciprocals were taken of those scales which smaller values were better.  This 
“flipped” these scales so bigger always meant the preferred condition.  Finally, the values falling 
below the threshold were linearly scaled between their smallest (worst) values and fixed threshold 
radius.  This identified route FoMs that did not make criteria and their area was shaded red to flag 
their failure to achieve the stated tolerance.  A minimum radius was applied so there was 
sufficient area to signal the user of the violated tolerance.  Values above the threshold were scaled 
between the threshold and the maximum diameter of the pie display.  Hence, these pie slice radii 
represented acceptable FoM values and their areas colored blue. 
The resulting circular figure we called a “Sprocket” because it resembled the tooth 
embellished wheel that drove a chain, or in this case, cognitive understanding.  It implements the 
VT paradigm because human vision is adept at area judgments and the Sprocket is designed so 
that its area represents the overall merit of the alternative route.  The user at a glance can compare 
the area subtended by each alternative’s FoMs to determine the best route.  It accomplishes 
graphically what a weighed sum of rescaled values does mathematically.  However, it clearly 
displays which dimensions contribute to the overall worth of the route and which dimensions 
exceed or fail to exceed their threshold requirements.  Further, if the decision analyst wishes to 
alter his or her weightings from the ones used to render the display, it is easy to visualize the 
changes and use them to alter the decision. 
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4 Research Framework 
This research used the cognitive systems in context framework developed by 
McNeese, Bautsch et al. (1999) to design and evaluate the user interfaces for multi-UAV 
supervisory control (Figure 4.1).  This general framework “provides a continuing 
specification of boundaries around a work domain”, the research domain being Multi-
UAV supervisory control.  McNeese’s research framework is a guide for research 
experiments within a given context.  A researcher must, implicitly or explicitly, begin 
with a set of goals.  Based on these goals, further “decisions regarding the experimental 
world, knowledge acquisition methods, representational schemes and evaluative 
procedures” must be made.  With each decision made, the researcher further limits the 
research plan, giving the researcher more awareness of what needs to be done, and 
specifying the level of detail required to complete the research.  In essence, these 
constraints narrow the choices the researcher makes, excluding choices that do not make 






















Figure 4.1  Components in the study of cognitive systems in context [adapted from (McNeese, 
Bautsch et al. 1999)] 
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As an example, this research’s goal is to evaluate visual thinking widgets as a 
decision aid and monitoring displays in the multi-UAV command and control domain.  
The expansion of Figure 4.1 showing specific goals for each experiment in this study is 
illustrated in Figure 4.2.  The figure explicitly illustrates the three experimental blocks 
(named Exp.1, Exp. 2, and Exp. 3) and the decisions made for each.  For each block in 
the figure, a decision had to be made with regards to the individual experiments. 
 
Figure 4.2 Framework of cognitive system expanded to this research 
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However, Figure 4.2 is visually overwhelming and rather complicated, so each 
experiment will be discussed in more detail with a breakout of the figure above to 
emphasize the decisions made along the way.  Along with this extraction, the questions 
each experiment was going to answer are listed as hypothesis. 
4.1 Experiment 1:  Decision Support Research Framework Details 
The first experiment’s goal is to use examine the visual thinking widget’s viability 
as a decision aid, informally called a visual thinking sprocket (or VTS) in honor of the 
cartoon “The Jetsons” and “Spacely’s Sprockets” factory.  The visual sprocket is 
compared to other standard text/graphical decision aid displays.  The McNeese 
framework for Experiment 1 (Figure 4.3) explicitly illustrates the decisions made for this 
experiment.   
 
Figure 4.3 Framework for Experiment 1 
From the first block, one sees that the goals of this experiment were to design and 
evaluate a visual thinking based user display as a decision-aiding tool for Multi-UAV 
command and control mission assignments by UAV supervisors.  After discussion with 
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stakeholders within the domain, it was determined to use the visual thinking sprocket as 
the decision aiding display. 
As shown in block 2, from this decision and the fact that UAV operators are not 
readily available for experiment subjects, it followed that a very restrictive laboratory 
setting was appropriate for the experiment.  This laboratory environment allowed the 
research to utilize college students as the subjects in the experiment.  As an added 
benefit, using college students with no prior knowledge of UAV operations removed any 
potential learning bias that a UAV operator subject might have with the existing system. 
Block 3 of the framework included questions generated during the experiment 
addressing different levels of situation awareness (SA) and questionnaires after each 
block (Appendix B).  In a cognitive system, the actual system functionality, rather than 
the theoretical or ideal function is important (Hollnagel and Woods 1999).  Thus, any 
new proposed system must be empirically evaluated.  This empirical evaluation used SA 
directed questions to instrument the display, posing questions to the subject.  The 
question format and applicable SA level is presented in Table 5.1. 
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Level 2 SA Rank order the routes  














Level 3 SA Which route is Best if Dimension X 
 is dropped?  (Where X was chosen  






Level 1 SA 
Level 2 SA 
Which route has Best Dimension Y? 






To judge the effectiveness of the new sprocket, data were collected both 
automatically (behavior traces) via the computer and manually after each block (each 
subject was asked to subjectively evaluate each display type via a questionnaire after 
each block).  After all three blocks of the experiment were completed; a final 
questionnaire asked the subjects to rate their subjective preferences of each display type.  
The data automatically collected objectively reflects the speed and accuracy of the 
decision aid’s usefulness.  The data collected by the computer was statistically analyzed 
using SAS 9.2 to examine the potential of the visual thinking widget as a viable decision 




Figure 4.4 Overview of operator decision process  
Modeling the operator’s decision process for selecting the best mission route 
among those presented (Block 4); Figure 4.4 presents one very high-level representation 
of the decision process.  As mentioned earlier, observations of current Ground Control 
Station (GCS) standard operating procedures show that the data the operators need to 
help make these decisions among alternative UAV mission paths is, in part, presented in 
text tables.  These existing tables have no aids (highlighting or hints) to help the operator 
to speed the decision.  Some of the data is available as hardcopy and while some is 
accessed through multiple computer displays.  Furthermore, there is some overlap on the 
data available through the different data stovepipes; only operator experience dictates 
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which data stovepipe to access.9  However, not all information necessary to make these 
decisions are available, so the operator must mentally construct or interpolate the 
necessary information.  Rather than use the existing data tables, considered rather 
bohemian when compared with the sprocket display, the text tables were “updated” to 
automated displays that have visual cues to draw the operator’s attention.  In other words, 
the electronic tables had color-coding to emphasize any out of tolerance Figure of Merit. 
Finally, it should be noted that the UAV operator does not receive a list of 
alternative mission routes as a rule, but rather each alternate mission route is generated 
and evaluated much like Klein’s Naturalistic Decision Making (1993) satisficing 
principle.  If the new route generated satisfied the minimum requirements, then select it 
and do not search for better solutions.  If the new route failed to satisfy the minimum 
requirements (FoMs), try to identify reasons for failure and generate new alternatives that 
address some or all of the shortcomings.  The method of generating these new 
alternatives is dependent on the operator, but generally appears to be the modification of 
previously successful mission routes that were applicable to similar situations.  Once 
again, operator experience widens the pool of alternative routes generated. 
On a visit in the summer of 2007 to a UAV command station10, it became obvious 
that the necessary information gathered for the operator to select among alternative 
                                                 
9 An information stovepipe is a data pipeline that largely restricts the flow of information to vertical 
communication and inhibits or prevents cross communication.   
10 The trailer came with four UAV operator control stations, each control station had three monitors (with 
room for 6) and a single notebook/clipboard hanging by the door with the daily intelligence report. 
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mission routes began when the operator walked into the trailer before mission handoff.  
The operator scanned the daily intelligence report hanging by the entrance.  This took 
about fifteen minutes, and supplied the current mission objectives, applicable routing 
information (waypoints for the next 2-3 legs of the mission), weather forecast, Human 
Intelligence (FFN), etc.  Following the intelligence report scan the new operator spoke 
with the current operator staffing the controls to get a flavor for the current mission 
status.  At this same time, the new operator would be scanning the Mission Monitor, the 
Satellite/weather Monitor and the Decision Support Monitor.  Each monitor had different 
information that operator might need, but no monitor had all the information that was 
necessary.  This debriefing also took about fifteen minutes, after which the new operator 
changed seats with the old operator.  The old operator might remain to observe the 
mission for a few minutes to verify all pertinent mission information had been passed on 
to the new operator.  The old operator was then able to leave the trailer. 
The reason for having many different places to get information is in part due to 
the government’s burdensome acquisition requirements.  To validate any new user 
interface requires a large investment of time, money and personnel – it takes between one 
and two years to validate and accept any new data system.  If the data is to be added to an 
existing interface, the old interface might become invalidated until the new data is added.  
Because of the inordinate amount of time to validate this new data, when new data is 
deemed to be an important enough to add to the incoming data flow, a new separate data 
stovepipe is created.  Each of the three existing monitors (Mission, Satellite/weather, and 
Decision Support) took more than a year to pass inspection.  Adding another piece of 
information to any of the UIs would require revalidating that entire subsystem.  Rather 
 
97 
than combine all user interfaces into a single complete data monitor, additional monitors 
are added; thus speeding up acquisition and lowering costs. 
Returning to the UAV mission script, each UAV’s complete mission may be 
secret and often it is on a need to know basis, and since the UAV could be in the air over 
multiple operator shifts, the operators frequently saw a partial release of the mission 
details based on time and the current location of the UAV.  Furthermore, the UAV’s 
mission may evolve over the course of the flight as targets that are more important and 
sub-missions rise to the surface of planning sessions.  Generally, the mission planning 
was performed away from the GCS.  (During an informal discussion session, one 
operator described flying UAVs as “herding cattle from point A to point B”.)  
Frequently, only the next waypoint or two in the mission were supplied to the 
operator, not the whole route.  If an operator completed a UAV’s sub-mission, then the 
mission “script” was modified or updated and the operator was then given the next 
waypoint of the current mission.  In the case of a drastic mission modification, operators 
might be requested to assist in rerouting the UAV through the new mission.  This new 
mission might include routing to a single new waypoint or a complete route with multiple 
waypoints that eventually returns the UAV to base.  The operator must use their own 
experience and current environmental information to form a viable route that satisfies any 
mission requirements. 
As a hypothetical example, imagine you are an operator flying a UAV on a 
typical surveillance mission that requires the recognizance of a suspected terrorist cell 
meeting.  The supplied routing for this mission was given by the Information/Intelligence 
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Officer to ensure maximum stealth (hovering downwind so propeller noise is not 
propagated to the target and not easily identified by the naked eye) and UAV 
survivability (outside the range of known AAA/radar sites).  Another way of saying this 
is that the top priorities of this mission from the commanders viewpoint is for the UAV to 
have a high level of survivability and stealth (not being seen or heard), while at the same 
time be able to fulfill its mission objectives to gather useful intelligence (UAV may have 
to adjust location to take pictures).  In this hypothetical situation, new information comes 
through channels stating that ambushed troops “nearby” are presently under fire – a UAV 
is needed to support the troops as their “eye in the sky” and to aid ground support 
response planning.  One needs to gather information to determine which UAV(s) 
should/can be reassigned in this high priority mission (usually distance and speed are the 
dominating parameters).  The UAV that is closest to the event and has a sufficiently low 
priority mission can be reassigned – so the UAV is reassigned to this “support the troops” 
mission.  Now the highest priorities for this new mission might be speed and survivability 
en route; however, after arriving the mission priorities might require stealth again.  
Where the priority on a simple surveillance mission might require survivability and 
stealth over speed, this new support mission might initially require speed over 
survivability and stealth.  After all, human lives are at stake and time is crucial.  
Furthermore, if the UAV is armed, then the UAV provides some valuable missile support 
to the troops on the ground.  If the UAV is not armed, then it might supply temporary 
visual support while waiting for an armed aerial response to arrive. 
The previous example illustrates the extremely complicated decision process that 
the operator may perform while responding to a change of UAV missions.  This decision 
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process can be modeled by an Operator Function Model (OFM) (McCormick 1976; 
Miller 1985; Mitchell and Miller 1986; Narayanan, Ruff et al. 2000). 
4.1.1 Operator Function Model 
An OFM is a mathematical construct finite state automata network of arcs and 
nodes that represents the cognitive processing of a process.  If represents the mental 
decomposition an operator might use to breakdown a complex system into simpler parts 
and any associated actions necessary to guarantee an acceptable overall system 
performance.  Other researchers have used OFMs to successfully model, design and 
control user-interfaces and supervisory control systems.  OFMs represent knowledge 
representation, information flow and decision-making in complex systems (Narayanan, 
Ruff et al. 2000). 
The previous hypothetical example also alludes to the mental effort required by 
the operator to determine a new UAV mission route.  How does the UAV operator 
determine the Probability of Survival (PoS)?  What type of data needs to be gathered?  
Where is it located?  Is the data out of date?  It should be obvious that the data is 
incomplete and out of date (If it were complete, then the troops under attack would have 
already had air support.).  So the operator must gather information to make a reasonable 
decision (Figure 4.5).  From the figure, one can see that information is essentially pulled 
from four sources:  mission, weather/satellite, decision support monitors and an 
“annotated” printout of current and recent satellite images and intelligence reports.  (The 
standard printout is very poorly annotated as black and white dense tables with labels, but 
little else to identify important datum.  No data or trend analysis is available.) 
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The mission monitor supplies a map of the terrain along with an overlay of the 
active mission route.  It also contains icons of relevant mission objectives and landmarks, 
such as targets, friend/foe/neutral, AAA sites, EW radar sites, etc.  The symbology assists 
the operator, but the information is frequently out of date and incorrect.  The location of 
enemy troops can be especially problematic in a non-traditional war, since the enemy 
moves fast and can be quickly camouflaged as civilians. 
The weather/satellite monitor can give current weather conditions as long as the 
operator is experienced enough to interpret the map.  However, this monitor does not 
supply a forecast capability.  To the public, the weather forecast can be easily obtained 
through a website (http://www.weather.com), which has international maps that supply 
hourly forecasts.  However, the UAV operator does not have access to a “web enabled” 
system inside the ground control station.  An external source supplied the weather 





Figure 4.5 Operator Function Model representing the information gathering stage of the decision to 
select the best mission among alternatives. 
Suggested mission alternatives can be partially compared on the decision support 
monitors.  The alternative mission routes might be graphed on a map, but the map does 
not supply hints or Figures of Merit that would assist the operator in making any 
decision.  The operator must attempt to mentally calculate path lengths, AAA and EW 
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radar footprints, etc.  Furthermore, to compare the alternate mission routes to the current 
mission, the operator must mentally translate the current mission route on the Mission 
monitor onto the Decision Support monitor, since the current mission route was not 
displayed on the Decision Support monitor.  In other words, one of the alternatives – “do 
nothing” – is not one of the choices on the Decision Support monitor.  These are gaping 
failures of the current system. 
Furthermore, the mission objectives described in the daily intelligence logs can be 
terse and incomplete.  Not all of the UAVs tasks will necessarily be listed on the 
intelligence logs because of the “need to know” secrecy of the missions.  After all, a 
mission could last up to 40 hours and the first operator might not need to know what the 
third operator is doing, nor does the third operator need to know what the first operator 
did.  The current, recent past and near future events are all that is relevant to the operator. 
Once the information is gathered, it must be analyzed by the operator as modeled 
in Figure 4.6.  The information supplied on the data acquisition side of Figure 4.5 
becomes the parameters to an optimization function side of Figure 4.6 in which the 
Probability of Survival (PoS) for the UAV is calculated.  Now we examine how this PoS 
characteristic determined or computed.  There are quite a few parameters that could make 
up the PoS, for instance, the weather, probability of detection by AAA sites, the number 
of AAA missiles available, airports, number of aircraft available for intercept at those 
airports, number of intercept aircraft in the air, etc.  Some of these FoM are reported 
through real-time information pipelines, while others are updated at some longer discrete 




Figure 4.6 Analyze Results OFM 
The operator selects the best mission route by calculating the PoS based on these 
supplied parameters.  For example, given two mission routes, one route with six known 
SAM sites and the other route with only two, the second route is preferable, based solely 
on this one parameter.  However, the decision is seldom based on one Figure of Merit 
(FoM) and sometimes the other FoMs suggest different alternatives.  Since there are no 
documented procedures to calculate the PoS, the operator uses an internal and very 
personal algorithm to determine whether enough information has been acquired to make 
the decision.  The OFM shown in Figure 4.6 is an example of what an operator might 
consider enough information.  If it is not, then the operator attempts to gather more 
information to better aid in discriminating among the existing mission choices.  
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Alternatively, a new mission that better fits the accumulated data might be suggested by 
the gathered information. 
Since the experiment examines an existing complex, dynamic decision support 
domain, UAV mission stakeholders were interviewed about what data was important to 
the operator when making mission decisions following the walkthrough of the UAV 
command station.  As expected, there was a wide range of opinions in the number and 
subjective priority of FoMs to use.  This led to designing the sprocket with the flexibility 
of displaying between six and fifteen FoMs with operator defined weighting.  These 
discussions directly led to the eight FoM and associated subjective weightings used in the 
first experiment. 
Based on the information derived from these interviews, a pattern of the decisions 
made by each operator emerged, namely an optimization problem.  Each operator applied 
different subjective weightings to each of their parameters (FoMs) in the problem.  For 
each of these FoMs, there existed an empirical threshold in which the alternate mission 
was scrubbed (more than 18 available SAMs, probability of success less than 25%, etc.).  
In these cases, other alternatives would have to be explored.   
The use of each parameter required the operator to have experience to interpret 
the results quickly.  Some of the apparent decision parameters for the operators could be 
best defined as composites of other simpler parameters (Probability of Success), while 
others were atomic (SAM sites).  Some FoMs were better when bigger (probability of 
survival, etc.), while other FoMs were better when the parameter was smaller (probability 
of detection by X, number of AAA sites, time in battle zone, etc.).  Furthermore, each 
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FoM had a different range of values.  And finally, a given FoM may have a maximum 
range, but if exceeds a given threshold below that maximum, then the risk may be too 
great. 
These disparate conceptual FoMs must be combined into one cohesive value 
representing the “goodness” of a mission route in order to differentiate among mission 
alternatives.  As a first stab, they can be represented informally by the equation 
min max( ) min( ) max( )FOMs that need to be mized FOMs that need to be imizedf x FoMs FoMs c= + +∑ ∑ , where 
c is the unknown, unaccounted for information that is not represented in the formal 



















, respectively.  However, the min function 
needs to be small and the max function needs to be large making it difficult to interpret 
and combine.  To address these differences between min and max FoMs, the FoMs min 
optimal can be inverted such that each the FoMs become max optimal, so the function 
becomes max( )Optimal FoMs c= + .  The individual FoMs have different scales, so 
normalizing is required: 
max( )
maxmax ( ) [0..1.0]
x






Mission w FoM c
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where w is the subjective weight of the FoM and ∑w = 1 and c represents external 
information available to the operator. 
However, another pattern emerged through the interview – a threshold point in 
which the operator was unsatisfied with the solution.  This threshold point was not a 
specific value like 10, but rather was dependent on the FoM units.  It might be that 15 
AAA missiles were “okay”, but 20 were not.  Likewise, 20 minutes flying over enemy 
territory was subjectively “okay”, but 60 minutes were not.  To create a display that can 
represent different units and different thresholds led to considering the Visual Thinking 
Sprocket.  To address the different units, each FoM was normalized to be into the range 
of [0..100]. Furthermore, the function was designed to be a two-piece linear function that 
represented by the linear function [1..threshold] and (threshold..100]. 
Further bits of fuzziness that cannot be modeled with a computer program are the 
esoteric influences, such as political, social and economic influences.  (For example, do 
not fly over the site of a “spontaneous” protest march.  Avoid state X because a coalition 
force is active there today.  The superior, more experienced officer says not to choose 
alternative B because “it doesn’t feel right”.) 
After gathering the data, the operator must analyze the resulting parameters to 
determine if the new missions are acceptable and/or optimal (Figure 4.6).  This that 
implies an informal risk analysis be performed on each alternate mission.  Once again, 
the operator’s experience tends to dictate the speed and accuracy of the analysis. 
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Since the experiment examines an existing complex, dynamic decision support 
domain, UAV mission stakeholders were interviewed about what data was important to 
the operator when making mission decisions.  These discussions directly led to the eight 
FoM used in the first two experiments.  Furthermore, as would be expected, there was a 
wide range in the number and subjective priority of FoMs to use, so the sprocket was 
designed with the flexibility of displaying between six and fifteen FoMs with operator 
defined weighting. 
4.1.2 Research Questions for Decision Support  
The objective of this experiment was to examine the viability of applying visual 
thinking concepts to designing static decision aid user interface displays.  Objective data 
was automatically acquired during the experimental trials, while subjective data was 
collected through a short questionnaire given to each subject after each trial.  Table 4.2 
presents the research questions addressed and their associated 1-tailed hypotheses. 
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Table 4.2 Research questions for Experiment 1 
Experiment Research Question Related Hypothesis 
Accuracy 1 Is there a significant 
difference in accuracy to 
obtain good rank order 
solutions using cognitively 
sensitive supervisory control 
of multiple UAVs? 
H0: There was no significant difference in accuracy to 
obtain good rank order solutions using cognitively 
sensitve human supervisory control of multiple 
UAVs. 
H1: It was significantly more accurate to obtain good 
rank order solutions using cognitively sensitve 
human supervisory control of multiple UAVs. 
Accuracy 2 Is there a significant 
difference in accuracy to 
determine global status 
information using cognitively 
sensitive supervisory 
control? 
H0: There was no significant difference in accuracy to 
determine global status information using 
cognitively sensitive supervisory control. 
H1: It was significantly more accurate to determine 
global status information using cognitively sensitive 
supervisory control. 
Accuracy 3 Is there a significant 
difference in accuracy to 
envision new solutions using 
mental visualization? 
H0: There was no significant difference in accuracy to 
envision new solutions using mental visualization. 
H1: It was significantly more accurate to envision new 
solutions using mental visualization. 
Accuracy 4 Is there a significant 
difference in accuracy to 
determine local status along 
a specific dimension using 
cognitively sensitive 
supervisory control? 
H0: There was no significant difference in accuracy to 
determine local status information using 
cognitively sensitive supervisory control. 
H1: It was significantly more accurate to determine 




Is there a significant 
difference in time to obtain 
good rank order solutions 
using cognitively sensitive 
supervisory control of 
multiple UAVs? 
H0: There was no significant difference in time to 
obtain good rank order solutions using cognitively 
sensitive human supervisory control of multiple 
UAVs. 
H1: It took significantly less time to obtain good rank 
order solutions using cognitively sensitve human 
supervisory control of multiple UAVs. 
Response 
Time 2 
Is there a significant 
difference in time to 
determine global status 
information using cognitively 
sensitive supervisory 
control? 
H0: There was no significant difference in time to 
determine global status information using 
cognitively sensitive supervisory control. 
H1: It took significantly less time to determine global 




Is there a significant 
difference in time to 
envision new solutions using 
mental visualization? 
H0: There was no significant difference in time to 
envision new solutions using mental visualization. 
H1: It took significantly less time to envision new 





Is there a significant 
difference in time to 
determine local status along 
a specific dimension using 
cognitively sensitive 
supervisory control? 
H0: There was no significant difference in time to 
determine local status information using 
cognitively sensitive supervisory control. 
H1: It took significantly less time to determine local 
status information using cognitively sensitive 
supervisory control. 
Each probe question used in the Decision Support Experiment was designed to 
specifically address two of these research questions.  For example, Rank Order the three 
alternate missions from best to worst is designed to examine research question 
Accuracy 1:  Is there a significant difference in accuracy to obtain good rank order 
solutions using cognitively sensitive supervisory control of multiple UAVs? and 
research question Response Time 1:  Is there a significant difference in time to obtain 
good rank order solutions using cognitively sensitive supervisory control of multiple 
UAVs? 
4.2 Experiment 2:  System Monitoring Research Framework 
Following the Experiment 1 success, the same research framework (Figure 4.3) 
was applied to Experiment 2, namely McNeese, Bautsch et al. (1999).  This time, the 
goal (Block 1) was to examine the Visual Thinking Widget as a dynamic system 
monitoring display within the multi-UAV control domain.  This experiment incorporated 
the Visual Thinking Widget into the MAGES simulation testbed, a medium/high fidelity 
simulator (Block 2).  The subjects were directed to monitor three UAV’s gauges 
simultaneously, determining whether a UAV’s “health” was out-of-tolerance.  
Throughout the experiment, the operator/supervisors were queried about the current and 
possible future states of the system (Block 3).  Following each 20-minute trial, the 
subjects were surveyed on their opinions of the presented design.  So once again, the 
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subjects were queried during and between experimental trials with SA guided questions 
(Blocks 5 & 6). 
 
Figure 4.7  Framework for Experiment 2 
The experiment follows the monitoring tasks similar to those presented by 
Narayanan, Ruff et al. (2000), but much simpler.  The only three options presented to the 
student subject were 1) do nothing (keep monitoring); 2) identify out-of-tolerance FoM 
(reboot FoM and note failure); and 3) identify FoMs that may “soon” go out-of-tolerance 
(watch more diligently and note potential failure).  The actions performed by the subjects 





Figure 4.8 OFM of experiment 2 monitoring task 
4.2.1 Research Questions for System Monitoring 
The objective of this experiment was to examine the viability of applying visual 
thinking concepts to designing dynamic monitoring user interface displays.  Objective 
data was automatically acquired during the experimental trials, while subjective data was 
collected through a short questionnaire given to each subject after each trial.  The 
simulation was performed on a medium-high fidelity testbed.  Table 4.3 presents the 
research questions addressed and their associated 1-tailed hypotheses. 
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Table 4.3 Research questions for Experiment 2 





Can the operator perform the 
primary task (keeping the target 
centered) better using cognitively 
sensitive human supervisory 
control of multiple UAVs? [RMSE]? 
H0: There was no significant difference in RMSE in 
keeping the target centered 
H1: There was significantly less RMSE in keeping 
the target centered. 
Monitor Task: 
Accuracy 
Is there a significant difference in 
accuracy when monitoring out of 
tolerance values? 
H0: There was no significant difference in 
accuracy when monitoring out-of-tolerance 
values. 
H1: There was significantly more accurate when 
monitoring out-of-tolerance values. 
Monitor Task: 
False Positive 
Is there a significant difference in 
false positives when monitoring 
out-of-tolerance values? 
H0: There was no significant difference in false 
positives when monitoring out-of-tolerance 
values. 
H1: There was significantly more false positives 
when monitoring out-of-tolerance values. 
Response 
Time 
Is there a significant difference in 
time to respond to out-of-
tolerance monitored values using 
cognitively sensitive supervisory 
control? 
H0: There was no significant difference in time to 
accurately respond to out-of-tolerance 
monitored values using cognitively sensitive 
human supervisory control of multiple UAVs. 
H1: It took significantly less time to accurately 
respond to out-of-tolerance monitored values 
using cognitively sensitive human supervisory 
control of multiple UAVs. 
4.3 Experiment 3 Research Framework Details 
Still following the flow of the McNeese framework, the final experiment initially 
was to instrument the existing Predator simulation software with the Visual Thinking 
Widget library, and then have active duty and reserve UAV operators use the system.  
However, due to internal military and external corporate requirements11, the validation 
                                                 
11 The copyright to the Predator Simulation software is held by a subcontractor of the simulation system.  
While the primary contractor had said that the instrumentation could be performed on the simulator, it 




was achieved using the existing MAGE software along with the active duty and reserve 
UAV operators. 
 
Figure 4.9 Framework for Experiment 3\ 
During the experiment, the UAV operators were surveyed and interviewed about 
the various MAGE training enhancements.  These included the Visual Thinking displays 
(decision aid and monitoring system) along with other enhancements12.  These interviews 
were held in Victorville, CA with the Predator training site and at Wright Patterson AFB 
Human Effectiveness Laboratory. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
the permission was postponed until one week prior to the experiment, at which time the primary 
copyright holder decided to not grant permission.  At that time, it was decided to have the UAV 
operators use the MAGE software to grant permission.  So it was decided to have the UAV operators 
observe the MAGE software to validate the concept. 
12 The other enhancements included a mission timeline decision aid, network centric information displays, 
real time weather low fidelity modeling,  
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4.3.1 Research Questions for third Experiment 
Table 4.4 Research questions for Experiment 2 
 Research Question Related Hypothesis 
Workload 
preference 
Does the SME prefer the VTS to 
the current or modified VIT 
system? 
H0: There was no significant difference in 
subjective workload preference among the 
three displays 
H1: There was significant difference in subjective 





5 Experiment Design 
5.1 Decision Aid Support Experiment 
The experiment presented three alternate static displays in a controlled laboratory 
environment.  The displays were to be used as decision aids for UAV mission planning.  
This experiment’s goal with respect to this research was intended to answer whether the 
visual thinking widget was an effective display alternative as a decision aid. 
5.1.1 Training 
Training consisted of 30 minutes of instructions via an oral PowerPoint® 
presentation, and visually (projected on a wall mounted screen and on each subject’s 
computer desktop). Furthermore, each subject was given a paper copy to refer to “as 
needed” during the experiment.  Each of the three display formats were examined in 
detail, with each prompting question examined along with verbal descriptions of what the 
interpretations should be. 
5.1.2 Design 
The experiment was a two factor repeated-measures design with full-model 
partitioning.  Microsoft Excel® was used to generate the text table and bar chart images 
that were compared with the sprocket, while software developed for the MAGE Decision 
Support System (DSS) generated the sprocket images.  Each image was generated from 
the same data, i.e., a bar chart, text table and sprocket image were generated from dataset 
1, 2, 3, etc.  Each subject was shown a series of generated images of the Figures of Merit 
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(FoM) for three alternative paths’ and a question.  The subject responded to the first 
question (rank order the three routes from best to worst), and then the second question 
was displayed, and so on – the presented image did not change and remained visible 
during the questioning (SPAM – Situation Present Assessment Method).  The four 
questions, possible answers, levels of situation awareness, and question abbreviation are 
listed in Table 5.1.  The question abbreviation is used in the Results section as an easy 
mnemonic for each of the question types. 







1 Level 2 SA Rank order the routes  















3 Level 3 SA Which route is Best if Dimension X is 
dropped?  (Where X was chosen from 







4 Level 1 SA 
Level 2 SA 
Which route has Best Dimension Y? (Where 





After the fourth question, a new image was displayed and the same four questions 
were asked.  For each display type, 12 images were generated with the same datasets.  In 
other words, 12 datasets were used to generate 12 bar chart, table and sprocket images for 
a total of 36 images.  Referring to Table 5.2, the two factors are display type (text table, 
bar chart, and sprocket) and image dataset (I1, I2, …, I12).  The order of presenting the 
displays was fully-balanced and randomly assigned to each subject to avoid learning 
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effects.  The order of presenting the images was also randomly assigned per block; 
however, there were only three lists of random images.  Each subject saw 36 images and 
answered four questions for each image for a total of 144 questions.  For each question, 
the response time and answer were recorded, thus giving two objective measures for each 
question. 
Table 5.2 Outline of the design with two repeated-measures factors 







)  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 I10 I11 I12 
Table 
D1 
I1D1 I2D1 I3D1 I4D1 I5D1 I6D1 I7D1 I8D1 I9D1 I10D1 I11D1 I12D1 
Bar Chart 
D2 
I1D2 I2D2 I3D2 I4D2 I5D2 I6D2 I7D2 I8D2 I9D2 I10D2 I11D2 I12D2 
Sprocket 
D3 
I1D3 I2D3 I3D3 I4D3 I5D3 I6D3 I7D3 I8D3 I9D3 I10D3 I11D3 I12D3 
Each mission route has seven weighted Figures of Merit (FoM) in which the 
subject was to judge the routes (Table 5.3).  Each FoM was presented to the subject in a 
predetermined order primarily based on its weighting value.  Although the FoM measures 
would likely have some interdependencies (i.e., SAM shots and SAM tracking 
probability of detection have an obvious relationship), their test values were randomly 
generated and independently determined. 
Table 5.3 Mission Figures of Merit descriptions and order of presentation 
Figure of Merit Weight Description 
Probability of Survival 40 Self-explanatory 
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) 
shots 
15 Number of SAM missile launch opportunities by the enemy 
Aircraft Intercept launch 15 Number of aircraft intercept opportunities (determined by 
tracking) that can intercept the UAV 
Anti-Aircraft-Artillery (AAA) 
exposure 
15 Number of minutes the UAV is exposed to enemy AAA 
Net number of tracks exposed 9 For each track (leg) of the route, how many allowed radar 
tracking 
SAM tracking probability of 
detection 
3 Given a SAM battery, the estimated probability of 
detection 
Early Warning (EW) radar 
probability of detection 
3 The possibility of an early warning system detecting the 
UAVs entering the enemy airspace 
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Each block of displays had twelve images of three alternative mission routes. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the same three routes displayed as a table, bar chart and a visual 
thinking sprocket image.  In the Table Display format (Figure 5.1.A), the first column 
lists the weight given for each FoM, the second column states the FoM’s name – so the 
Probability of Survival is the most important dimension reflected in the 40%, while SAM 
tracking probability of detection, Early Warning (EW) radar probability of detection 
share the bottom at a 3% weighting value.  The third, fourth and fifth columns represent 
the three alternative routes.  The sixth and seventh columns are used in conjunction to 
assign pass/fail for the specific FoM.  The sixth column states the minimum/maximum 
threshold for that respective FoM, any value failing to meet this threshold is colored red.  
The last column refers to the directionality of the FoM axis:  the plus sign (+) means 
bigger is better, while the minus sign (-) means smaller is better.  (Only the Probability of 
Survival has a positive direction, i.e., the value must be larger than the criterion to pass.  
All of the other FoM require smaller values to pass the criterion.) 
Looking at the first route (3rd column) in Figure 5.1.A, one can see that for the 
Probability of Survival (2nd row) – “bigger is better” (7th column) and fails to exceed the 
minimum criterion at 0.11 (6th column), and is thus colored red (3rd column). 
The Bar Chart Display (Figure 5.1.B) and the Visual Thinking Sprocket Display 
(Figure 5.1.C) formats supply the same information as the Table Display.  (See Appendix 





Figure 5.1  Three different display modes of the same mission alternatives 
The same twelve data profiles were used in each image, but the profiles were 
presented in six different orders to reduce carry over effects.  This was so the subjects 
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were not able to detect similarities across blocks.  The blocks were counter balanced to 
further reduce any carry over effects. 
5.1.3 Participants 
The research design and procedures were submitted to the Wright State 
University Institutional Review Board, who approved conduct of the study as a low-risk 
protocol.  The first experiment had 24 volunteer subjects, mostly engineering graduate 
students, recruited from Wright State University.  All subjects saw the same images.  The 
order of presentation was varied by display type (3) and mission/route order (12) using a 
Latin Square design.  Each subject was given a Subject Consent Form prior to starting the 
experiment.  This was followed by a thirty minute PowerPoint® presentation of 
background material and instructions for the experiment.  Training, presentation of the 
three conditions, and debrief of the subjects took a total of 2.5 hours. 
5.1.4 Evaluating Rank Order 
This research explores a novel approach to grading the rank-order selection of the 
by the subjects (question 1 above).  A correct/not correct grading seems not a strong 
enough statistical measure of wrongness, nor is it a fine enough measure of the 
permutations of wrong.  Referring to Table 5.4, I propose using a weighting function that 
places a premium on the number of orderings that are correct.  For instance, if the correct 
ordering of the routes was 1-2-3, then one can break this ordering into three pairs:  
1 before 2, 2 before 3 and 1 before 3; henceforth written as 12, 23 and 13, 
respectively.  One then considers the six permutations of these the original three numbers 
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and counts the number of correct paired orderings:  the first column is 1-2-3, and has 
three correct pairings (12, 23 and 13), giving us a correct ordering value of 3; the 
second column has two correct pairings (12 and 13), giving a value of 2; the third 
column has two correct pairings (13 and 23), giving a value of 2; etc.  In short hand 
notation, if 1-2-3 were correct, then one could write Selection123 (12, 23, 13) = 3; 
Selection132 (12, 13) = 2, Selection213 (23, 13) = 2, Selection231 (23) = 1, 
Selection312 (12) = 1, and Selection321 (ø) = 0.  A Table 5.4 lookup table is created for 
each of the six possible permutations of ordering truths.  The benefit of this function is 
that the answers are objectively partitioned into four groups of relative wrongness 
[3, 2, 1, 0], giving us a way to measure the “wrongness” of an answer. 
Table 5.4 Evaluating rank order 
Truth Order Selected by Subject 
1  1 1 2 2 3 3 
2  2 3 1 3 1 2 
3  3 2 3 1 2 1 
Ordinals correct  3 2 2 1 1 0 
An alternate weighting function in which the correct placement of the first two 
items in the answer is rewarded with bonus points: first (+2) or second (+1) correct.  For 
instance, in the first column, since 1 is in the first place setting this answer gets a bonus 
of +2, and since the 2 is in the second place setting this answer gets a bonus +1; for a 
total bonus of +3 and grand total of 6.  The second column has the 1 in the correct place 
but not the 2, so it gets a bonus of +2 points. Columns 3, 4 and 5 have no bonus points, 
but column 6 gains a bonus point.  This weighting function was not used since the 
subjects were not told to concentrate on getting the best first (and because it adds some 
undeserved ambiguity to the "worst" three choices). [Again, assuming that 1-2-3 was the 
 
122 
correct order, the final scores with any bonuses added would be:  
Selection123 (12, 23, 13,+2,+1) = 6; Selection132 (12, 13,+2,0) = 4, 
Selection213 (23, 13,0,0) = 2, Selection231 (23,0,0) = 1, Selection312 (12,0,0) = 1, 
and Selection321 (ø,0,1) = 1].  Again we have 4 levels of discrimination. 
5.2 System Monitoring Experiment 
The experiment presented three alternate animated displays in a controlled 
laboratory environment.  The displays were to be used for system monitoring of four 
simulated UAVs.  Since the first experiment was a success, this experiment’s goal with 
respect to this research was intended to answer whether the visual thinking widget was an 
effective display alternative as a system monitoring aid.  To this end, the visual thinking 
widget could then be considered a flexible alternative to other displays.  
5.2.1 Training 
Training consisted of 30 minutes of instructions via a PowerPoint® presentation, 
the presentation was made with a projector and a copy of the PowerPoint® presentation 
was on each subject’s computer desktop so they could follow along.  Each subject 
received a color copy of the PowerPoint® slides that they could keep for reference during 
the experiment.  Each display format was examined in detail, with each prompting 
question examined along with verbal descriptions of what the interpretations should be. 
Following the PowerPoint® slides, the subjects were given a 5 minute limited 
response training simulation.  The screen layout was the same as the actual experiment 
display, but only 2 of the feedbacks for the sensors were active, i.e., these two sensors 
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initially started near 50 (neutral), went out of tolerance, and clicking on those sensors 
reset the sensor to a neutral value.  The only sensor display used in the training 
simulation was the analog sensor.  The training simulator was primarily intended to give 
the subjects experience in keeping the target in the crosshair sights.  The sensor gauges 
that were live were explicitly specified to the subjects, and what “going out of tolerance” 
meant was explained. 
5.2.2 Design 
The experiment was a two repeated-measures factors design with full-model 
partitioning.  Java® standard software libraries were used to generate the text and gauge 
table animations, while software developed in Java® for the MAGE decision support 
system generated the sprocket animations.  The experiment was divided into two tasks:  
the primary task was to maintain target acquisition within the camera’s crosshair while 
the UAV drifts (because of simulated turbulence and wind) and the secondary task was 
monitoring three UAV systems.  (See Section 5.2.4 for a description of the experiment 
flow.) 
Microsoft Excel® was used to generate the data used in the animated text table, 
analog gauges and sprocket displays, guaranteeing consistent repeatable experiments.  
Each animation was generated from the same data, i.e., the gauge, text table and sprocket 
images were generated from dataset 1, 2, 3, etc.  Each FoM had over 1,500 data points to 
ensure coverage of at least a 25 minute simulation time.  Since this was interspersed with 
questions that froze the simulation clock, the data was sufficient for 30 minute trials. 
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Level 1 SA For UAVY, what is the value of the GaugeX? Slider 
Did UAVY stay in tolerance? Boolean 
Did UAVY have a Gauge go out of tolerance? Boolean 
Level 2 SA Is the GaugeX in UAVY stable? (+/-10 from center) Boolean 
How many UAVs are currently healthy? Count 
Which UAV is MOST healthy? (Closest to center) Selection 
Is the GaugeX in UAVY at the desired level? Boolean 
Level 3 SA Which UAV is most likely to fail? (Maintenance Report) Selection 
Which UAV will go out of tolerance next? Selection 
Can the GaugeX for UAVY exceed tolerance in the next 5 seconds? Boolean 
5.2.3 Participants 
The second experiment had 24 subjects, recruited from Wright State University 
graduate students.  All subjects saw the same animations, however, the order of 
presenting the sensor displays varied for each animation and the data behind the 
animations was randomly assigned to the display type. 
5.2.4 Experiment flow 
As mentioned earlier, the two tasks were to maintain target acquisition within the 
camera’s simulated crosshair while the UAV drifts (because of simulated turbulence and 




Figure 5.2 System monitoring experiment flow 
The right hand column in Figure 5.2 is an overview of each trial – initialize the 
data, run the trial, present a questionnaire, save any additional data, repeat.  During the 
“run the trial” portion, the subject was expected to perform these two tasks, while 
intermittently answering questions.  The primary task was to control the UAV’s camera 
to be trained on a targeted building.  The targeted building is represented by a red box 
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surrounding a building on one of three aerial photographs of Bagdad, Fallujah and Hadid.  
Each subject was also shown animations of simulated monitored systems and was 
instructed to respond by clicking on the gauge if it goes out of tolerance.  The initial 
conditions of the monitored systems place all the gauges in-tolerance and they “drift” 
according to the scripted datasets.   
During the test, the subject had to answer probe questions (e.g., How many times 
were you aware of out of tolerance conditions?  Is UAV1 completely in tolerance at this 
moment?  etc.)  The systems monitoring experiment examines an animated Visual 
Thinking Sprocket with two criteria (thresholds) per dimension for monitoring the health 
of multiple UAVs.  Each of these Visual Thinking widgets were designed to be flexible 
in number of dimensions (5-15) and different weighting values for each dimension.  
However, for this experiment, six dimensions were chosen. 
Each subject was shown a series of generated animations for three UAVs, every 
60-120 seconds a question was presented to the user.  The variation in presenting the 
times was to avoid the situation where the subject anticipates/times the question interval 
and changes their intensity of the concentration.  When the subject responded to a 
question, while the animation was halted, the presented image did not change and 
remained visible during the questioning (SPAM – Situation Present Assessment Method).  
The three levels of situation awareness, ten associated questions, and their corresponding 
input mechanism are listed in Table 5.5.  During each pause, a set of three questions were 
asked, one from each SA level.  Which question was asked was randomly chosen and 
dynamically populated with appropriate FoM and UAV data.  For example, Level 1 SA 
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question “For UAVY, what is the value of the GaugeX?” could be asked as “For UAV1, what is 
the value of the Air Temperature Gauge?” or “For UAV2, what is the value of the Engine RPM?” 
5.3 Full system experiment 
The experiment was a usability study using subject matter experts (SMEs) from 
Victorville, CA and Wright Patterson AFB, OH with concurrent protocols and examined 
a Visual Thinking decision support aid in the existing full MAGE simulation testbed and 
in particular it’s Decision Support System (DSS). 
5.3.1 Training 
Compared to the existing Predator control mechanisms, operator responses are 
different in the MAGE system.  Currently, the Predator is manually flown and largely 
manually controlled.  MAGE on the other had is semi-autonomous in which operators 
exercise supervisory control.  These SMEs are familiar with many of the operational 
issues of UAV operations and are best qualified to appreciate how those issues interact 
with UAV operations.  Their instructions were to apply their knowledge to the 
supervisory control scheme, although they were free to comment and criticize the 
elements and assumptions of the MAGE system. 
5.3.2 Design 
Usability testing lasted approximately 2.5 hours.  During the first hour, the 
participant completed an UAV experience questionnaire that captured their qualifications 
as a Subject Matter Expert (SME).  This hour included approximately 45 minutes of 
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familiarity training with the MAGE system.  A short demonstration scenario was run 
showing each of the typical events the SME would experience in the longer test scenario.  
They were familiarized with the workload and other assessment methods employed 
during the usability testing. 
The test scenario was specifically designed to exercise all aspects of MAGE, with 
particular emphasis on the DSS system.  The scenario requires monitoring and control 
over two UAVs flying mixed Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and 
target strike missions over Iraq.  The missions were choreographed to contain event 
conflicts between the UAV missions to see how well the DSS mitigates the temporal 
conflicting mission demands.  The operator received mission updates from higher 
authority which added or decreased tasking during the different mission segments.  
Furthermore, the displays used during a specific leg of the mission were automatically 
changed to visit all three display types. 
Besides the automated action data logging, several other measures were used 
during the test scenario.  First, audio recording were made of each session and the 
subjects were instructed during training to “Think Out Loud”, verbalizing their 
impressions of the system during the scenario.  These audio recordings were screened for 
important observations, and carefully scrutinized during key events to extract the most 
information about the DSS effectiveness. 
Second, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index 
(NASA TLX) was used to capture workload assessment between missions.  The SME’s 
performed a sample NASA TLX during their study preparation.  It should be noted that 
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the NASA TLX used in this study in known as Raw NASA TLX (Hart 2006).  It 
eliminates the weighting process all together or weighting the subscales and then 
analyzing them individually.  The subjects do not have to do a pairwise ranking of the six 
scales (Mental, Physical, Temporal, Frustration, Effort and Performance).  The subjects 
were instructed to use the GCS Variable Information Tables (VIT) as a baseline 
definition of the scale.  That is, assume the 
mental/physical/temporal/effort/frustration/performance scales for the VIT is 50%.  If 
that were the case, how would the other displays be rated compared to that baseline. 
 
Figure 5.3 NASA TLX program interface (Sharek 2010) 
The last section of the study session was used to complete a close-out 
questionnaire about MAGE’s function and to collect open-ended verbal comments from 





Five current Predator Pilots (P) or Sensor Operators (SO) served as SME 
participants for the DSS Usability Study.  These P/SO are civilians employed by USI, 
Inc. in Victorville, CA.  They are former military P/SOs with operational experience, 
who now flies the Predator for their employer in support of operational test and training 
at Edwards AFB, CA.  Furthermore, three additional P/SO SME participants were used 
from WPAFB.  The P/SOs were active duty or civilian contractors that were at WPAFB 
for a three day system review of the Predator system.  A background survey captured 
each participant’s exact experience with UAV operations. 
5.4 Summary 
Each experiment presented in this research was carefully designed to specifically 
address whether the visual thinking paradigm could be incorporated into a highly 
complex, dynamic system.  The first showed that the concept was sound, while the 
second experiment indicated that the concept was generalizable, and finally, the third 
experiment was to try to understand the barriers and hurdles of incorporating the displays 
into an existing environment. 




Table 5.6 The variables involved in the experiments 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Quantitative Yes Yes No 
Independent 
Variables 
Display Type Display Type Missions run w/ and w/o baseline 
net-centric supplemental display 
Questions Questions  
Dependent 
Variables 
Rank Order Distracter:  RMS Error 
centering target 
Observations 
Response Time1 Monitor Task:  Accuracy Think Out Loud Protocol 
Minimum criteria Monitor Task:  Response Time NASA TLX scores 
Response Time2   
Drop FoM X   
Response Time3   
Best Dimension Y   
Response Time4   






6.1 Decision Aid Support Experiment 
The data was comprised of answers to questions related to decision support 
choices found in the three static displays presented to the operators.  The decision support 
questions were based on mission critical planning information called Figures of Merit 
(FoM) – see Table 4.2.  The data collected for this experiment used questions to ascertain 
the ease of use as a decision support tool for each display.  Recall that the text table 
represents the current UAV display technology (circa 2007) used in a Predator Ground 
Control Station (GCS) Variable Information Tables (VIT). The bar chart was chosen as a 
first naive attempt at a “graphical user interface”.  It is understood that these are discrete 
interfaces, not integral interfaces, which is because there exist no integral interfaces for 
multiple UAVs. 
The displays were static images, meant to elicit quickly identified solution 
patterns for the operator.  The questions were designed to explore specific decisions 
considered typical within a multi-UAV mission. 
6.1.1 Analysis of Data 
The data for the operators’ answers to the static displays were analyzed using 
Statistical Analysis Tool® (SAS v 9.2) for windows.  There were 24 subjects that had 
three display types of twelve images with four questions each (24 subjects x 3 blocks x 
12 images x 4 questions = 864 Total Observations).  The operators’ responses were 
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grouped and analyzed by display type (text table, bar chart and sprocket), for correctness 
of answer per question type (Rank_Order, Minimum_Criteria, Drop_Dimension, and 
Best_Dimension), response time per question type and response over time (learning 
curve). 
6.1.1.1 Correctness 
Looking at the “correctness of answer” per question data first, the generated 
experiment data were examined prior to presentation to the subjects to determine the 
“correct answer” to each question.  The operator’s “correctness” response was then 
defined as whether the operator responded with the pre-calculated correct answer.  A 
correct response was assigned a value of 1 and a wrong answer was assigned a value of 0.  
The sum of the correct answers was then used as a measure to determine the cognitive 
ease of use for each display type – each question had a maximum score of 12 points for 
correctness. 
For example, the Minimum_Criteria question asks whether all of the mission 
alternatives presented to the operator meet the minimum criteria on all dimensions:  
(1) the possible answers are Yes or No, and (2) the correct answer is Yes (the three 
mission statements are all valid).13  Then for each operator that answered Yes, a counter 
would be incremented by 1.  The maximum value the counter could reach is 12, so if the 
                                                 
13 The Text Table and the Sprocket color coded a failure of each dimension, i.e., if the “Probability of 
Success” dimension failed to reach the minimum value, then the text (pie piece) would be colored red.  
For the Bar Chart, no color coding was attempted. 
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final counter value was 12 (out of 12), then 100% of the subjects responded with the 
correct answer.  If ½ of the subjects responded correctly, then the final value would be 6 
(out of 12). 
The results of the one-way repeated measures ANOVA are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Tests for Correctness of Within-Subjects Question Type with Subject*Display as an Error 
Term 
 Source DF ANOVA SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F Sig 
Rank_Order 
(Boolean) 
Display 2 66.08 33.042 11.70 <.0001 * 
Error Term Subject*Display 46 129.92 33.042    
Minimum_Criteria Display 2 24.69 12.347 7.82 0.0012 * 
Error Term Subject*Display 46 72.64 1.579    
Drop_Dimension Display 2 50.78 25.389 14.03 <.0001 * 
Error Term Subject*Display 46 83.22 1.809    
Best_Dimension Display 2 10.75 5.375 2.03 0.1432  
Error Term Subject*Display 46 121.92 2.650    
Rank_Order 
(Levels of Correctness) 
Display 2 182.25 91.125 10.40 0.0002 * 
Error Term Subject*Display 46 403.08 8.763    
Interpreting Table 6.1 is straight forward:  For line 1, there exists a significant main effect 
of Displays [F(2, 46)=11.70, p<0.0001] when judging the Rank_Order of the three 
missions using simple Boolean correct/incorrect scoring.  Post hoc analysis (Table 6.2) 
using the Tukey method for multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05 
revealed that operator responses with the Sprocket were significantly more accurate than 
either the Bar Chart or Text Table. 
Table 6.2 Rank_Order BOOLEAN Tukey Correctness grouping (Means with the same letter are not 
significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Block 
A 7.17 24 Sprocket 
B 5.38 24 Bar Chart 
B 4.96 24 Text Table 
For line 2, Table 6.1 shows there exists a significant main effect of Displays [F(2, 
46)= 7.82, p=0.0012] when judging the Minimum_Criteria.  Post hoc analysis (Table 
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6.3) using the Tukey method for multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05 
revealed that operator responses with the Sprocket and Text Table were significantly 
more accurate than the Bar Chart.  This is most likely attributable to the color coding in 
the Sprocket and Text Table displays:  operators were able to immediately determine a 
bad dimension without having to search the display. 
Table 6.3 Minimum_Criteria Tukey Correctness grouping (Means with the same letter are not 
significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Display 
A 11.29 24 Sprocket 
A 10.96 24 Text Table  
B 9.92 24 Bar Chart 
For line 3, Table 6.1 there exists a significant main effect of Displays [F(2, 46)= 
14.03, p<0.0001] when judging the Drop_Dimension question.  Post hoc analysis (Table 
6.4) using the Tukey method for multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05 
revealed that operator responses with the Sprocket were significantly more accurate than 
either the Bar Chart or Text Table. 
Table 6.4 Dimension_Drop Tukey Correctness grouping (Means with the same letter are not 
significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Display 
A 9.17 24 Sprocket 
B 7.75  24 Bar Chart  
B 7.17  24 Text Table 
For line 4, Table 6.1 shows NO significant main effect of Displays [F(2, 46)= 10.75, 
p=0.1432] when judging the Best_Dimension. 
For line 5, Table 6.1 shows there exists a significant main effect of Displays [F(2, 
46)= 10.40, p=0.0002] when judging Rank_Order of the three missions using Levels for 
correct/incorrect scoring.  Post hoc analysis (Table 6.5) using the Tukey method for 
multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05 revealed that operator responses 
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with the Sprocket were significantly more accurate than either the Bar Chart or Text 
Table. 
Table 6.5 Rank_Order LEVELS Tukey Correctness grouping (Means with the same letter are not 
significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Block 
A 29.88 24 Sprocket 
B 26.50 24 Bar Chart 
B 26.50 24 Text Table 
Unfortunately, comparing the results of Line 1 (Rank_Order – BOOLEAN) with Line 5 
(Rank_Order – LEVELS) shows no gain in the strength of the statistical analysis using 
the more sophisticated measure for Rank_Order.  This does not mean that the “Levels of 
Correctness” is not a valid tool; just that in this circumstance it gives us nothing more. 
In summary, the first three question types (Rank_Order, Minimum_Criteria, and 
Drop_Dimension) showed significant differences in the Correctness for the displays, with 
the Sprocket display being either the best or tied for best display.  In the last question 
(Best_Dimension), there was no statistical significance in accuracy among any of the 
displays. 
6.1.1.2 Response Time 
A two repeated measure ANOVA was used to test the main effects of display 
(Text Table, Bar Chart, and Visual Sprocket) and Trial (12 images) on the operators’ 
response time for each question type (Rank_Order, Minimum_Criteria, Drop_Dimension, 
Best_Dimension).  The next four subsections analyze these SAS ANOVA results. 
Each analysis has two tables.  The first of the pair has the calculated ANOVA 
Sum of Squares (SS) and Mean Square of the sources of error generated by SAS:  The 
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sources of variance are the same for each question type.  The second table has the main 
effects of Display and Trial and the interaction of Display*Trial analyzed with the 
appropriate corrected error. 
6.1.1.2.1 Response Time for Rank_Order 
The first question examines the operator’s ability to mentally rank the three 
mission alternatives from best to worst based on the FoM information presented in each 
display.  The operators’ response time needed to Rank_Order the alternate mission 
images is analyzed. 
Table 6.6 Rank_Order Response Time Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
 Source DF ANOVA SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F Sig 
Effect Display 2 98420818853 49210409427 30.91 <.0001 * 
Error Subject*Display 46 73242779526 1592234338    
Effect Trial 11 104379784322 9489071302 17.44 <.0001 * 
Error Subject*Trial 253 137651423089 544076771    
Effect Display*Trial 22 52837127566 2401687617 7.99 <.0001 * 
Error Subject*Display*Trial 506 152093131835 300579312    
The main effect of Display was found to be significant:  [F(2, 46)= 30.91, 
p<0.0001].  This means that the Display type used can significantly affect the speed with 
which the operator interprets the ranking of the mission alternatives.  The main effect of 
Trial (image presentation order) was found to be significant:  
[F(11,253)=17.44, p<0.0001].  Images presented at the beginning of the trial took 
significantly longer to interpret than those presented at the end of the trial, irrespective of 
display type.  This is also known as a “learning curve”.   
Examining the post-hoc Rank_Order Tukey Response Time grouping by Display 
Type (Table 6.7) results for multiple comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05 
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revealed that operator responses were significantly faster for the Sprocket Display 
(smaller is better). 
Table 6.7 Rank_Order Tukey Response Time grouping by Display Type (Means with the same letter 
are not significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean (Sec) N Display 
A 44.049 288 Bar Chart 
B 23.616 288 Text Table 
C 19.708 288 Sprocket 
Furthermore, examining the post-hoc Rank_Order Tukey Response Time 
grouping by Image Presentation Order (Table 6.8) results for multiple comparisons with 
an alpha level set to α=0.05 revealed that there was a learning effect, i.e., the numbers 
started large and quickly leveled out (smaller is better).  Since the order of the image 
presentation was random, the learning effect was similar for each display type (generally 
declining response time).  However, response times for the early images showed different 
levels of cognitive workload for each display type.  [For one subject, the first image was 
presented and then questions were asked about interpretation.  These questions had been 
answered in the training, but the subject’s lack of familiarity with the display resulted in 
an unusually high response time for the response for the very first image presented – over 
330 seconds (5.5 minutes).  Replacing that data point with the mean of the subject pool 
does not significantly change the results of the statistical findings:  Tukey Grouping for 
the Display Response Time changed from three to two groups with Text Tables and 
Sprocket not being significantly different, and the Response Time Ordering for the 
images goes from 1, 2, 3 to 1, 3, 2 – the groupings remain the same!] 
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Table 6.8 Rank_Order Tukey Response Time grouping by Image Presentation Order (Means with 
the same letter are not significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Trial 
A 60084 72 1 
  B 38708 72 2 
  BC 35656 72 3 
  BCD 31358 72 5 
    CDE 26211 72 7 
       DE 25612 72 4 
       DE 24559 72 9 
       DE 23459 72 6 
       DE 22908 72 8 
       DE 22380 72 11 
          E 19290 72 12 
          E 19269 72 10 
6.1.1.2.2 Response Time for Minimum_Criteria 
Next, the main effects on response time for the Minimum_Criteria were examined 
(Table 6.9).  As expected, the type of display had a strong statistical effect on the 
response time [F(2,46)=29.86, p<0.0001].  Also as expected, the presentation of images 
over time improved statistically (had a learning curve) [F(11,253)=13.27, p<0.0001].  
Finally, when considering the Display_Type in conjunction with the presentation of the 
images showed a statistical difference [F(22,506)=2.80, p<0.0001], implying that the 
“learning curve” of the different displays was different. 
Table 6.9 Minimum_Criteria Response Time Tests of Within-Subjects Effects  
 Source DF ANOVA SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F Sig 
Effect Display 2 6767534790 3383767395 29.86 <.0001 * 
Error Subject*Display 46 5212332183 113311569    
Effect Trial 11 8748503790 795318526 13.27 <.0001 * 
Error Subject*Trial 253 15160538178 59923076    
Effect Display*Trial 22 3180072529 144548751 2.80 <.0001 * 
Error Subject*Display*Trial 506 26129051706 51638442    
Examining the post-hoc Minimum_Criteria Tukey Response Time grouping by 
Display Type (Table 6.10) shows the Sprocket display is considerably faster than the 
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other two displays.  This suggests that the Sprocket display is cognitively easier to extract 
the data. 
Table 6.10 Minimum_Criteria Tukey Response Time grouping by Display Type (Means with the 
same letter are not significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Display 
   A 11784.6 288 Bar Chart 
      B 7102.4 288 Text Table 
         C 5107.0 288 Sprocket 
Examining the post-hoc Minimum_Criteria Tukey Response Time grouping by 
Image Presentation Order (Table 6.11), there appears to be a learning curve irrespective 
of display.  The first image takes considerably longer to process than any of the 
succeeding images.  This is probably due to the subject trying to interpret all of the data 
on the screen without narrowing their attention to the important features.  By the time the 
fourth image is displayed, the relevance of specific areas within the display rose in 
importance and the operator’s attention was drawn to those particular areas. 
Table 6.11 Minimum_Criteria Tukey Response Time grouping by Image Presentation Order (Means 
with the same letter are not significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Trial 
A 16774 72 1 
  B 11157 72 2 
  BC 9971 72 3 
  BCD 8099 72 4 
  BCD 7660 72 5 
  BCD 7274 72 6 
    CD 6619 72 11 
    CD 6259 72 9 
      D 6037 72 8 
      D 5907 72 7 
      D 5383 72 10 
      D 4838 72 12 
6.1.1.2.3 Response Time for Drop_Dimension 
The third question was an exploration into the operator’s ability to predict the 
future by mentally dropping a dimension of the FoMs and then predicting which mission 
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alternative was best.  This was to mimic a specific operation scenario:  The case in which 
current mission computer information has not kept up with the real world.  For example, 
before the mission started, the operator might receive information giving specific 
information that is not included in the mission displays.  The ability of the operator to 
mentally visualize the changes to the mission alternatives might be important during a 
mission.  This was the most cognitively difficult question, meant to explore situation 
awareness Level 3 SA. 
Unfortunately, display type was not found to have a significant effect on 
predicting the best mission alternative.  Although this is a disappointing result, the fact 
that Level 3 SA errors only make up 3.3% of the total situation awareness errors (see 
Section 2.1.5.3) alleviates some of the agony.  Results from the other three questions 
(Level 1- and 2-SA) are where the effort and results need to be concentrated. 
That being said, there was a significant learning effect from the image 
presentation order [F(11,253)=9.37, p<0.0001] along with a significant interaction 
between the Display Type and image presentation order [F(22,506)=1.98, p<0.0001]. 
Table 6.12 Drop_Dimension Response Time Tests of Within-Subjects Effects  
 Source DF ANOVA SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F Sig 
Effect Display 2 5446634141 2723317070 2.95 0.0626  
Error Subject*Display 46 42535840506 924692185    
Effect Trial 11 20747438607 1886130782 9.37 <.0001 * 
Error Subject*Trial 253 50952518401 201393353    
Effect Display*Trial 22 8351896340 379631652 1.98 <.0001 * 
Error Subject*Display*Trial 506 97059881037 191817947    
Inspecting the post-hoc Drop_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Image 
Presentation Order (Table 6.13) 
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Table 6.13 Drop_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Image Presentation Order (Means 
with the same letter are not significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Trial 
A 29617 72 2 
AB 28129 72 1 
ABC 22428 72 4 
   BC 21129 72 3 
     CD 20356 72 9 
     CD 20082 72 5 
     CDE 18437 72 8 
     CDE 18370 72 7 
     CDE 18170 72 11 
     CDE 17186 72 6 
        DE 13517 72 10 
           E 12006 72 12 
6.1.1.2.4 Response Time for Best_Dimension 
The final question examines the operator’s ability to quickly identify the mission 
alternative with the best rating for a given FoM.  As expected, Table 6.14 shows there 
was a statistically significant effect of display type on predicting the Best_Dimension 
[F(2,46)=8.85, p=0.0006].  The image presentation order also showed a learning curve, 
i.e., response times tended to improve over time on the same display 
[F(11,253)=12.41, p<0.0001].  And finally, there appeared to be an interaction between 
the display types and the image presentation order [F(22,506)=8.04, p<0.0001]. 
Table 6.14 Best_Dimension Response Time Tests of Within-Subjects Effects  
 Source DF ANOVA SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F Sig 
Effect Display 2 1724807764 862403882 8.85 0.0006 * 
Error Subject*Display 46 4483541158 97468286    
Effect Trial 11 5327085375 484280489 12.41 <0.0001 * 
Error Subject*Trial 253 9876518757 39037624    
Effect Display*Trial 22 6509883486 295903795 8.04 <0.0001 * 
Error Subject*Display*Trial 506 18626469746 36811205    
Looking at the individual post-hoc Best_Dimension Tukey Response Time 
grouping by Display Type (Table 6.15) shows the unexpected result that the Text Table 
was the fastest response time.  This could be because of the presentation of pertinent 
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information was proximal:  once the operator found the correct column label, they did not 
have to “search” beyond the column of numbers. 
Table 6.15 Best_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Display Type (Means with the same 
letter are not significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Display 
A 12443.4 288 Bar Chart 
B 10539.8 288 Sprocket 
C 8988.5 288 Text Table 
Finally, the post-hoc Best_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Image 
Presentation Order (Table 6.16) showed a learning curve, but one that was more wildly 
ordered.  One expects the first image presented to have the slowest reaction time, but the 
5th image was slowest (14.7 seconds) and the 10th image was in the middle of the pack 
(not one of the fastest).   
Table 6.16 Best_Dimension Tukey Response Time grouping by Image Presentation Order (Means 
with the same letter are not significantly different) 
Tukey Grouping Mean N Trial 
A 14669 72 5 
A 14469 72 1 
AB 12582 72 2 
ABC 12139 72 3 
ABCD 11612 72 10 
ABCD 11610 72 4 
   BCDE 10403 72 7 
     CDE 8922 72 9 
        DE 8808 72 6 
           E 7816 72 12 
           E 7763 72 11 
           E 7095 72 8 
6.1.1.3 Comparison of Response Times 
With regards to the first experiment, the learning curve of each question is 
examined.  The important features to examine are the initial values on the left (this is an 
indication of how easily this display type is interpreted by an “inexperienced” operator 
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for the given question) and the level to which the curve declines (an indication of how 
easily the display type is interpreted for an “experienced” operator). 
For the first question, Figure 6.1 illustrates the learning curves for the respective 
Display Types.  The Bar Chart is the most difficult to interpret for an inexperienced 
operator, while the sprocket is the easiest.  The Bar Chart and the Sprocket appear to 
level out near the fourth round of questions, but the Sprocket is still slightly lower. 
 
Figure 6.1  Response times for Rank_Order by Display Type 
For the second question, the results were similar to the first questions learning 
curves.  However, the Text Table is initially more difficult for the subject to interpret 
than the first question.  The subjects quickly understand what the question is asking, so 
they are able to anticipate the question and skim more quickly.  It should be noted that the 
Sprocket Display is easily understood by the subjects and has the quickest (or nearly the 
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Figure 6.2  Response times for Minimum_Criteria 
Dropping a Dimension is significantly more difficult than the previous two 
questions, requiring the subject to mentally recalculate the “best route” based on the 
information presented to them.   
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The Text Table was the quickest aid when determining the best dimension.  The 
learning curve is flattest and seems to be the easiest to mentally compute.  That said, the 
Sprocket display is not that far behind. 
 
Figure 6.4  Response times for Best_Dimension 
Taking all four of the learning curves, the Sprocket display seems to be the easiest 
to learn for three situations and is near the bottom for the fourth.  This implies that the 
Sprocket display is easiest to learn among these three displays. 
6.2 System Monitoring Experiment 
The data was comprised of answers to questions related to system monitoring of 
three dynamic displays presented to the subjects.  The system monitoring questions were 
based on system health information – see Table 5.5.  The data collected for this 
experiment used questions to ascertain the ease of use as a system monitoring tool for 
each display.  The text table represents an advancement of the current UAV display 
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Information Tables (VIT).  The analog gauge was chosen as an exemplar of a current 
attempt at a “graphical user interface”. 
The displays were dynamic animations meant to elicit quickly identified solution 
patterns for the operator.  The questions were designed to explore specific decisions 
considered typical within a multi-UAV mission. 
The overall results expanded in the next section show that the Sprocket and 
Analog Displays were significantly faster than the Text Display.  On the other hand, the 
Sprocket and Text Displays were significantly more accurate than the Analog Display.  
This infers that if one wants both speed and accuracy, the Sprocket Display would be 
preferred over the Analog and Text Displays. 
6.2.1 Analysis of Data 
In essence, this experiment had interesting results, not all of them expected.  The 
experiment examined a primary task (simulating a surveillance mission by maintaining a 
target box in the crosshairs), a secondary task (simulating a system monitoring task by 
responding to gauges that go out of tolerance), and probe questions that examine the 
operators’ situation awareness.  The data for the operators’ answers to the static displays 
were analyzed using JMP® 9.0 for windows. 
This experiment examined three objectively measureable facets:  (1) the root 
mean square error (RMSE) of the distance from optimal surveillance for the Primary 
Task; (2) the response to when a gauge went out of tolerance for the Secondary Task; and 
(3) the response to SA questions presented to the operator approximately every minute.  
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6.2.1.1 Primary Task Distance from Optimal – Root Mean Square Error 
The primary task simulated a UAV mounted camera that constantly moved 
because of swirling wind, UAV movement and a bad tracking gear.  These three 
character flaws required the operator to constantly monitor and correct the camera 
direction to maintain the target under the camera crosshairs. 
To examine the data for the primary task, the distance from optimal position had 
to be calculated and corrected.  With respect to the primary task, the research examined 
the root mean square error (RMSE) distance in pixels from the actual position of the 
target and the optimal position, i.e., being completely within the crosshair scope.  Since 
the crosshair was larger than the target, the optimal position, i.e., target being fully within 
the crosshairs, was a ±10 pixel range.  That is, if the target is located at x=20 and y=-5, to 
calculate the Euclidean distance, one had to first map the <x,y>  <ẋ,ẏ> to incorporate 
the ±10 pixel range:  ẋ=floor(abs(x-x0))=floor(abs(20-10),0)=10 and ẏ=floor(abs(y-
y0))=floor(abs((-5)-10),0)=0.  The final Euclidean distance uses these corrected values 
2 2 2 2
,, ; 10 0 10x yx y RMSE x y< >< > = + = + =    .  
With respect to the correcting the data sampling frequency, each 25 minute 
experiment run could generate more than 2500 data points.  The first attempt in 
processing these all of these data points created an analysis that was overwhelmed by the 
denominator (used in the statistics), since the variation between each pair of points was 
relatively smooth.  That is, the total variability was too small over such a large number of 
readings.  The second attempt was to perform a running average of the data to create a 
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lower statistical denominator.  This lowered the statistical denominator; but as a side 
effect, the data was smoothed and again the variability was not evident.  There were two 
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The third attempt used the data point at the 60 second mark, essentially allowing 
the denominator to be lowered while at the same time allowing the data to remain 
unsmoothed.  The obvious side effect of ignoring most of the raw data is deemed 
acceptable for the following reason.  Consider the raw data to be equivalent to looking at 
an object at very high resolution, such as a painting of a horse by Remington, a famous 
American Painter of southwest life in the 1800s.  However, a dot-to-dot drawing of a 
horse by a three year old toddler is a simpler representation.  Both images reveal a pattern 
that can be interpreted as “horse”, but the simpler dot-to-dot image emphasizes bold 
features, while Remington’s picture is appreciated for its fine detail.  This simplification 
is equivalent to choosing a data point at each minute.  The underlying “tracking” pattern 
might emerge.  In other words, the coarse pattern ignores the jittery intermediate noise to 
focus on the gross pattern. 
Table 6.17 shows the statistical results of these snapshots.  There were some 
significant differences among the users, displays and their interactions.  This necessitates 
an investigation of the underlying causes.  The fact that the subjects are significantly 
different is problematic. 
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Table 6.17 Primary Task Effect Tests 
 
Post hoc analysis of the RMSE distance among the three displays shows that the 
Sprocket is significantly faster than the Text Table, but it is indistinguishable from the 
Analog Display.  Also, that the Text table is indistinguishable from the Analog Display.  
One way of interpreting this is that the subject has less mental workload on the secondary 
task, thus making the primary task easier to perform. 
 
Figure 6.5 Post hoc analysis of the RMSE distance for the three displays 
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6.2.1.1.1 Primary Task Distance from Optimal (RMSE) with respect to Subject 
Examining the post-hoc subjects Response Time grouping results for multiple 
comparisons with an alpha level set to α=0.05 shows that Subject 17 was unusually slow 
compared to the rest of the subjects (Figure 6.6).  That subject was “asleep with his eyes 
open”, not reacting to the gauges.   
Removing the 17th subject from the data because of its outlier status leaves a 
different, more interesting picture.  Without the anomalous subject, we still have 
statistically significant differences for the model [F(2,34)=2.1503, p=0.0002].   
 
Figure 6.6 Users Least Squares Plot showing subject 17 being extremely slow. 
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Furthermore, Subject 17’s anomalous behavior was so abhorrent that all other 
differences among the subjects were drowned out into a wash of similarity (Figure 6.6).  
Now examining the Effect Tests shows that the Display are statistically different 
[F(2,32)=3.1193, p=0.0445].  Without Subject 17, there is appears to be much more 
variability within the remaining subjects (Figure 6.7).  However, one should note that the 
y-axes are two drastically different scales in both figures.  The variability would not be as 
obvious if the scales were the same.  The subjects with the highest values (Level A) 
probably quickly decided to assign Task 2 (system monitoring) a higher priority than 
Task 1 (Surveillance).  The subjects with the lowest values (Level F) prioritized the 
Surveillance as a higher priority than the system monitoring.  Those subjects in between 




Figure 6.7 Least Squares Means Plot and LSMeans Differences Tukey HSD with Subject 17 removed 
as an outlier 
Examining the distance over time with respect to subjects shows there are no 
significant changes over time (Table 6.18).  This implies that there was no changing of 
priorities over time and any strategy with which a subject started was the same strategy 
with which they ended the experiment. 
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Table 6.18 Effects Tests of Distance over Time with respect to Subject 
 
Just to complete this reflection on changing strategies, we examine the distance 
over time with respect to the displays (Table 6.19).  For a second time, there are no 
apparent differences among the displays as time progressed.  So once again we are left 
with the conclusion that whatever strategy a subject began the experiment with was the 
same one that they ended with. 
Table 6.19 Effects Test of Distance over Time with respect to Display 
 
6.2.1.1.2 Primary Task Distance from Optimal (RMSE) with respect to Display 
From Table 6.17, we know that the displays are significantly different.  
Examining the least squares means plot (Figure 6.8) confirms that there is a difference 
between the Sprocket and Text Table, but no statistic difference between Sprocket and 
Gauge and Analog Gauge and Text Table.  The Sprocket is much better than the current 




Figure 6.8 Least Square Means of Primary Task RMSE with respect to Display 
6.2.1.2 Secondary Task:  Response to when a Gauge goes Out-of-Tolerance 
With respect to secondary task of system monitoring, the research examined the 
speed and accuracy of response.  The response time was the difference in time between 
the gauge going out of tolerance and the subject correcting the condition by clicking on 
the gauge.  Clicking on the display reset the gauge to initial conditions, and the scripted 
animation would restart.  Accuracy of response considered whether the user correctly 
responded to an out of tolerance condition or incorrectly clicked on a gauge (error).  The 
two types of errors a subject could have:  (1) click on gauges that were not out of 
tolerance (false click); or (2) click on the same gauge twice (double click). 
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6.2.1.2.1 Secondary Task Response Time 
There was a statistical difference for the speed the operator responded found 
among the users [F(50,5774)=569.5, p=0.0001].  And indeed, examining the effects tests 
confirms that there is a significant difference among users, blocks and the interaction 
between users and blocks (Figure 6.9).   
 
Figure 6.9 Effects tests of Secondary Task Response Time 
This finding appears to be very good, so we delve further into the effects (Figure 
6.10).  After examining the Least Means Square plot for the users, one finds that there are 
a couple of peaks in an otherwise flat response time.  And the Least Means Square 




Figure 6.10 Least Square Means of Secondary Task effects 
Going back to the raw data finds some obvious strategies employed by four 
subjects; namely giving very high priority to the primary task to the exclusion of the 
secondary task.  To verify this conclusion, a simple count of errors committed per subject 
was tabulated and the results were astonishing (Figure 6.11).  The top row, Missing, 
shows how many responses the subject had without committing an error – typically 
ranging between 300 and 400.  On the other hand, the row labeled “1” represents the 
number of errors committed if there were more than 100 committed. For subjects 6, 8, 13 
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and 14, there appears to be a problem.  Their error count was a significant proportion to 
their total responses.  The raw data shows that these four users reset all gauges when one 
went out of tolerance so that they could concentrate on the primary task.  Subject 14 hit 
upon this strategy early, hence his low count for non-errors and his very high count for 
errors.  Subject 8 & 13 found this strategy after completing at least one run using the 
“correct” strategies suggested in the preliminary instructions given to all subjects.  
Finally, Subject 6 performed most of the tasks within parameters, but made an excessive 
number of double clicks, i.e., he did not always wait for the first click to register with the 
Windows® operating system, notoriously known for not being real-time computing. 
 
Figure 6.11 Count of Errors for each subject in secondary task 
Looking at the same count by display shows that there does not appear to be any 
evidence that displays were immune to errors, but the Sprocket had the fewest.  
Furthermore, the one error that occurred more frequently with the Sprocket was the 
“nearest neighbor” error.  In this error, the neighboring FoM pie pieces were clicked.  
However, there were only 12 of these errors, which is an insignificant number when 
compared to the total events (25,000+).  This was probably because of the button’s 
design, and can probably be programmatically corrected by disallowing clicks near the 




Figure 6.12 Count of Errors for each display in secondary task 
This discussion is to address the possibility of dropping the subjects or displays 
that appear to be anomalous.  Obviously that displays are not going to be the deciding 
factor here, all three displays seem reasonably similar.  Examining the raw data suggests 
that Subject 6 was not “redefining” the parameters, but was just eager.  So, running the 
same tests with Subjects 8, 13, and 14 excluded finds that all of the remaining users are 
indeed similar, but there is a significant difference among the displays (Figure 6.13). 
 
Figure 6.13 Fixed Effects Tests without Subject 17 (previous sections) and Subjects 8, 13, and 14 
Knowing that there is a difference in the Blocks (Displays), we examine those 
effects the displays had on the model using the Least Squares Means plot and the Least 
Squares Means Tukey HSD.  From these we conclude that there is a significant 




Figure 6.14 Least Square Means of Secondary Task Display effects 
6.2.1.2.2 Secondary Task Accuracy 
When it comes to the accuracy of responding to the out of tolerance there were 
two error conditions examined:  double clicking and false clicking.  Double clicking 
typically arises from the subject observing an out of tolerance event and clicking on the 
target gauge twice.  This can normally be explained be two conditions:  (1) the subject 
double clicked because of the lag time inherent in the Java®/Windows® platforms.  
There were no significant differences among the displays for all Errors [F(2, 39)=2.7503, 
p<0.0750], just the Double Clicking [F(2, 39)=0.4849, p<0.6194], nor False Clicking 
[F(2, 39)=2.8819, p<0.0680].   
That does not mean that the errors did not affect the experiment.  The number of 
user generated events is the sum of the correct responses and the incorrect responses 
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(Errors).  In general, if there were no errors, then all to the events for the displays should 
have balanced out, because of Latin Squares balancing the displays and scripts.  
However, this was not the case.  In fact, because of the additional clicking done for the 
errors, the Analysis of Variance for the entire model revealed that there was a difference 
among the displays [F(2, 39)=39.3629, p<0.0001].   
The Analog Gauge had significantly higher subject initiated events than the Text 
Table (Table 6.14).  This means that the subjects were “busier” because they were 
making errors for themselves.  The significance of this is that the more errors created, the 
busier the user – in interesting paradox to say the least. 
 
Figure 6.15 LS Means Plot and LS Means Diferrences Tukey HSD for the count of Subject Initiated 
Events:  correct response + error response 
In addition to the count, the amount of time wasted to respond for these errors has 
a significant difference among the displays, [F(2, 39)=19.0048, p<0.0001].  This is the 
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total amount of time that is wasted for all of the errors for a given display (Table 6.15).  
In other words, if the time between the two clicks of a double click takes one second and 
there were fourteen Double Click errors for the Analog Gauge display, then fourteen 
seconds were wasted during this experimental run.  The amount of time wasted 
performing errors is significantly less for the Text Table, while the Analog Gauge has 
significantly more time wasted.  This implies that when an error was made in the Text 
Table, they were of short duration, while the Analog Gauge errors were of relatively long 
duration. 
 
Figure 6.16 LS Means Plot and LS Means Differences Tukey HSD for the time to respond of Subject 
Initiated Events:  correct response + error response 
6.3 Full System Experiment:  Displays within a full simulator 
This experiment was performed at Wright Patterson AFB with active duty and 
retired military UAV operators.  The retired UAV operators were currently working as 
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subcontractors, training new UAV operators in Victor Valley, CA.  The pilot experience 
was 14.7±8.2 years, while the pure UAV operator experience was 8.3±4.5 years. 
The software used for this experiment, MAGE, is not the official USAF simulator 
software.  The MAGE software is a testbed to examine next generation user interfaces in 
support of command and control of multiple UAV missions.  As such, the subjects were 
not familiar with the operation of the software and received a 45 minute tutorial and 
sample mission to familiarize them with MAGE. 
Within the MAGE software were multiple new user interfaces, the Visual 
Thinking Sprocket being just one.  Others user interfaces included a temporal planner, 
map overlays, mission timeline monitor and a planning “sandbox”.  As mentioned earlier, 
the subjects were instructed during training to “Think Out Loud”, verbalizing their 
impressions of the system during the scenario, so that we could have some insight into 
their thinking.  One of the subjects, upon seeing the Visual Thinking Sprocket for the first 
time, said “Wow!”  Asked to elaborate, he stated that it was a “confusing looking” 
display.  However, the third time that the Visual Thinking Sprocket was presented to him 
in the simulation he said “Oh, I get it”. 
The subjects were specifically asked to subjectively rate the workload of the 
different decision aids used within MAGE using NASA TLX.  For task performance, 
significant differences were observed over task periods (F(2,39) = 15.1133, p < .0001).  
Examining the LS Means Plot and Differences Tukey HSD indicates that there is a 
significant difference among the displays, with the Sprocket being significantly better 




Figure 6.17 Mean Values of NASA-TLX scores for the Text, Analog and Sprocket displays 
Post mission comments from the subjects indicated that the sprocket was “strange 
at first, but simple to use”, “analog display was difficult to read – I had to squint”, and 
“analog and text displays take up too much screen space”.  These comments probably 
were a major effect on the eventual ranking of the displays.   
6.4 Conclusions from experiments 
From the Decision Support Experiment, the Sprocket design was found to be a 
faster and more accurate display as a decision aid in general.  Furthermore, the 
experimental results show that the Sprocket display is generally easier to learn than either 
of the other two displays. Looking back at the specific research questions originally asked 
in Section 4.1., the Decision Support Experiment findings are summarized in Table 6.20.   
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Table 6.20 Research questions for Decision Support Experiment:  Legend – Visual Thinking 
Sprocket (VTS), Bar Chart (BC) and Text Table (TT) 
 Research Question Findings 
Accuracy 1 Is there a significant difference in accuracy 
to obtain good rank order solutions using 
cognitively sensitve supervisory control of 
multiple UAVs? 
YES:  There is a significant difference – the 
VTS was significantly more accurate than 
BC or TT.  BC and TT were similar.  
[VTS>BC=TT] 
Accuracy 2 Is there a significant difference in accuracy 
to determine global status information 
using cognitively sensitive supervisory 
control? 
YES:  There is a significant difference – the 
VTS and TT were significantly more 
accurate than BC.  VTS and TT were similar.  
[VTS=TT>BC] 
Accuracy 3 Is there a significant difference in accuracy 
to envision new solutions using mental 
visualization? 
YES:  There is a significant difference – the 
VTS was significantly more accurate than 
BC or TT.  BC and TT were similar.  
[VTS>BC=TT] 
Accuracy 4 Is there a significant difference in accuracy 
to determine local status along a specific 





Is there a significant difference in time to 
obtain good rank order solutions using 
cognitively sensitve supervisory control of 
multiple UAVs? 
YES:  There is a significant difference – the 
VTS was significantly faster than TT and TT 




Is there a significant difference in time to 
determine global status information using 
cognitively sensitive supervisory control? 
YES:  There is a significant difference – the 
VTS was significantly faster than TT and TT 




Is there a significant difference in time to 
envision new solutions using mental 
visualization? 
NO:  There was no significant difference 
among the displays 
Response 
Time 4 
Is there a significant difference in time to 
determine local status along a specific 
dimension using cognitively sensitive 
supervisory control? 
YES:  There is a significant difference – the 
TT was significantly faster than VTS and 
VTS was significantly faster than BC. 
[TT<VTS<BC] 
The last line of each finding represents the ordering and relative statistical 
findings, where the first display has the “best” mean value, and the operators < and > 
refer to statistically significant differences, while the operator = means statistically 
equivalent.  For example, Accuracy ones findings, [VTS>BC=TT], can be interpreted as 
“the VTS was significantly more accurate than BC or TT.  BC and TT were similar”. 
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The System Monitoring Experiment found the VTS is either the best or 
statistically indistinguishable from the best display for speed and correct responses.  
However, the experiment found TT had significantly fewer errors than the VTS, which 
had significantly fewer errors than the AG.  The color coding to the TT was probably a 
large factor in this accuracy.  The System Monitoring Experiment findings are 
summarized in Table 6.21.   
Table 6.21 Research questions for Experiment 2:  Legend – Visual Thinking Sprocket (VTS), Analog 
Gauge (AG) and Text Table (TT) 





Can the operator perform the 
primary task (keeping the target 
centered) better using cognitively 
sensitve human supervisory 
control of multiple UAVs? [RMSE]? 
Yes:  The VTS and AG were significantly more 
accurate than the TT.  There was no 
significant difference in accuracy between the 
VTS and AG.  [VTS=AG>TT] 
Monitor Task: 
Accuracy 
Is there a significant difference in 
accuracy when monitoring out of 
tolerance values? 
Yes:  The VTS and AG were significantly more 
accurate  than the TT.  There was no 
significant difference between the VTS and 
AG.  [VTS=AG>TT] 
Monitor Task: 
False Positive 
Is there a significant difference in 
false positives when monitoring 
out-of-tolerance values? 
Yes:  The TT were fewer errors than the VTS 




Is there a significant difference in 
time to respond to out-of-
tolerance monitored values using 
cognitively sensitive supervisory 
control? 
Yes:  The VTS and AG were significantly faster 
than the TT.  There was no significant 
difference between the VTS and AG. 
[(VTS=AG)>(AG=TT)] 
The final experiment used subject matter experts that were quite positive about 
the Sprocket display.  Despite the small pool of subjects, the fact that they were experts 
and not enlisted college students reflects positively on the conclusions.  Here, the 
question asked and answered was that the SME preferred all three modified displays over 
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the current VIT data collection system.  However, they considered the Visual Thinking 
Sprocket to be significantly easier to use than the Text Table or the Analog Gauge. 
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7 Research Contributions and Significance 
Technological advances in propulsion, sensors, wireless communication, and 
other areas allow us to have quite sophisticated UAVs.  These advances have 
overwhelmed the UAV operators/supervisors with data and information.  This research 
presented a new model of human cognition that attempts to implement a cognitively 
sensitive human-computer interface.  The interface presented information to the 
operator/supervisor in a graphical format that more closely follows a visual thinking 
paradigm. 
Perhaps the most important contribution is a simple three step practical design 
loop for the implementation of UIs, which was in turn used to design and assess the 
displays used in this experiment (Table 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.1 Iterative process to designing a display (copied from Figure 1.1) 
WHAT  
information 











This simple, yet elegant framework can be used by a researcher or programmer to 
guide the steps of developing a UI that is cognitively sensitive.  Just like McNeese’s 
research framework guides the researcher through the necessary steps but does not dictate 
the tools to be used, this framework guides the designer through the necessary steps 
(what, how and assess), and the underlying tools are those available to the designer (user 
modeling, NDM, semiotic analysis, VT, SA, etc.)  This framework encourages an 
iterative spiral design methodology that is easy to milestone. 
Secondly, the use of visual thinking features when designing a display was shown 
to be a viable option.  The Sprocket design was found to be either best or tied for best in 
almost all statistical measurements.  Because the Visual Thinking Sprocket is cognitively 
sensitive, the operator was able to identify patterns quickly and efficiently, especially 
obvious in the decision support experiment.  The interpretation of difficult data was not 
mentally taxing, but was grasped quickly. 
This research showed that the Sprocket was effective in the UAV domain, and by 
extension it can be reasonably assumed that the sprocket may be effective in the decision 
aid and system monitoring family of problems. 
The Operator Function Model was found useful helping to develop the Semiotic 
Analysis in a systematic manner that was computationally implemented and evaluated.  
This means that development of operator models can help in semiotic analysis, because 
Semiotic Analysis suggests that signs should be put into cultural reference.  In this case, 
the culture is UAV operators.  Understanding the culture through the OFM assisted in 
applying that semiotic analysis to the UAV operator culture. 
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Furthermore, one of the side effects of the Naturalistic Decision Making 
interviews was designed extensibility in the Visual Thinking Sprocket.  Because of the 
UAV culture, different levels of bureaucracy had different requirements.  For example, 
the Secretary of the Air Force may mandate certain Figures of Merit (FoM), such as a 
calculated Probability of Success.  At the same time, the UAV constructor might require 
a FoM that indicates the wind speed because of possible stall conditions.  Similarly, the 
wing commander might require a specific FoM and the operator might desire yet another 
FoM.  The higher levels of bureaucracy FoMs could not be altered by the lower levels.  
The Visual Thinking Sprocket is designed to be flexible, allowing between five and 
twenty FoMs.  Besides adding mandatory FoMs, each level of bureaucracy can also 
affect the assigned weights. 
Besides this reason for the flexibility, the domain is complex and evolving.  FoMs 
that were considered important previously might not be important now.  For example, a 
No Fly Zone (NFZ) might have been imposed for political reasons that may eventually be 
removed by diplomacy.  The Sprocket’s old NFZ FoM can now be removed at the 
command center.  The two sprockets used in this research had six and eight FoMs, 
respectively.   
This research provided useful insights into human decision making in complex 
systems.  It examined multiple user interfaces:  tabular text-based, graphical bar charts, 
analog dials and visual thinking sprockets.  The text tables were similar to the standard 
user interface used in the Predator’s UAV ground control station VIT.  These tables are 
long, tedious and required a hardcopy, with the potential of easily misinterpreting the 
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data.  The bar charts and analog dials are a readily available graphics format that could 
very easily be implemented in an attempt to create a “visual” interface.  Finally, the 
visual thinking widget was developed to present the data to the operator in a format easily 
interpreted by the operator. 
This research also introduced a method to extract multiple levels of “correctness” 
for a rank order selection.  Traditional research presents the results of the rank ordering as 
either correct or incorrect.  This research presented a simple method to expand the 
incorrect ranking into multiple levels of wrongness.  Since a three-way rank order has six 
permutations and only one absolutely correct, we examined a method to expand the five 
remaining permutations into three levels of “wrongness” or “less correct”. 
Besides the “Correctness” of answers, the Response Time needed to be examined.  
This led to a discussion of when to choose the better display.  If two displays are being 
considered (A and B) and both of them are new displays, then the implementation of one 
over the other is straight forward.  There are nine possibilities shown in Table 7.1.  Tie 
breakers can be personal preference, program requirements, coin flip, etc. 
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Table 7.1 Simplified Decision Matrix when choosing between two displays, - means same 
Display A Display B Result Decision 
Correctness Response Time Correctness Response Time 
Better Better   Strong A Display A 
  Better Better Strong B Display B 
Better   Better Tie Weighted Decision 
 Better Better  Tie Weighted Decision 
Better -  - Prefer A Display A 
- Better -  Prefer A Display A 
-  - Better Prefer B Display B 
 - Better - Prefer B Display B 
- - - - Tie Weighted Decision 
However, if one of the displays is the current existing display, then tradeoffs have 
to be considered; hence the weighted decision in Table 7.1.  The expense of replacing an 
existing display with a new display must balance cost in acquisition, deployment and 
training.  Furthermore, the cost of overcoming the human nature to avoid change when a 
current solution “works” needs to be addressed in an objective manner. 
In the case of this research, no standard display exists.  If one display is 
significantly faster but not statistically different in “Correctness”, it still might be prudent 
to change to the faster display.  Faster display is the mean response time for each display 
type.  The designer of the decision support system may weigh a bracketing of the speed 
more important than the mean response time. 
Mathematically, the expanded decision rules needed to objectively determine 
which Display Type to choose are given by  







Decision w Correct w wµ σ
=
= + +∑  
Where µ and σ are the statistical mean and standard deviation, and w is their associated 
weights.  The final decision is a linearly weighted sum of the response times. 
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This discussion was prompted by the results of the second experiment, in which 
the Sprocket design was the best or tied for best display.  Since this research was 
supported by a for profit company, recommendations needed to be presented to the 
customer.  Hence the decision table in Table 7.1.  Using this decision table, the clear 
preference is the Sprocket Display. 
Although the Visual Thinking Sprocket shows promise, further research is 
necessary to examine its limitations.  The Visual Thinking Sprocket was implemented as 
a web applet, and it was animated by the WeatherBug.com data feed, thus showing a 
moderate amount of generic appeal.  However, this was by no means a complex, time 
sensitive domain.  The design of the bar chart display was limited by the standard Java® 
graphics library.  Designing the bar chart display from scratch may have affected the 
results with respect to accuracy and speed.  However, the Java® library is optimized, 
while our display was not and the Visual Thinking Sprocket was still faster.   
Furthermore, screen metrics comparing the absolute screen space needed by the 
various displays should be performed.  While the Visual Thinking Sprocket can be 
resized dynamically, the “readability” of the displays may limit the minimum size.  The 
Analog Gauges were made as large as possible to allow eight FoMs, but still had 
readability issues.  This interaction of readability and size must be researched further. 
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Appendix A – Experiment 1:  Data Displayed in Three 
Templates 
The following pages illustrate the three template versions displayed.  The first 
page was used in the Training Slide to give the subjects a sample of the same data 
displayed in the three templates – Bar Chart, Tabular and Visual Thinking Sprocket. 
The top figure illustrates the bar chart template of the data.  If we look at the first 
bar chart, the dimension/axis name is called “Survivability” and represents the probability 
of survival.  The label on the right reports directionality of the dimension – either the 
largest bar is best (illustrated by the ↑ arrow) or the smallest bar is best (illustrated by the 
↓ arrow).  In this experiment, the first dimension is the only one in which largest is best.  
The label beneath each chart reports the weighting of each dimension.  The Survivability 
dimension has a weighting factor of 40%, while the Defense Network Tracks only has a 
weighting of 9%.  On each vertical axis is the range of interest for each dimension.  For 
each of the probability dimensions the range is held constant between [0.0 .. 1.0].  
Otherwise, the upper limit was automatically generated by the charting program 
(Microsoft Excel® 2007).  The final chart, EW Track Radar Probability of Detection, has 
the Legend for all of the charts – Blue is Route 1, Green is Route 2, Yellow is Route 3, 
and Red is the Criterion.  Examining the Survivability bar chart tells the operator that 
bigger bars are better, all three routes surpass the criteria and Route 1 has the best 
probability of survival. 
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The second template illustrating the layout of the data is the Tabular form.  The 
top row states the columnar headings: Weighting (of each dimension), the Figure of Merit 
(dimension), Route 1, Route 2, Route 3, Criterion (for each dimension), and directionality 
(whether higher numbers are better [+] or lower numbers are better [-]).  Any values 
within the route columns that are black have exceeded the criterion, while those in red did 
not exceed the criterion. 
Finally, the third template makes the same information available in the Visual 
Thinking Sprocket.  Each pie slice is labeled with its dimension name for each route.  
Each dimension is normalized to be the same diameter.  The directionality is fixed so that 
the best possible value always is on the edge of the sprocket, i.e., large is always best.  
The weighting of each dimension is illustrated by the arc of the pie slice.  The criterions 
for all of the dimensions are normalized to the same radius and are represented by the red 




Appendix B – comments for experiment 1 
The following comments are correctly transcribed from the subjects 
questionnaires on experiment one. [ ] indicate difficult terms to interpret or read in the 
handwriting. 
Any comments about the Text Table block of the experiment? 
• Very easy to distinguish between close choices.  The red was also very helpful. 
• Since certain criteria were weighted it differently, four missions with similar 
numbers or number of failures it became difficult sometimes to distinguish which 
option was best.  I almost wanted to multiply the row data by their weights and 
some the results to get a better feeling of what was REALLY best. 
• This was a little better than the bar graphs and those deficiencies were coded in 
red, but it was still hard to compare the routes while taking into account the 
different weights.  No, the tables are not comfortable.  They gave me [a] 
headache. 
• A lot of comparing each and looking but all on tables…  Better than the bar one.  
Need to look at them, but not too bad. 
• It would help to invert probability of survival to match the others (lower is better). 
• The table lacked a sense of scale.  His hard to tell how bad things are except in 
reference to the criterion. 
• When all of the three routes are possible it takes time looking at the table and 
deciding which is the best route. 
Any comments about the Bar Chart block of the experiment? 
• Making the Headings match the question would make it easier to read / 
understand.  Charts were very confusing.  Color coding was helpful, but 
somewhat overwhelming. 
• If survivability were replaced by “probability of loss” so that it went the same 
way you would have been helpful.  Also, I think of the routes in reference to their 
color rather than number.  Waiting is difficult in this format. 
• This was very confusing and time consuming. 
• It’s hard to come up with a decision.  It’s slightly confusing. 
• Tedious compare to the other two. 
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• It was easy to understand, but all those best choices per chart seemed to blend 
together, so that some right choices are very hard to choose between.  The color 
was very helpful in choosing between the routes. 
• Deftly the most difficult to decipher as far as total merit.  It might be the easiest to 
decipher for a single value, however.  To determine the “best” mission route I was 
left and basically deciphering of each category was a pass / fail and counting the 
number of failures.  Probably not the best approach, but I couldn’t think of any 
easier / better way. 
• A lot more difficult than the sprocket.  It was hard to remember that on 
survivability hire is better but lower as better on the other two.  He was also 
difficult to factor in weights since the bars did not change and thickness or area to 
reflect a change in wait. 
• When lower values were better, the difference of the values with the largest 
values should be displayed instead of the values themselves! 
• There’s a lot to think about when reading it.  I have to look at each one again and 
again to answer the question.  Need to recognize if higher is better or which one is 
which.  There are also 7-8 bar graphs to look at. 
• Weighting factor was not represented properly. 
• It was difficult to read the data off the bar chart. You had to keep looking / staring 
at the charts and thinking of different alternatives.  It was quite tedious, also when 
compared to the other two (Sprocket & Text Table). 
Any comments about the Sprocket block of the experiment? 
• And bigger size of sprocket and probably use separate color instead of think has a 
son something carry as difficult a notice (as in values which were very small). 
• This was the best thing to make quick decisions.  It was easy to see the most 
important and easy to understand the criteria.  I think I did the best on this.  I think 
it is a good idea to use the same (highest / lowest is better) because it takes extra 
time to think cool weather that one should be higher or lower.  It's not hard, but 
it's an extra hoop to jump through. 
• Difficult to notice small differences quickly but easy for large. 
• Easy to quickly determine the relative values of each of the parameters and the all 
overall weighted area. 
• There are only three circles instead of so many bars.  It was easier to read, see, 
and understand.  Taking something out of which one is better – this allows me to 
just take a look and not have to rethink the graphs. 
• It would be good if read was used in place of thinking.  Red is always associated 
with danger and it's kind of always known for danger everywhere. 
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• The ascending or descending order of criteria is important like probability of 
survival, etc. [min/max] but for a [non pilot] plane doesn't matter, but is confusing 
at first to make decision as an engineer (mechanical) safety came into mind first. 
• It is easier to make a quick decision when all mission options are coated the same 
(more is better).  Text for samTracking overlaps the pink area so was hard to 
distinguish.  Although this was the easiest, it helps to have numbers available 
when they are close in value. 
• It's very clear and helpful. 
• I believe it is easy to identify the route and is not confusing.  Gives the user quick 
decision-making ability. 
Any comments about the overall experiment? 
• Very interesting experiment.  The sprocket reduces the decision-making time by a 
large extent compared to the [Text] Table and Bar Chart. 
• The table decision data was the best according to me and was pretty fast and easy 
to understand.  The color coding of the bar chart was a little bit confusing though. 
• Good experiment. I would've thought the bar chart would be best. 
• I really like the sprocket idea as it gives a clear and easy visual cue by using 
volume to quantify "strength". 
• Very good test. 
• I like this experiment.  This pretty good.  I would like to participate, if such set of 
experiments are held in [the] future. 
• It's hard for me to read the bar chart.  Because the number [were crossed out???]. 
• The sprocket is the way to go!  Bar graph is not useful at all.  I believe the bar 
graph is actually a step backward from the data table. 
• I had bargained tables first and then finally [the] sprocket.  It is sometimes 
difficult to come out of state of mind that bigger is always better. 
• The bar chart was the difficult one and it took a lot of time.  [I] felt a little strain 
doing that.  The sprocket was more handy with everything pictured.  In bar chart, 
you had to come back again to the different charts when comparing routes. 
• Visual learning has always been my preferred method of learning and this kind of 
proves that. 
• Went smoothly, but you need to get a new projector without the lack of color 
option. 
• Nice work. 
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